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Abstract 
 
Social networking sites (SNSs) are an emerging channel of political mediation in Thailand for 
political figures to establish and develop their relationships with Thai citizens. Through focusing on 
the online political public relations work by candidates (and their teams) in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign, this thesis contributes a Thai perspective and experience to the 
growing literature on the use of SNSs globally in election campaigning. 
This research utilises multimodal textual analysis and interviews with Thai politicians, candidates and 
public relations personnel to explore the management of candidates’ images on Facebook via 
photographs, text and interactions, the management relationship between candidates and public 
relations personnel and citizens, the dynamics of what can be understood as ‘digital vote-canvassing 
networks’, and the various associated possibilities and challenges of using SNSs to contest for 
political power in the Thai context. 
This thesis finds that the political public relations work carried out via Facebook during the 2013 
election campaign constituted a new and complex process of managing content and of managing 
human resources and relationships. The construction of candidates’ political images integrated 
existing Thai archetypes and connotations with more global images and strategies. The publication of 
campaign content on Facebook over the entire election campaign was managed to facilitate followers’ 
interpretations of the candidates’ campaigns. Election campaigns on Facebook developed digital vote-
canvassing networks as candidates and their teams used different tactics to engage, interact with and 
manage citizens, as well as attempt to maximise the ‘spreadability’ of their content and thus extend 
their reach. As candidates campaigned on Facebook under election campaign rules not defined 
particularly for Facebook, the decentralisation of interaction among Facebook users was a major 
concern in controlling their election campaign on Facebook.  
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Glossary  
Digital vote-canvassing network: A term coined in this thesis. A digital vote-canvassing network is a 
network connecting Facebook users based on Facebook algorithms and the interaction on a 
candidate’s status update.  Digital vote-canvassing networks are established and developed as a result 
of the media affordance of Facebook in relation to the traditional vote-canvassing systems in Thai 
political culture and two-step flow communication. Vote-canvassing systems become ‘digital’ when a 
candidate’s public relations personnel act as core vote-canvassers to manage and transmit campaign 
messages on the candidate’s Facebook page on behalf of the candidate, while the candidate’s 
followers interact and spread the candidate’s campaign message to their own networks, enabling more 
SNSs users to be exposed to the campaign content. The core idea of digital vote-canvassing networks 
is to make campaign messages on SNSs reach as many SNS users as possible.  
Nakleng: A person who can be characterised brave and confident in the way he/she speaks, makes 
decision or behaves.  
Nakleng keyboard: This term can be translated as ‘keyboard warrior’, referring to someone who 
hides his real identity or uses pseudonyms in order to be express their thoughts online. In the context 
of political communication online, a ‘nakleng keyboard’ tends to give unconstructive criticism on 
other people’s SNS pages in order to challenge the SNS user’s image.  
Phakphuak: A group of people who are related based on the same interest.  
Phi nong: Elder (phi) and younger (nong) siblings. 
Phudi: A person who has a good family background and/or has good manners.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
This research sets out to explore political public relations operations on social networking sites in 
Thailand, with a particular focus on Facebook as the social networking sites platform and the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign as the context of study. This chapter provides a brief 
overview of the relevant issues on the development of using media for political communication and 
election campaigns in Thailand as well as to give a synopsis of this thesis. It begins by providing a 
short summary of politics in Thailand, Bangkokians’ voting behaviour, social problems in Bangkok, 
the role of the Bangkok governor and the background knowledge of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign in relation to the role of social networking sites. The background knowledge in this 
research also contains the main issues of election campaigning and political communication on old 
media and new media, which will be reviewed later in this chapter. Based on the issues introduced in 
this chapter, this chapter ends by outlining the objectives of this research, research questions, research 
contributions, thesis outline and research arguments.  
Brief background knowledge of Thai politics  
After the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand formally adopted constitutional rule. Since 
then, there have been nearly 20 military coups (Pavin, 2011, p.45), indicating the fragility of 
constitutional order (Connors, 2009, pp.366-368). Consequently, the achievement of political 
succession in Thailand has been through both ‘peaceful and constitutionally sanctioned transfer of 
power’ as well as nonauthoritative coups d’etat (Neher, 1992, p.585). A number of these coups fit a 
pattern which Pasuk and Baker (1998, p.328) describe as a ‘conservative reaction’ against 
constitutional rule.  
The coup in September 2006 occurred during the second term of Thaksin government. The latest coup 
was in May 2014. For some commentators these coups fit the pattern of ‘conservative reaction’ 
against an expanding democratic sphere, while for others, they are attempts to stop the emergence of a 
new populist regime based around former prime minister Thaksin that would diminish the standing of 
the royal family and the military (see Farrelly, 2013; McCargo, 2015).  
The rise of Thaksin has roots in Thailand’s economic transformation. In the mid-1980s, the economy 
in Southeast Asia including Thailand was doing well until Thailand was faced with the 1997 financial 
crisis as a result of ‘the strains of rapid transformation, magnified by exposure to the erratic behaviour 
13 
 
of the over-powerful and under-regulated world of international finance’ (Pasuk and Baker, 1998, 
p.315). Both Thais and foreigners were affected by the financial crisis. The baht value depreciated 
dramatically (Church, 2006), affecting trade and foreign investment in Thailand. Unemployment 
increased and some Thais received lower income, which led to social problems such as crime and 
poverty.  
Against this background, the businessman Thaksin rose to political power (McCargo and Ukrist, 
2005). Thaksin’s party Thai Rak Thai Party won the 2001 general election and he became the prime 
minister of Thailand. The implementation of Thaksin’s ‘populist policies’ were able to somehow 
recover the Thai economy and businesses. His policies also aimed to provide financial support 
offering low-interest loans and debt relief for farmers and sponsoring local entrepreneurs (Sripan, 
2009, p.7). The 30 baht universal health care system was also popular (ibid.).  Thaksin gained a lot of 
support from Thai people. After his first term in office, his party won the next election to form a 
majority government in 2005. Despite his popularity, opposition groups were critical about policy 
corruption, human rights abuses and control of the media (Connors, 2008). Political polarisation led to 
the coup of 2006 and Thaksin went into exile.  
The military ruled until a new election in December 2007 which was won by pro-Thaksin parties. 
Thai politics became more polarised with the anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirts (People’s Alliance for 
Democracy) or PAD, and the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts (United Front for Democracy against 
Dictatorship) or UDD amplified  their political interests and engaged in street politics. From 2006 to 
2014, there were many incidents of political violence, occupations of central Bangkok and violent 
clashes from both sides. Most dramatically, the two months protest by the Red Shirt in front of luxury 
shopping malls in central Bangkok turned into a major military crackdown against Red Shirts in May 
2010, causing property damage, an estimated 91 deaths and 1300 injuries (Dalpino, 2011, p.157). In 
2013-2014 the anti-Thaksin movement fought to bring down the Pheu Thai government, led by 
Thaksin’s sister, Yingluk. They called for the boycott of elections in February 2014 and blocked 
registration and voters (McCargo, 2015).  
In general, the Yellow Shirt protesters were mainly middle-class people who were against Thaksin’s 
government. The Yellow Shirt social movement constituted of people from various background and 
occupation, including NGO networks, the powerful state enterprise unions, old democracy activists, 
journalists, and a range of intellectuals, poets, musicians, and artist  (Pasuk and Baker, 2009, p.357).  
The Yellow Shirts criticised Thaksin as corrupt and they claimed to ‘fight for the King’ (ibid., pp.255-
256).  
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On the other hand, Red Shirt protesters have been described as coming from the lower middle classes, 
including political office holders at the district or municipal level, vote canvassers for political parties 
and people who had previously not been involved in politics such as ‘self-employed and semi-skilled 
workers, low-ranking members of the security services, and farmers holding sub-contracts to produce 
crops for agribusiness’ (McCargo, 2010, p.9). While some were fighting for democracy and social 
justice, others were more focused on Thaksin’s return. Notably, the Red Shirts became associated 
with the pro-Thaksin parties, while the Yellow Shirts were identified with the Democrat Party. 
It might be thought that this conflict was reflected in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign, and that this would have impacted greatly on the use of social networking sites in the 
campaign. This was not the case. The Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt social movements were not active 
during the Bangkok election campaign.   This reflected the fact that after the pro-Thaksin party, Phue 
Thai party, won the 2011 elections and formed government, there was relative peace as both sides 
returned to institutional and parliamentary contest. During the gubernatorial election campaign, the 
governing Phue Thai Party government assisted its candidate, while the candidate from Democrat 
Party who had won the Bangkok governorship in 2004, 2008 and 2009, hoped to win another term. 
Although political party based issues on implementing policies were referenced by the candidates and 
political parties throughout the election campaign, the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign 
was free from violence and aggressive uses of language on political attacks, because it was essentially 
an election about governing Bangkok, not a referendum on the political conflict. The Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign focused mainly on the social and economic problems in Bangkok, 
rather than the contestation of power among national politicians, the drafting and proposal of 
referendum or even the political movement of Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt protesters. However, 
political conflicts and demonstrations occurred once again in late 2013 by Thais who were against the 
proposal of amnesty law by the Yingluck Government and Phue Thai Party, which led to the dissolve 
of parliament in December 2013, an unsuccessful general election on 4
th
 February 2014 and military 
coup on 21 May 2014 (McCargo, 2015).  
As a result of the ongoing political crisis in Thailand, some readers may expect a detailed treatment of 
democracy, power and ideology in this thesis. However, as this thesis is predominantly interested in 
political public relations of the management of election campaigning and political communication on 
social networking sites in Thailand, the concepts of democracy, power and ideology are only 
occasionally referred in this thesis, used with the intention to touch on the discussion on followers’ 
ideological perception of candidates’ images and information posted on candidate’s Facebook page 
during the candidates’ contestation of power during election campaigning on Facebook (Chapter 4 
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and Chapter 5), the way in which the emergence of new media is decentralising the control of political 
communication within the atmosphere of deliberative democracy (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). As this 
thesis focuses specifically on the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign and the managerial 
side of operation on political public relations elements during the election campaign on social 
networking sites, analysis and discussion in this thesis does not predominantly contribute to the 
concept power, ideology and democracy. However, the background knowledge given about the 
national politics and contemporary social movements in Thailand gives indications on the contrasting 
approach that candidates of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign had taken to proceed 
with their campaign. To gain a better understanding the role of Bangkok governor in relation to 
Bangkokians and the capital, the next part contextualise the social problems and voting behaviour of 
Bangkokians, with reference to the voting behaviour of non-Bangkokians.  
Bangkok Metropolis: governor, people and social problems  
Unlike the seventy-six provinces of Thailand Bangkok or Krung Thep Maha Nakhon is a special 
administrative region in Thailand, with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration in authority 
presided over by an elected governor. In Thailand, other provincial governors are centrally appointed 
by the Ministry of Interior.  The capital is made up of fifty districts. The official name of Bangkok in 
Thai (Krung Thep Maha Nakhon) was shortened from the full name ‘Krung Thep Maha Nakhon 
Amon Rattanakosin Mahinthara Yutthaya Mahadilok Phop Noppharat Ratchathani Burirom 
Udomratchaniwet Mahasathan Amon Phiman Awatan Sathit Sakkathattiya Witsanukam Prasit’, 
which has been officially recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records as the longest place name 
in the world (Simons, 2014). The full name of Bangkok in Thai is composed from the Pali and 
Sanskrit languages, with meaning ‘The magnificent city of angels, supreme unconquerable city of the 
great immortal gods, the grand regal capital of nine noble gems, the pleasant metropolis with plenty 
of royal palaces, divine home of the godly incarnations, built by the god Viśwákarman as commanded 
by Indra’ (ibid.). The full name of the capital is used as the lyrics of a song which is commonly 
played on television programmes related to Bangkok issues or during Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaigns.  
About 5.6 million people (8.8.% of the Thai population) lived in Bangkok in 2012 (“รายงานสถิติจ านวน
ประชากร และบา้น ทัว่ประเทศ และรายจงัหวดั ณ เดือน ธนัวาคม พ.ศ. 2555 [Report of demographic and homes across the 
country and province, as of December 2012],” n.d.) (This figure is based on the number of households 
and Bangkokians registered, which is an underestimate of the actual number of people living in 
Bangkok)ใ The Bangkok gubernatorial election is an important election at both local and national 
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levels. Bangkokians elect their governor every four years. Voters who are eligible to vote in the 
Bangkok gubernatorial election must be Thai by nationality, aged 18 and above, and have a house 
registered in Bangkok at least one year before the election.
1
 Thais who move from provinces outside 
Bangkok have the opportunity to vote if they meet the three conditions.  
According to the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Act, 1985, Section 49,  part of the Bangkok 
governor’s power is to set policies and manage the Bangkok Metropolis, appoint and allocate human 
resources to coordinate work relating to Bangkok Metropolis.
2
 Surapongse (2002) notes that as a 
result, the image of candidates in Bangkok gubernatorial elections is focused on the candidate, 
because not every candidate is nominated by a political party; however, the image of candidates in 
general elections is constructed according to the image of her/his political party or the way the 
political party wants the candidate to project her/his image (p.43). On the other hand, candidates in 
Bangkok gubernatorial elections do not have to be nominated by a political party to register as 
candidates. Independent candidates can advocate administration and the implementation of policy in a 
way to make Bangkok Metropolis free from national politics. Thus, Bangkok gubernatorial elections 
are different from general elections. 
The Bangkok gubernatorial election is seen as an election for city-based Thais, who are thought to be 
rational and have certain kind of voting behaviour, to elect their governor. Thai political discourse 
distinguishes city-based people (คนเมือง) from simple country folk (คนบ้านนอก) according to the place 
they come from and the differences in values and tastes between the two groups of people (Askew, 
2002, p.1). Sometimes the term country folk (คนบ้านนอก) is used pejoratively and is equivalent to 
country ‘hicks’. The middle-class Thais are ranked as moderately well-off between the economic elite 
and ordinary people struggling to make a living. This section of the Thai population does various jobs 
such as civil servants in semi-government authorities (electricity, telephone and postal company), 
self-employed small business owners, tradesmen, technicians and white collar works in private 
companies and they value education, social respectability, self-improvement, security and the 
environment that they are living in (ibid., pp.171-176). The different sectors that city-based Thais 
                                                             
1
 Cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้่าราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทติยท์ี่ 3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.).  
2
 (“พระราชบญัญตัิ ระเบียบบริหารราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร พ.ศ.๒๕๒๘ [Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Act Year 1985],” n.d.) 
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work in indicate how candidates of Bangkok gubernatorial election would formulate policy to propose 
in Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign.  
There are differences in political views on democracy among Thais living in rural and urban areas too. 
Anek (1996) analyses that middle-class Thais perceive themselves as people who can critically 
evaluate candidates’ policies based on the impact that they will have on the country as a whole, and 
their voting preferences are likely to be based on candidates who are ‘honest and capable persons to 
serve as lawmakers and political executives’, which is different from how rural people vote for 
candidates that voters could gain ‘parochial and personal benefits’ from (p.221). Furthermore, 
LoGerfo (1996) surveyed the different attitudes that Bangkokian and rural Northern Thais have 
toward democracy and found that Bangkok respondents were more critical of the government 
performance at that time, in comparison to Northern Thais, who give importance to tangible benefits 
that they could gain from candidates  (p.918).  
With a more updated analysis Thai people’s political views, Suchit (2009) analyses that in the context 
of Thailand’s 2007 constitution, urban middle-class Thais are still concerned with corruption among 
politicians and government officials as urban middle-class Thais want a democracy with 
‘transparency, efficiency and quality’ (p.93), while rural voters prefer to vote based on the policies 
that they could benefit from. But in a more recent analysis, Anyarat (2010) claims that in the 2005 
general election, it is too simplistic to generalise that rural Thais are still associated with the patronage 
system and that they are money-oriented, while urban Thais are not. Furthermore Stithorn (2012) 
concludes that political attitudes for rural and urban Thais have changed over the last decade as the 
level of education and social-economic status did not have a direct influence on Thai people’s interest 
and engagement in political issues, which means that Thais who are less educated were not necessary 
less interested in Thai political issues. Such knowledge gives further indications that in Bangkok 
gubernatorial election, Bangkokians are likely to be critical about the dishonesty of candidates and the 
policies that candidates propose although voters might seek for the benefits that they could gain from 
the policies or the potential governor. The issues that candidates raised in during election campaign 
could therefore be associated with voters’ voting behaviour and the social problems that they face.  
Bangkok faces various social problems such as living conditions, economic issues, the informal 
economy, pollution, transportation, communication technology, education, healthcare, and security. 
The ‘boom’ of the Thai economy in the second half of the 19th century had attracted a few million 
villagers to move to Bangkok, which has changed the culture of the city (Pasuk and Baker, 1998, 
p.180). The capital has provided many employment opportunities for commuters to work in Bangkok 
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as the city offers jobs and higher income (Daradirek and Rosechongporn, 2004). In addition to the 
various employment opportunities in the city, villagers earn a living in Bangkok by setting up as food 
vendors selling local Thai food (Eckardt, 1999, p.69-76), which is part of what Askew (2002) refers 
as the ‘informal economy’ (p.75).  
Skyscrapers can be seen throughout the city centre and the building of condominiums has brought a 
change to Bangkokians’ lifestyle. However, there are working-class Thais who moved from villages 
and live in slums or ‘crowded communities’ in Bangkok as they settle down informally (Askew, 2002, 
p.79). Slum dwellers aim to have a sufficient income to survive (ibid., pp.141-143).  Problems 
associated with such communities include water and sanitation, drugs, poor health care and low 
standards of living, and residents of slums are at risk of homelessness (Eckardt, 1999, p.118).  
The use of public transportation is also common for locals and tourists to get around in the capital. 
The Bangkok Transit System (BTS) sky-train reaches central, southern and northern Bangkok as well 
as Thon Buri, while the Metropolitan Rapid Transit (MRT) underground train currently has three 
interchange stations with the BTS sky-train, and covers central and northern Bangkok. Other public 
transportation such as buses is accessible throughout the capital while taxis and tuk-tuk are available 
for travel to areas which public transportation does not serve. Motorbike-taxis are another solution to 
moving around in Bangkok during peak hours, but people use such services at their risk (Eckardt, 
1999, pp.95-100).  
Flooding is a severe seasonal problem. Many districts of the capital were submerged when the Great 
Flood hit the capital in 2011 (Montira, 2013). Political conflict occurred between the Bangkok 
Governor and the central government including the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
concerning flood management (Suchart, 2012). The social media Twitter became a significant 
platform for disseminating emergency and disaster information during the 2011 flood (Alisa, 
Choochart, Jaruwat, and Sarawoot, 2012).  
The development and allocation of resources in the capital are dependent on the person who holds the 
power to govern the capital. The stated responsibilities of the Bangkok governor and the existing 
social problems in Bangkok suggest that a candidate in the Bangkok gubernatorial election would 
propose policies reflecting their ability to tackle problems in Bangkok to fulfil these responsibilities. 
The suitability of a candidate could be determined by the political party that nominated them, the 
candidate’s biography, previous work experience, personality, problem-solving skills, decision-
making competence and the ability to work and deal with political elites at the national level. The 
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Bangkok gubernatorial election is, therefore, an important election at a local and national level as the 
result of the election determines the person who will undertake the roles to coordinate work in 
Bangkok, solve social problems, and work with other political elites in Thailand to improve the 
standard of living in Bangkok.  
Background knowledge on the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign  
After Mom Rajawongse Sukhumbhand Paribatra (M.R. Sukhumbhand) resigned as the 15
th
 Bangkok 
governor on 9 January 2013, the Election Commission was required to hold the next Bangkok 
gubernatorial election within 60 days.
3
 25 candidates registered for the election. A series of opinion 
polls predicted that Police General Doctor Pongsapat Pongcharoen (Pongsapat), one of the main rivals 
from the Pheu Thai Party was likely to win the election, but the actual result was that M.R. 
Sukhumbhand from the Democrat Party won. In a neck-and-neck competition, M.R. Sukhumbhand 
won 46.26 % of the vote and Pongsapat 39.69 % (Appendix 1).  
The voter turnout for the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election was 63.98% (Saksith, 2013), the 
highest voter turnout in a Bangkok gubernatorial election.
4
 Since the implementation of compulsory 
voting in Thailand in 1997, voting has been made a duty for eligible voters (“Constitution of Kingdom 
of Thailand 1997”). This law can arguably improve democratic quality and avoid political abuse 
(Birch, 2009), which is also a signal of political reformation, improving the qualities of 
parliamentarians and the management of the nation (Murray, 1998). Before mandatory voting laws 
were passed, voter turnout for Bangkok elections was about 40 percent as Bangkokians who did not 
turnout for elections did not trust or had no hope for politics and politicians as they see no 
improvements (Suchit, 1996, p.195). As a result of this law, it could be said that the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election has become an even more important election, making the election campaign an 
important period for Bangkokians to know more about the candidates.  
The 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was another competitive election that managed to 
draw significant attention from both the media and voters. As the media and voters sought to know 
the candidates’ approach to the campaign, new candidates for the election were persuading voters for 
a change in the Bangkok governor and administration of Bangkok. The controversial scandals that 
                                                             
3
 Cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้่าราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทิตยท์ี ่ 3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.). 
4
 Cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้่าราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทิตยท์ี ่ 3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.).  
20 
 
M.R. Sukhumbhand faced in the management of 2011 ‘Great Flood’ in Bangkok (Thitinan, n.d.) and 
the delay in completing the construction of a futsal stadium in 2012 raised awareness of the need for 
the Bangkok governor to handle crises efficiently and coordinate work with the Thai government 
(S.Bangkunprom, 2012). Thus, there were doubts about the suitability of the Democrat Party’s 
nomination of M.R. Sukhumbhand to take up the role of Bangkok governor for another term. 
Out of the ten Bangkok gubernatorial elections held between 1975 and 2013, candidates from the 
Democrat Party won five times while the remaining elections were won by candidates from other 
political parties or independent candidates.
5
 Apirak Kosayodhin’s resignation in his second term as 
Bangkok Governor in 2008 led to a gubernatorial election in early 2009, won by M.R. Sukhumbhand, 
who was re-elected in 2013, thus making a trend of the Democrat Party winning in four consecutive 
Bangkok gubernatorial elections. Such voting pattern indicates Bangkokians’ political culture of 
being associated with the Democrat Party.  
The fundamental question in the 2013 election was whether the winning trend of the Democrat Party 
in Bangkok gubernatorial elections since 2004 would be broken or whether the candidate nominated 
by the Democrat Party would be allowed to hold the position as Bangkok governor for another term. 
The high level of competitiveness during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was 
reflected in the different approaches and policies used by candidates. As a veteran of elections, M.R. 
Sukhumbhand saw the importance of continuing to develop and implement policies which he had 
supported since the 2009 election, while Pongsapat characterised his campaign and policies under the 
slogan of ‘to work with government seamlessly’ and campaigned on uniting the administration of the 
capital with the central government. Although Pongsapat had a police background that was not a 
familiar image in Bangkok gubernatorial elections, the Pheu Thai Party still strived to compete in the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election after Democrat Party had dominated Bangkok for the past 
decade. With the policies proposed in Pongsapat’s campaign, there was a clear difference on how the 
two core candidates attempted to build relationships with voters to gain their support. Independent 
candidates tried to persuade voters about the benefits of freeing Bangkok from political party-based 
issues.  
                                                             
5
  Cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้่าราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทิตยท์ี่ 3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.). 
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The use of social networking sites (SNSs) in election campaigns in Thailand was first seen during the 
2008 Bangkok gubernatorial election, where Apirak Kosayodhin campaigned for a second term as 
Bangkok Governor and saw the potential in using Hi5 as part of his campaign to reach out to voters in 
the online community at nearly no expense, even though SNSs were ‘new’ in Thailand and the 
number of citizens are online at the time of the election campaign was limited (cited in Russell, 2011). 
The increase in popularity in Thailand of other SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter led to the 
significant use of both of these platforms by both contenders in the 2011 general election, the Pheu 
Thai Party and Democrat Party. 12 out of 40 political parties in Thailand had Facebook pages during 
the 2011 general election campaign (Isriya, 2012). In the most recent Bangkok gubernatorial election 
on 3 March 2013, candidates made substantial use of SNSs in the election campaign; this research 
found that 16 out of 25 candidates had a Facebook account. According to Zocial inc, in 2013 there 
were 18 million Thai users of Facebook, which is the SNS with the highest number of users in 
comparison to other SNSs (cited in Millward, 2013) and in 2015, this figure was almost doubled 
(cited in Monlamai, 2015). 
Digital divide in Thailand means there is a barrier of entry for the majority of Thais to access political 
communication. Thus, online content on the internet is not consumed by all of the Thai population as 
not all Thais have access to the internet. The most recent Household Survey on Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) conducted by National Statistical Office (NSO) revealed that Thai 
people’s use of computers, the internet and mobile phones has gradually increased from 2008 to 2012, 
with Bangkok having the highest percentage access to ICT compared to other regions in Thailand 
(“Executive Summary,” 2013). Inequality in accessing online technology is what Van Dijk (2006) 
refers as the ‘digital divide.’ Van Dijk’s suggestions on the causes of the digital divide include the 
lack of motivation to use online technology, lack of financial resources to buy a computer and internet 
access, lack of operational skills, information skills or strategic skills and lack of opportunity, 
obligation, time or effort to use digital technology (pp.179-183). An empirical study of internet cafes 
in Bangkok, conducted by Hirata (2013), acknowledges that for people who live in Bangkok and 
cannot afford to buy computers or do not have operation skills and information skills to use computers 
or the internet, the availability of internet cafes offers services and assists customers to communicate 
on ICT, which reduces the digital divide (pp.287-289). The widespread availability of digital cafes 
means that the digital divide is partly overcome.  
There were 8.6 million Facebook users in Bangkok in the year before the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign, which made  the capital  had  the highest number of Facebook users in the world 
in 2012, followed by Jakarta and Istanbul (“Bangkok ranked top highest numbers of Facebook users 
22 
 
in the world,” n.d., “Top 10 Biggest Facebook Cities,” 2012). It must be noted here that the Facebook 
penetration rate in Bangkok is higher than the underestimated population in Bangkok (5.6 million) 
because this figure is recorded according to the internet protocol address (IP address), which in 
Thailand, the IP addresses of users are not clearly identified in different provinces. Thus, no matter 
which province some Thai Facebook user is active in, the user would be identified as using Facebook 
in Bangkok (“กรุงเทพเป็นเมืองท่ีมีผูใ้ช ้Facebook มากเป็นอนัดบั 1 ของโลก [Bangkok is the city that has the 
highest Facebook users in the world],” n.d.). Nevertheless, such record of Facebook penetration rate 
still increases the significance and interest of studying the use of SNSs during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign, which draws the attention on the way in which candidates of the 
election would manage their Facebook page to enhance their campaign reach to different Bangkokian 
Facebook users during the election campaign.  
In 2015, slightly over half of Bangkok population has access to computer and internet, which is higher 
compared to other regions in Thailand (บทสรุปส าหรับผูบ้ริหาร การมีการใชเ้ทคโนโลยีสารสนเทศและการส่ือสารในครัวเรือน พ.ศ. 
2558 [Summary for manager: the use of information and communications technology in the 
household year 2015 ], n.d.). Most Thais who use Facebook are educated, city-based and ranged from 
middle to upper classes (Macan-Markar, 2010),  indicating the digital divide in Thailand. Although it 
was noted that the rural and lower-class Red Shirt protesters using community radio and internet radio 
(Ubonrat Siryuvasuk cited in Macan-Markar, 2010), Red Shirt protest leaders, politicians of Thai Rak 
Thai and Phue Thai Party, and political activists of the pro-Thaksin have been active on SNSs as 
additional channel of political communication, which made political content on SNSs pages in 
Thailand reflect  critical political opinion from users of different political ideologies.  
Candidates’ use of SNSs in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was a development in 
how Thai candidates communicated their policies to voters, constructed their images and interacted 
with voters. M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat had Facebook, Twitter, Instagram accounts and 
YouTube channels as their platforms of communication to publish campaign information and to reach 
out to voters with preferences for different social networks. Even television channels such as The 
Nation Channel took an interest in candidates’ use of social media in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign, by organising and facilitating a discussion about candidates’ experiences of using 
social media on 16 February 2013.
6
 The traditional print media, such as election billboards and 
                                                             
6
 The author attended the social media forum organised by The Nation Channel on 16 February 2013 
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brochures, included SNS logos and candidates’ usernames as part of their identity, to raise awareness 
among voters about the candidates’ use of SNSs and also encourage more voters who were SNS users 
on different networks to connect with the candidates’ campaigns on SNSs.  
Followers connecting to candidates’ social networks are diversified and not all followers are 
necessarily eligible voters. According to Teerada and Combs (2014), the number of followers 
connected to candidate’s SNS page and the level of interaction on SNSs cannot predict the number of 
votes for each candidate (p.168) – particularly as people may ‘like’ candidates they do not support so 
they can criticise them. Swing voters have been another element in Bangkok’s political culture. The 
discrepancy between the results of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election and predictions of polls 
conducted during the election campaign caused confusion among the public. Boonlert (2015b) 
explained that the main element of the election was voters who had not decided who to vote at the 
early stage of the election campaign. The percentage of these voters declined based on overall trends 
revealed by the results of the polls conducted by the Bangkok University and National Institute of 
Development Administration (NIDA) polls (ibid.). Consequently, Boonlert comments that undecided 
voters remain the main challenge in maximising the accuracy of poll results, and the results of polls 
published by the media throughout the election campaign can have an impact on voters’ final decision.  
Each candidate’s campaign required management of human resources and campaign content so that 
candidates could clearly communicate their campaign message to voters and tailor their campaign 
content to Bangkokians’ voting behaviour, and demonstrate that the candidate has the potential to take 
the role of Bangkok governor. The limited amount of time available to accomplish the candidate’s 
goals entailed an efficient campaign operation to allow candidates to construct their image and 
establish a relationship with voters. How each candidate campaigned and what media each candidate 
used could also determine the image that they created with voters, the relationship established 
between the candidate and citizens, and the ability of the candidate’s campaign to reach voters. 
Factors of political communication and election campaigning in Thailand  
Before the emergence of SNSs, political communication and election campaigning in Thailand used 
different media and channels of communication to allow Thai political figures to construct their image 
and establish a relationship with voters. Surin and McCargo (1997) outline the different tactics that 
candidates use in a Thai election campaign, which include the issuing of name cards or calendars that 
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contain the candidate’s photograph, brochures that contain the candidate’s policies and slogans, 
billboards showing the candidate, distribution of cassette tape recordings of campaign speeches and 
door-to-door campaigning (p.137). Oranong and Rosechongporn (2009) conclude that the factors that 
determine local Thai politicians’ choice of communication channel, a few of these factors include 
politicians’ budget, politicians’ intention in communication, features of the media platform, and target 
audience (p.42).  
Image construction is a fundamental element in Thai election. Sombat (1993) compares the idea of 
image construction to ‘play-acting’ (เลน่ละคร), whereby vote-canvassers mobilise voters to campaign 
speech sites, prepare garlands for voters to give to candidates and organise voters to put up posters to 
show their support (p.99). Establishing a candidate’s image is part of winning an election as a 
candidate’s image helps voters to recognise the candidate and her/his campaign, and recall the 
candidate when they cast their vote (Surapongse, 2002). Also, Nanthana (2006) proposes that 
candidates in an election campaign are ‘public figures’ and people often know them by the ‘image’ 
they establish in public, instead of who they are (p.94).  
Sombat (1993) mentions that background information on the candidate, such as the education 
institution presented in the candidate’s literature, is intended to target voters who are connected to the 
same institution as well as to confer prestige on the candidate (p.95). Candidates can construct an 
image by showing their speaking skills in delivering entertaining and engaging campaign speeches, 
and relating problems in a particular community to the candidate’s policy, as this shows the candidate 
have an amicable and approachable personality (ibid., pp.98-110). Visiting commercial and business 
areas to meet voters allows candidates to have conversations with voters, when candidates might be 
able to gain support from swing voters (ibid., p.103). Also, according to Surapongse (2002), face-to-
face communication and door-to-door home visits allow candidates to interact with voters, giving an 
opportunity for candidates to show that they are determined in competing in the election and for 
voters to know more about the candidates (pp.171-172).   
Thai political figures tend to establish ‘phi nong’（พ่ีนอ้ง）relationships with voters during election 
campaigns. The literal meaning of phi nong is elder and younger sibling respectively. However, phi 
nong is also used to address people who are not siblings, but are somehow closely related and 
respected by the individual. As a result, it is common that during Thai election campaigns, political 
figures attempt to construct a ‘close’ relationship between politicians and voters and establish a 
positive rapport with voters, reflecting their supposedly friendly relationship (Sanit, 1994, pp.169-
170).  
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Different tactics have been used in billboards as candidates aim to make their image distinct during 
the election campaigns. Veera (2003) comments that in the 1985 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign, Chamlong Srimuang’s campaign was uniquely identifiable as he used low-cost bamboo 
material in his campaign advertisements while his competitors spent large sums of money on huge 
billboards (pp.282-285). In a study of the 1992 general election campaign in Thailand, Sombat (1993) 
suggests that the size and quality of billboards matter as this reflects upon a candidate’s intention in 
competing in the election (pp.91-97). Also, the content varies according to the different phases of 
election campaigns. As the election campaign proceeds, candidates design their posters and name 
cards with an emphasis on the candidate’s number to ensure that voters recognise their candidate’s 
number on the day of the election, indicating the significance of candidate numbers in Thai elections 
(ibid., pp.91-97). The result of polls conducted during the election campaign and the news reports 
about it can determine the actions that candidates might want to take in the final phase of an election 
(ibid., p.107). 
The selection of photographs and information presented on candidate’s billboards also matters. 
Gingthong (2003) proposes that the use of photographs and information on the candidate’s family 
background, education and work experience on billboards in the 2000 Bangkok Senate election 
reflected the candidates’ suitability for the position. Another eye-catching design of billboards was the 
‘Vote No’ campaign (see Appendix 2) which launched an attack to candidates and political parties 
who self-portrayed their image during in the 2011 general election in Thailand. Jones (2014) analysed 
the campaign for its use of animal caricatures and metaphorical language to symbolise Thai 
politicians as lacking a basic understanding of Buddhist Dharma. As a result of years of political 
instability, the ‘Vote No’ campaign used  billboards during the 2011 general election in Thailand  and 
conveyed the message, ‘Don’t Let the Animals enter Parliament’;  the  images of monkeys, buffalos 
and dogs was striking.  The design and information placed on these billboards was part of a traditional 
campaign medium (the billboard) but it reflected a new feeling among Yellow Shirts against allegedly 
corrupt politicians, and appeared in the form of a meme. With the rise of SNS as a new way of 
campaigning, citizens who are exposed to political advertisements would be motivated to use news 
media and social networks more effectively including memes (Cho, 2008, p.443), which means there 
could be an intensified relationship between campaigning on new media and old media.  
In short, the literature has noted that the image construction of Thai political candidates is based on a 
visual image, the information that they present about themselves and the medium that they use to 
communicate with voters. This enables voters to recognise candidate’s appearance, personality, and 
the relationship between the candidate voters. As a result, each channel of communication requires 
26 
 
careful selection of medium to construct their image and selection of content to be sent to citizens to 
fulfil the politicians’ intention in communicating.  
Political economy of Thai media and changes in media consumption in Thailand  
With the rise of the internet, there has been a major transformation in how Thai politicians, citizens 
and journalists disseminate political information or express their political views. As for young people 
in different regions in Thailand, Pimonpan and Pirongrong (2013) concluded that young people in 
Thailand use the internet to access political information as additional source of information when 
mainstream media such as television does not meet young people’s requirement, while Smith and 
Shuo (2014) found that more than half of the respondents, who are university students in Bangkok, 
receive news from social media (p.202). In terms of interacting about political issues, most university 
students talk about politics with friends and family offline more than doing it online (ibid), perhaps 
reflecting caution. Even so, for those with access to digital technology, the internet has been another 
platform for Thais to express their political thoughts, co-existing with traditional media. This section 
gives an overview of the political news consumption in Thailand and discusses briefly how new 
media are challenging political communication. Firstly, this part looks at the issues of political 
communication and the political economy in the old media or mainstream media in Thailand. Then, 
this part moves on to review how the decentralisation of political communication on new media, 
particularly SNSs, have been impacting on the way Thai people consume and discuss about political 
issues.  
In the past, both political organisations and citizens have had to rely on the mass media as the means 
of political communication. The lack of personal meeting between politicians and citizens allowed the 
media to act as the mediator of messages between both parties to inform about any significant 
political issues that occur on each side (Sathiian, 2008). McNair (2011) outlines the roles of the media 
in the democratic process as: 1. media must ‘inform’ citizens on issues around them; 2. media must 
‘educate’ citizens by explaining and highlighting ‘facts’; 3. media must provide a space for public 
political discourse, facilitate ‘the formation of public opinion’ and let the public know about the 
public opinions formulated; 4. media’s role is to give publicity to government and political parties; 5. 
media provide a space for the ‘advocacy of political viewpoints’ (pp.18-20). The roles of media in 
Thailand have been limited in fulfilling these roles due to regulation, political ties and ownership in 
different channels. However, the increase in choice to access different channels of political 
communication in Thailand, through both new media and old media, has spread the avenues of 
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political communication and raises the question on who owns the media in Thailand, how the media 
are regulated and to what extent the media in Thailand are free.  
Based on the question on who owns the media in Thailand, this depends on which type of media or 
channel one is asking about. The mainstream media consumption in Thailand includes television, 
radio and newspaper, where ownership is distributed among the state, military and private sector, 
which means that political messages used to be mainly dominated by the these elites that centralised 
the distribution of political news (Kavi, 2002). Political information on television are the main source 
of political communication in Thailand (Nalinee and Brown, 2006; Pimonpan and Pirongrong, 2013). 
The main channels of television in Thailand is owned by four government bodies which are the Public 
Relations Department, the Thai Public Broadcasting Service, Mass Communication Organization of 
Thailand (MCOT) and the Thai Royal Army (“Thailand: Freedom of the press 2013,” n.d.). There 
are over 700 radio stations in Thailand registered with National Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) (established in 2010) and they are owned by the 
government and military (ibid). According to Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, radio stations in Thailand are 
funded by local entrepreneurs, local businesses, community donations and the military (cited in “BBG 
Indonesia and Thailand Strategic Review: Expert Panel Notes,” 2011). Newspapers in Thailand are 
privately owned and usually are family business, with political ties use to influence journalists on how 
to frame certain political issues (McCargo, 2003). The profits of mainstream media such as Thairath 
newspapers, are mainly from advertisements rather than the sales of the newspaper copies (McCargo, 
2012, p.205). Satellite TV, such as ASTV channel, owned by one of the core Yellow Shirt protest 
leaders, Sondhi Limthongkul, have also been alternative channel of political communication for Thais 
to receive political news. Satellite TV are normally free from government interference, which means 
that protesters, leaders and interest groups have their own platform of communication to broadcast 
their movement, political opinions, amplifying their own extreme political views and criticism of 
politicians that they are against (Isriya, 2012; McCargo, 2009; Pravit & Jiranan, 2010). 
According to the website ‘Freedom House’, the overall press status in Thai media had not been free 
since 2013 due to a harder enforcement of lèse-majesté law in the country on both new media and old 
media, regardless on how the media were ‘partly free’ during the expansion of media coverage during 
the 2011 general election (“Thailand: Freedom of the press 2012,” n.d., “Thailand: Freedom of the 
press 2013,” n.d.). The limitation of press freedom is due to the broadcasting and telecommunication 
industries being regulated by the NBTC, whereby the commissioners include a high-ranking police 
officer and top military officials, raising concerns on the limited independence of media content in the 
two industries (ibid).  
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News production on television in Thailand has been changing from straight reportage to discussion, 
with some news anchors telling the audience how different newspapers in Thailand published about 
the top stories, saving time and effort for millions of Thais to get a copy and read the newspaper 
(McCargo, 2012, p.205). With the digital terrestrial television aiming to provide more quality and 
variety of news and entertainments programmes for television audiences since 2014 (Boonlert, 2015a), 
Thais have more channels to receive political news. But recently content with regards to local and 
national politics have been particularly sensitive due to the contemporary political division. Although 
the website ‘Thai Journalists Association’ states that the journalists’ associations in Thailand such as 
Thai Journalists Association (TJA) was established to promote press freedom in Thailand and support 
the members of the press, researchers have acknowledged that Thai journalists tend to face political 
interference, pressure and attacks, particularly on media companies which were politicians or 
demonstrators (Carthew, 2010; McCargo, 2009, 2003; Ockey, 2007; Ubonrat, 2013). Hathaichanok 
(2011) argues that Thai journalists on television channels 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and Thai TV and cable TV 
channels have been careful about what they report and have paid attention to the language that they 
select for their reports in order to avoid any risk of being attacked verbally or physically (p.243). But 
the different approaches that Thai media have taken to set the agenda and frame the same news 
indicates that journalistic bias can occur, and the interests of the television stations have to be 
protected (ibid).  
The media and the Thai government have also been critical of each other’s work over the last one to 
two decades. During the political instability of the 1990s, the media, including television journalists, 
critically examined and monitored political issues by interviewing politicians in front of Government 
House for the interest of Thai urban residents (Pasuk and Baker, 1998, pp.249-250). Print media in 
Thailand have shown attempts to report political crises to achieve political change in the 1992 mass 
protests in Thailand (McCargo, 2003, p.23). Another interesting finding is that the majority of the 
Bangkok respondent agreed that the newspapers have the right to publish criticism on the government 
(LoGerfo, 1996).  
Political power matters in political news production. It seems common for individual Thai politicians 
to try to approach newspaper editors and columnists as politicians rely heavily on the media and 
compete among themselves to get media attention (McCargo, 2003). Some commentators have argued 
that  elements of the media, especially state and government dependent media,  shifted from being 
‘watchdogs’ (สนุขัเฝา้บ้าน) to ‘lapdogs’ (สนุขัว่านอนสอนง่าย) during the Thaksin government  (Thepchai, 
2005, p.193). Thepchai argues that the purpose of government regulation of the media is to prevent 
society from knowing the true information (p.199). Therefore, there are doubts about the reliability of 
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political news in the mainstream media as Thaksin tried to intervene in news production, preventing 
the media from being critical of Thai politicians’ image and performance. (ibid., 2005, p.201). Such 
issues have led to pressure and dismissals of editors and reporters who have been critical of the 
Thaksin government (Ubonrat, 2013). Critics have asserted that Thaksin showed an unwillingness to 
tolerate criticism (Ockey, 2007). Also, there is an information gap between rural and urban area in 
Thailand as Jäger (2012) analyses that the urban middle-class Thais did not have positive impression 
on Thaksin Government due to negative news reports made about Thaksin, which these reports were 
less accessible on television in rural areas. Such differences mean that Thai people who live in 
different location experience different level of political intervention on media. Also, during military 
coups, Thais experience greater media control.  
Communication between Thai prime minister and Thais begun to be ‘direct’ when Thaksin was the 
prime minister in 2001. His weekly radio programme enabled him to directly and personally 
communicate with Thais based on the actions that his government was taking to implement policies, 
demanding for trust to stay in power and constructing an approachable image of the prime minister 
casually speaking to the citizens (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005). When Abhisit was the prime ministers, 
his weekly radio programme was persuading Thais to be confident with his government dealing with 
political conciliation during the Red Shirt social movement in 2010, attempting to establish a closer 
relationship between the prime minister and Thais (Nattawee and Patchanee, 2011). However, with 
the rise of the internet, political figures own their own SNSs page. Such direct political 
communication occurred between the prime minister and Thais, who are connected to the prime 
minister SNSs network, in an interactive way, allowing the prime minister to gain questions and 
feedback, which is a development of political communication in Thailand.  
Political communication online can also develop deliberative democracy. Pitch (2002) claims that 
online debates and discussions, which might be seen as a source of deliberative democracy, are not 
representative of all Thais, because online discussions involved only urban middle-class Thais who 
have access to the internet (p.164). John Rawls (1999), cited in Crocker (2008, p.309), proposes that 
deliberative democracy is ‘the idea of deliberation itself. When citizens deliberate, they exchange 
views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that 
their political opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or nonpolitical interests. 
It is at this point that public reason is crucial, for it characterizes such citizens’ reasoning concerning 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.’ Crocker proposes that the overall idea of 
deliberative democracy aims to solve ‘concrete problems’ or to have plans for to solve particular 
issues, and the deliberation aims for people to have a ‘fair way’ to negotiate and agree on decisions. 
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Crocker adds that being fair means that people are treated with respect by other members and they 
express their opinions and contribute to the agreement (pp.310-311).  
Thai politicians have been using SNSs to communicate directly with citizens (Unyarat, 2011; Isriya, 
2012), which led  to the decentralisation of political communication, making the production, 
distribution and consumption of political content on new media different from mainstream media in 
Thailand. Contemporary political crises in Thailand have also motivated Thai internet users to gain 
rapid updates on political situations from the internet, particularly SNSs (Nuchada and Vikanda, 2012; 
Carthew, 2010). By having their own channel of communication through SNSs, top Thai politicians 
such as Abhisit Vejjajiva, Thaksin Shinawatra and Korn Chatikavanij and political social movement 
groups such as the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts have used SNSs to clearly present their political ideas, 
policies and ideologies, and mobilise supporters (Unyarat, 2011). Individual SNSs users regulate their 
own SNSs page and control the information on the particular SNSs page. However, as Thais used the 
internet to express their political views, there are critical political views posted online as a result of 
political division (Aksarapaak, 2013; Sripan, 2009).  
But like the mainstream media, the government has tried to regulate online media. Thousands of 
websites have been blocked and internet users have been arrested as regulating online media is done 
with the enforcement of the Computer Crime Act 2007 (cited in Chalisa, 2012; Isriya, 2012), as will 
be further described in Chapter 2. Online regulation also occur among individual SNS users as they 
can moderate the comments and their network by deleting the content or people connecting to their 
networks (Kent, 2010). For one reason, this might be done to compile with the Computer Crime Act 
2007. For another reason, filtering comments might be done for individual interest such as image 
management and preventing the spread of misleading information. Thus, the regulation of new media 
is done by both authority and the individual users in order to control the dissemination of content and 
moderate individual networks.  
Political communication on new media is not a stand-alone platform as the  agenda on SNSs is related 
to mainstream media in Thailand (Isriya, 2012; Nuchada and Vikanda, 2012; Supreeya, 2009). 
Mainstream media used political figures’ Facebook page as their source of information, while 
political figures also used news agenda on mainstream media to initiate interaction on their own SNSs 
page. Mainstream media in Thailand also have their own SNSs page, allowing each channel to 
continuously publish news on SNSs, which SNSs users can receive and discuss about the news 
regardless of time and location.  
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As political communication on SNSs is decentralised, each SNSs user regulates content and moderate 
their network of connection, leading to greater availability of political information. Thus, what 
McCargo (2000) defines as ‘news’ (‘a literal descriptions of actual events, plus the statements of 
people involved’ p.33), are less credible on new media than when is broadcast or published in old 
media. Maetavee (2011) did a comparison study on the credibility of news on Twitter and mainstream 
media in Thailand and found that news on Twitter has low credibility because users race to post 
messages as quickly as they can. In addition, Sakulsri (2012) claims that Thai journalists still have to 
evaluate the news and information on SNSs to avoid reporting wrong information. This point is 
further backed up by the experience of Noppatjak Attanond, a TV host of The Nation Channel, who 
admitted reporters have to be careful as information online is not always right  (cited in Aree, 2013). 
In other words, there is no formal gate-keeping process involved in publishing content on individual 
SNS page and SNS users hold the independence to communicate on their SNS page, which news 
posted on SNS might not be as trustworthy as what is on mainstream media. Thus, communication on 
SNSs is more rapid, direct and interactive, which individual SNSs users should choose how to 
interpret the news and which news to share.  
To conclude, with the entry of new social media, and shifts in the political economy of ownership, 
there has been an increased in variety of source to consume political news in Thailand, which makes it 
more difficult for the Thai government to control what political information Thai people consume and 
interact with, putting Thai government and other politicians’ image at risk if negative ideas circulate 
in SNSs. Media ownership matters in political communication as it determines the content of message 
sent to citizens. Political news consumption in Thailand have begun to be more interactive on both 
mainstream media and SNSs but as for political news consumed from SNSs, particularly the Thai 
politicians’ SNSs page, had initiated a new digital way of direct and interactive political 
communication between the politician and citizens. As a result, content on new media is regulated 
under the Computer Crime Act 2007 and the old media have been broadly regulated and threatened by 
the Thai government, suggesting that political communication on both types of media, are not free. As 
for old media in particular, what is published and broadcast are likely to impact on Thai people’s 
perception on the government and opposition party. Thus, the shift in media consumption occurred as 
Thai politicians, citizens and journalists used SNSs individually to disseminate information, alongside 
with the existence of mainstream media, which leaves political figures seeking the most efficient way 
to manage the operation of their SNSs page for political communication and election campaign 
purposes. It is usual for Thai government to regulate the mainstream media to increase the reliability 
of news, enabling positive image on policies implementation to be constructed and limiting critique of 
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the government broadcast to the majority of the Thai population. Now image management has 
become more decentralised.  
Gap in research field  
Besides Teerada and Combs' (2014) conference proceeding on Thai citizen’s utilization of social 
media communications devices during the Bangkok Governor campaign in 2013, there is hardly any 
in-depth study on the use of SNSs for election campaign in Thailand or for the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign in particular. Although traditional ways of campaigning were still 
used in recent election campaigns in Thailand, research done in this area has recently become 
outdated as it has focused on traditional ways of communication, ignoring SNSs. Also, research in 
this area lack a detailed understanding of the operation and problems of political communication on 
SNSs. For example, Aksarapaak (2013) research  explores how Thais citizens and Thai political 
activists use SNS for political communication. She studies the use of Facebook for political purposes 
during the Yingluck government (2011-2013), arguing that ‘Thai use Facebook for political purpose 
to express political views namely publicizing, propaganda, attacking the opponents, and mobilization 
of people’ (p.42). As Thai politicians’ image has been challenged by the way Thai Facebook users 
express their political views in different political sites, this research examines political figures’ views 
on such issue and the actions that they take to balance off their image with the individual ownership 
and freedom that Facebook users have for political communication on Facebook. Aksarapaak 
randomly studied the Facebook pages of pro and anti Yingluck government, and conceded that her 
research lacked a specific focus on content analysis as there were too many political Facebook pages 
that she could possibly have studied and there were too many issues discussed. Also, her convenient 
sampling of 30 interviews were diverse in age, occupation and background, and did not include 
political elites’ point of view on using SNSs to send political messages and policies to Thai SNSs 
users. Thus, a more specific focus on interview samples and Facebook pages for content analysis is 
needed to conduct an in-depth study on the way in which SNSs impact political communication in 
Thailand. This is an important area of study.  
When political elites such as national politicians or candidates from the government party or 
opposition party use Facebook, they are using Facebook to mass communicate with thousands and 
perhaps millions of followers. The message has the possibility of influencing greater numbers than 
ordinary person’s use of Facebook. The limits of Aksarapaak’s research indicates the importance of 
providing a more comprehensive understanding of the management of content and indeed, of the 
human resources who play a role in Thai political figures’ SNS networks and  the strategy they used 
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to influence citizens. How did those controlling politicians’ Facebook adapt to the decentralisation of 
political communication? How did they cope with the fact that the platform allows interactive and 
direct transmission of message to occur between the political elites and citizens? How did they 
response to managing this opportunity and challenge? These are exciting questions that have not been 
studied in the context of Thailand. As SNSs started to emerge in Thailand, it became increasingly 
difficult to ignore political public relations on SNSs in the Thai context as a development of political 
communication and election campaigning, requiring an in-depth study of this new phenomenon.  
Research objectives and framework  
This research sets out to explore political public relations operations on SNSs in Thailand, with a 
particular focus on Facebook as the SNSs platform with the highest usage in Thailand, and the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign as the context of study. This research discusses how 
political public relations work on SNSs in Thailand can establish and develop ‘digital vote-canvassing 
networks’ based on the media affordance provided by Facebook and how the building of relationships 
among Facebook users can spread campaign content to more Facebook users. The analysis in this 
research is from the perspective of candidates of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election and the 
campaign staff or public relations personnel involved in operating SNSs page for candidates during 
the election.  The analysis in the later of this thesis takes into account on the views of Thai politicians 
and staff who assist Thai politicians in using SNSs for political communication in general.  
The themes of analysing political public relations on SNSs subsume:  
1. Candidates’ image management on their Facebook pages;  
2. The dissemination of candidates’ campaign information on their Facebook pages;  
3. Internal communications and the operation of candidates’ SNS pages;  
4. The management of the relationship between candidates and public relations personnel, and 
between candidates and followers;  
5. The challenges of using SNSs for political purposes. 
The above fives themes are derived from both features of SNSs and the concept of ‘political public 
relations.’ Baym's (2010, pp.6-12) proposes seven features of digital media (interactivity, temporal 
structure, social cues, storage, replication, reach and mobility) that are used as structural dimensions 
and orienting affordances in the analysis within this research (the seven features are further explained 
in Subsection 2.1.1. below). The theoretical dimension of this research is based on the concept of 
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‘political public relations’ used in understanding the operation of Thai political figures’ SNS accounts, 
analysing the management of people, relationship and challenges associated with the production and 
dissemination of content posted on candidates’ SNS accounts in for public figures to establish a 
positive image on their SNS pages, as well as on Thai political imagery and archetypes.   
McNair (2011) defines ‘political public relations’ from a political communication perspective as ‘the 
means and methods, by which political parties, at times of the election and in the intervals between 
them, with the help of their political consultants, seek to manage the media in such ways as to 
maximise favourable coverage and to minimise that which is damaging to the organisations’ interest’ 
(p.122) and the four activities include media management, image management, internal 
communications and information management. On the other hand, Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) 
integrate the elements of public relations such as reputation management and relationship cultivation 
and use to manage relationships as core elements and define political public relations as ‘the 
management process by which an organization or individual actor for political purposes, through 
purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to establish, build, and maintain 
beneficial relationships and reputations with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its 
goals’ (p.8). Strömbäck and Kiousis comment that their definition of ‘political public relations’ can be 
integrated with different research fields as political campaigning. As will further be reviewed in 
Chapter 2, this research integrated these two definitions of political public relations to analyse the use 
of Facebook for the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, exploring on the transmission of 
messages on Facebook for political purposes, the strategic planning and management of content and 
relationship for political figures to achieve a particular goal. 
Communication on the internet is viewed as a globalised platform of communication in enhancing 
connectivity. However, analysis of communication on the internet should not be considered as a 
global culture. Even though Thai politicians, journalists, and citizens have been adopting the use of 
SNSs as a source of political information, the network and content of communications on SNSs are 
still associated with the traditional form of Thai election campaigning and political culture. The 
mediation of content on SNSs as a globalised platform of communication is determined by the local 
political context and the interrelated political issues. Thus, one should also take into consideration 
local cultures. Soraj (1999) argues that ‘Thai cultural attitudes do affect computer-mediated 
communication in a meaningful way’ (p.232), meaning that Thai culture influences internet usage 
alongside Western ideas. This point suggests that in studying the use of SNSs for political 
communication and election campaigns in Thailand, knowing the local political culture of among 
Thais, particularly Bangkokians, would be useful.  
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Political culture has been a developing concept in understanding citizens’ and politicians’ behaviour 
in a particular society. The examination of political culture cannot occur in isolation, but political 
culture looks at what people share in common within a particular group. Almond (1956) first defines 
political culture as the ‘particular pattern of orientations to political action’ (p.396), and Chilton (1988) 
further develops Almond’s definition and defines political culture as the way in which people are 
related in similar way with a group (p.431). Looking at political culture from a Thai perspective, 
Askew (2008) claims that political culture is able to provide coherence and justification to people as 
they act in the world, how one relates to another and the identification of themselves. This research 
takes into account of the relationship between Thai political figures, the image of Thai political 
figures, and signs associated with Thai election campaigns. In this, the political culture background 
will serve as a basis for this this research to demonstrate in what aspects political communication and 
election campaigning on SNSs evolves within the Thai political culture and what political figures take 
into consideration when they communicate about politics on SNSs. 
In analysing the ritual, public monuments and semantic changes in Thailand, Rhum (1996) defines the 
term ‘tradition’ as ‘the handing down of practice, and those practices are legitimate because they are 
handed down’ (p.327), while the term ‘modernity’ is ‘the improved way to do things’ (p.328). This 
research uses Rhum’s definition of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ to examine the way election 
campaigning and political communication have been done in Thailand and the way in which SNSs 
bring improvements as well as new challenges for political figures, journalists and citizens accessing 
information from political figures’ SNS pages.  
This research takes a critical constructivist approach to determine the approach and challenge that 
encompass the operation of Thai political figure’s SNSs page. The critical constructivist approach 
takes into account the interest, biases, worldviews and agendas of individual who construct the images 
for media audience to consume (Louw, 2010). Louw gives the example of the angle in which the 
cameraman points at, who is the boss of cameraman and journalists, and the journalists’ bias towards 
reporting a particular issue (pp.3-7). Taking a critical constructivist approach to study the operation of 
political public relations on SNSs would mean that this research appreciates that the way political 
figures communicate with followers on SNSs would be based on the interest of the political figure and 
followers who supports and are keen to know more about the political figure. However, at the same 
time, the analysis in this research cogitates about other SNSs users who are connected to political 
figure’s SNSs page in one way or another, as such group of SNSs users might be implicitly receiving 
a message from political figure’s SNSs network. Taking a critical constructivist approach would, 
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therefore, guide this research towards critical as well as functional and organisational conclusions 
about its area of study. 
Research contributions  
SNSs have the potential to attract and motivate Thai political figures to use SNSs in the future as an 
additional channel of communication. Determining the task and issues associated with the use of 
SNSs by political figures, the expansion of their SNS networks and the extent to which followers who 
are voters in the election can rely on messages that they receive from a political figure’s SNSs page 
are significant questions. This research provides an understanding of the development of election 
campaigns and political communication in Thailand on SNSs, aiming to contribute knowledge from 
the Thai perspective on political public relations on SNSs in the following areas: 
1. This research will serve as a base for future study to examine the selection of candidates’ 
visual image and the proposal of candidates’ policy-related posts on their Facebook pages in 
order to determine how candidates portray their images and persuade followers based on their 
policies throughout the election campaign; 
2. This research aims to enhance our understanding of the roles of public relations personnel and 
the management of relationships among individuals connected to the political use of SNSs, 
the establishment and development of digital vote-canvassing networks, and visualising the 
‘spreadability’ of messages through interaction among SNS users (Jenkins, Ford, and Green, 
2013);  
3. Findings in this research add to a growing body of literature on the challenges of regulating 
SNS communication for the purpose of political public relations in Thailand in response to 
the features of SNSs;  
4. The triangulation research methodologies of multimodal analysis, interviews and coding 
procedures used in this research can be applied to other research studying SNSs and political 
public relations in other contexts.  
Thesis outline  
The rest of this thesis is divided into seven chapters. The exploration of political public relations on 
SNSs during election campaigns within the context of Thai political culture involves a background 
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understanding of the features and functions of SNSs in enhancing communication between candidates 
and voters. The facilitation and strategic planning of election campaign resources and campaign 
messages are essential to persuade voters about a candidate’s campaign. Chapter 2 defines and 
conceptualises the features and functions of SNSs in relation to the ability of SNSs to allow political 
figures to construct their image, personalise, disseminate information, interact with voters and spread 
messages on SNSs. Chapter 2 further clarifies the definition of political public relations and discusses 
the strategies that Thai political figures might take to manage their SNSs accounts. The conclusion of 
Chapter 2 develops a framework for exploring political public relations on Thai political figures’ SNS 
accounts.  
As the study of political public relations is a new area of study in the Thai context, an exploratory 
approach is taken to collect and analyse data.  Chapter 3 outlines the research question and justifies 
the research methodologies used in this research by describing the relevant procedures and 
acknowledges the pilot study done in this research. The research methodologies utilised in this 
research include a multimodal analysis of the official Facebook pages of the two main contenders in 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election (Mom Rajawongse Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Police 
General Doctor Pongsapat Pongcharoen), as well as interviews with Thai political figures and their 
SNS staff. Data analysis of this research contains four chapters, organised in the following way.  
The basic dimension of political public relations on Facebook is fundamental in understanding a 
candidate’s approach to campaigning on SNSs. Chapter 4 lays out the basic dimension of political 
public relations based on the introduction of the candidates’ campaign on Facebook by assessing the 
candidates’ basic information published on Facebook in relation to the typical image of the Bangkok 
governor. Chapter 4 also examines candidates’ core identities and core visual images used as the 
candidates’ profile pictures and used as a cover page, determining the different visual perception that 
candidates were portraying on their Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign.  
Having almost two months to campaign involved the management of content and the relationship 
between the candidates and their followers in order to gain the support of their followers on the day of 
the election. Chapter 5 examines the management of election campaign content on the candidates’ 
Facebook pages in engaging their followers on SNSs and maintaining followers’ support throughout 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, by looking particularly at the framing of 
candidates’ campaign slogans, the distribution of policy-related post published on Facebook and the 
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ways that candidate adopted to facilitate followers to interpret about candidate’s campaign on 
Facebook.  
The idea of a vote-canvassing network was significant in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign on SNSs. Chapter 6 analyses the management of human resources and the operation of 
candidates’ SNS accounts. Chapter 6 determines the way in which SNS users are connected to 
candidates’ SNS accounts and the way in which campaign messages are spread on SNSs during the 
election campaign, which has led to the establishment of ‘digital vote-canvassing networks’ on SNSs. 
The first part of Chapter 6 reviews the responsibilities, professionalism and autonomy that public 
relations personnel have as ‘core vote-canvassers’ to coordinate communication with candidates’ 
followers. The second half of Chapter 6 develops a prototype to visualise how features of interaction 
on Facebook, can implicitly and explicitly link different Facebook users together to be part of a digital 
vote-canvassing network as SNS users are exposed to the same messages disseminated from a 
candidates’ SNS account. This research will use the term ‘public relations personnel’ and ‘personnel’ 
interchangeably to refer to the campaign staff, who manage and personalise candidates’ SNS accounts.  
As the use of SNSs for political purpose is still emerging and developing deliberative democracy in 
Thailand, Chapter 7 identifies the way in which the functions of SNSs challenge election campaign 
regulation and highlight the threats that political figures face in achieving their goals to communicate 
on SNSs. Chapter 7 discusses how decentralisation of election campaigning and political 
communication on SNSs is transforming the democratic values of voters enabling them to be more 
involved in expressing their opinions and disseminating messages on SNSs. The chapter points out the 
possible issues for which public relations personnel could be responsible for in comparison to a self-
managed SNS account.  
Chapter 8 is the final chapter of this thesis, which summarise the research findings, analysis 
developed in this thesis and the contribution of this study. The chapter identifies the limitations of this 
research, outlines suggestions for future study and presents the research argument.  
This thesis argues that the political public relations work carried out via Facebook during the 2013 
election campaign consisted of a new and complex process of managing the coordination and 
dissemination of campaign content and visual images on Facebook, managing human resources and 
relationship. The management of campaign information and visual images on Facebook is 
fundamental in communicating via Facebook, engaging with voters and manipulating voters. The 
establishment and development of the relationship among people on the digital vote-canvassing 
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network can increase the spreadability of election campaigning on SNSs. As election campaigns and 
political communication on SNSs in Thailand are still developing, it can be anticipated that there will 
be problems and challenges for Thai political figures in enhancing their communication on SNSs. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
 
Introduction  
Political communication has always been developing in parallel with the evolution of communication 
technology, increasing the competitiveness of politics and increasing citizens’ interest in participating 
in political communication. As clearly outlined by Blumler and Kavanagh (1999), the first age of 
political communication was mainly dominated by political parties. As television became a significant 
medium in the second age, political parties started to adapt their methods of political communication 
by increasing professionalisation of election campaigns or communication in press conferences or 
media interviews. The third age of political communication started to see the emergence of the 
internet in circulating political news and information, raising the need to heighten the level of 
professionalism in dealing with challenges and complexities (pp.211-213).  
Mediation, by definition, is the transmission of a message through media to influence all aspect of 
politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999, p.249; Strömbäck, 2008, p.231). The third age of political 
communication encompasses a range of social media and SNSs emerging in today’s political 
landscape, impacting the way politics is mediated. A widely known pioneer example of a candidate 
using SNSs effectively for election campaigning is Barak Obama’s campaign in the 2008 Presidential 
election in the United States. According to Louw (2010), Obama was synthesising different 
approaches in the election campaign, including both online and offline media as well as door-to-door 
campaigning, realising the importance of the internet and traditional ways election campaigning 
(pp.97-101). In terms of social movements, Castells (2012) comments that the mobilisation of 
protesters in the Arab Spring through digital technology ‘created deep communication ties and 
organizational capacity in groups of activists before the major protests took place’ (p.105). These two 
widely known examples have shown and raised awareness on the strengths of using SNSs for 
institutional and grassroots political movements.  
As SNSs are a new and developing channel of communication in Thailand, there is limited research 
on SNSs and election campaigning and political communication in Thailand. The main objective of 
this chapter is to develop a foundation for understanding the operation of Thai politicians’ SNS 
accounts for political public relations in Thailand in general and the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign in particular. This chapter reveals the relevant concepts and issues for this research 
to take into consideration.  
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Divided into three sections, this chapter starts off by conceptualising the basis of political public 
relations on SNSs, and reviews the roles of political public relations in engaging with voters during an 
election campaign. The chapter then moves on to integrate typical images of Thai political figures 
within a framework of visual images that are likely to be seen during election campaigns. This 
provides criteria for analysing candidates’ images during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign on SNSs. Lastly, this chapter problematises how interaction on SNSs can be both beneficial 
and challenging to political public relations with regards to image management and the spreadability 
of content on SNSs, by conceptualising interaction with the concept of a two-step flow and traditional 
vote-canvassing systems.  
2.1. Using social networking sites for political purposes  
The aim of this section is to conceptualise the basis of political public relations on SNSs. To gain a 
basic understanding of how SNSs function, this section starts off by defining ‘social networking sites’ 
(SNSs) and explains the functions of SNSs where users disseminate and receive messages to and from 
each other. Secondly, this section clarifies the definition of ‘political public relations.’ Finally, this 
section identifies plausible ways in which public relations personnel of political figures would use 
SNSs to engage with voters during election campaigns.  
2.1.1. Features and functions of social networking sites  
boyd and Ellison (2008)define social networking sites as ‘web-based services that allow individuals to 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made 
by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to 
site’ (p.211). Examples of SNSs include Facebook, Twitter, Friendster, Flickr, YouTube, and 
MySpace. Though these sites might have different characteristics, they are still categorised as SNSs.  
There are differences between the term ‘social media’ and ‘social networking sites’ even though 
several researchers use these terms interchangeably to refer to the same platforms of communication. 
SNSs are one of the many types of social media. Page (2012) points out that social media refer to ‘the 
Internet-based applications that promote social interaction between participants’ (p.5), e.g. discussion 
forum websites, blogs, wikis, podcasts, social network sites, video sharing and microblogging, where 
interaction on these platforms leads to the production of feedback between message senders and 
receivers on the same network. Social networking sites are therefore a subset of social media, which 
may be why researchers use these terms interchangeably.  
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Baym (2010, pp.6-12) proposes seven key concepts in analysing different media platforms and forms 
of communication: interactivity, temporal structure, social cues, storage, replication, reach, and 
mobility. Firstly, interactivity allows users to respond to each other, meet new people and also 
become close to each other (Section 2.3 analyses more on interactivity). Secondly, the temporal 
structure looks at the way in which media enable synchronous or asynchronous communication. Face 
to face, phone calls and instant messages are a synchronous form of communication. Voicemail and 
email are asynchronous communication media as there is a time delay between sending and receiving 
messages. Thirdly, social cues look at the further information provided in context, the explanation of 
the message or the identities of people communicating in the message. Digital media provide fewer 
social cues as there might be a lack of shared physical context. Next, digital media may be stored and 
replicated on a device, which allows users to access historical content at later dates (Carnevale and 
Probst, 1997; Cherny, 1999; Culnan and Markus, 1987; Walther, 1996 cited in Baym, 2010). Media 
are also different in their ability to make a message reach a number of audiences. Messages on digital 
media can reach thousands of people in just one click. Finally, mobility varies from medium to 
medium, and digital media enable people to communicate with each other regardless of where they 
are.  
In terms of the relationships between SNSs users, Miller (2011) states that SNSs allow users to 
communicate and stay in touch with one another in a faster and more direct form of communication. 
Users can share their experience and opinions with one another via status updates. They can also leave 
‘comments’, such as through the ‘Like’ tab or ‘Share’ tab and through sending short text messages to 
other users. Baym (2010) notes that there is no clear definition of who are friends on SNSs, since 
friends on SNSs can consist of ‘strangers, admirers, confidants, co-workers, family and a host of other 
relationship types.’ (p.145). Offline friends can also be friends on SNSs. Moreover, depending on the 
culture and user’s personality and choice, communicating online can both enhance and weaken 
relationships among users as the comfort level varies from one user to another (ibid., pp.130-45). 
Algorithms, or what Potter (2012) defines as ‘a set of mental codes that people use both consciously 
and unconsciously to make sense of media messages’, are the core element to clarify how people 
encounter and process media messages (pp.26-7). A Facebook algorithm is about how Facebook 
attempts to relate users to each other through biographical information and users’ interests in 
interaction (section 2.3 will further analyse about interaction.) Facebook is able to figure out how 
users are related to each other e.g. having a feature called ‘People You May Know (PYMK)’ to help 
users to find friends and flagging people whom users may be interested in adding to the network of 
people who are from same family or education institution (Van Dijck, 2013, p.47, p.156). This quality 
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is what Van Dijck refers to ‘connectedness’ as Facebook guides users to share information with other 
users through ‘purposeful designed interfaces’ (pp.46-7). With reference to Granovetter's (1973) 
analysis of strong ties and weak ties,  it could be said that PYMK can be acquaintances and when 
Facebook users connect to PYMK, the connection might be a ‘weak tie.’ As Facebook friends are 
related differently to the Facebook user, the status updates of Facebook users is communication with 
multiple weak ties (Baym, 2010, p.135). Whereas ‘strong tie’ relationships are established when 
Facebook users connected to their close friends (or when weak ties become converted to strong ties 
through interaction). Consequently, using SNSs enables users in various relationships to connect with 
one another through status updates, interaction, and instant messages.  
Dubrofsky (2011, pp.120-1) describes a user’s Facebook home page as ‘a moving, changeable space 
infused with particular digital tracks of a user’s data movements’, where Facebook makes 
announcements and acknowledgments of the interactions and status that the user just posted. 
Facebook’s algorithm determines which post comes as the top news feed on a user's Facebook page. 
If a post is interesting and manages to gain a high level of interaction, it is likely that the post will be 
circulated on Facebook. Thus, the core idea of Facebook is to influence its users by continuously 
uploading data for other users to pay attention to (by commenting on it, clicking the ‘like’ tab or 
sharing the content).  
Van Dijck (2013) mentions that the literal meaning of the ‘like’ tab on Facebook is a reflection of 
people’s preferences for things or the particular interest that they have as the amount of ‘likes’ that a 
piece of data receives can determine the level of interest (p.158). When other users see what their 
friends ‘like’ on Facebook, it is possible for the content to have an impact on the user as they would 
be interested in relating themselves to the content that is of interest to their friends on Facebook (ibid.). 
As a result of the high level of interaction, Dubrofsky comments that a Facebook user’s page can be 
completely ‘transformed’ overnight in response to the amount of interaction that a piece of content 
gets. New actions taken by a user’s friends are shown on the page, moving notices about previous 
actions down the page even though users can retrieve old actions (Dubrofsky, 2011, p.120-1).  
Based on consumption of information, SNSs allow personalisation of content according to users’ 
interests. Papacharissi (2010) defines ‘personalisation’ from a consumption perspective as ‘the ability 
to organize information based on a subjective order of importance determined by the self, presents an 
operative feature of online media like the Internet’ (p.144). An example is the way social media and 
SNSs support the feature of personalisation of consumption with the use of the ‘#’ (hashtag) symbol 
in front of a phrase or topic, which symbol can group content related to a particular topic, facilitating 
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and directing users to consume content related to the topic within one click (Alisa, Choochart, Jaruwat, 
and Sarawoot, 2012, p.2228).  
Similarly to political communication, a Facebook user who clicks ‘like’ to follow a political page is 
choosing to be subscribed to posts or updates relating to the page. This is a way to establish links 
between Facebook users and political figures on Facebook, encouraging users to get involved in the 
political figure’s news feeds (Edgerly, Bode, Kim, and Shah, 2013). As one of the research questions 
in this research seeks to find the connection and relationship between political figures and their 
followers, this research takes into consideration Van Dijck's concept of ‘connectedness’ and Potter’s 
definition of ‘algorithm’ to analyse the connection between SNS users. This research will use Baym's 
(2010) seven features of media as the framework to analyse the use of  SNSs for political purposes in 
Thailand.  
2.1.2. Political public relations 
There are several definitions of political public relations. Before clarifying these definitions, this 
subsection starts off by reviewing the basic definition of political communication, in order to find the 
relationship between the two concepts when used to analyse election campaigns on SNSs.  
Looking from the American perspective of political communication, Denton and Woodward (1990) 
define political communication as ‘public discussion about the allocation of public resources 
(revenues), official authority (who is given the power to make legal, legislative and executive 
decision), and official sanctions (what the state rewards or punishes)’ (p.14).  This definition was 
formed after Denton and Woodward analysed the failure of political communication in two cases: first, 
the public relations disaster of Gerald Ford, where the President of United States struggled to manage 
and control inflation problems on America national TV, where he was bombarding people with too 
many ideas on the issues; and second, the case of Delaware Senator Joseph Biden, who was running 
for the United States presidential campaign in 1987, and found guilty of academic plagiarism when he 
was in university (ibid., pp.6-8). Denton and Woodward’s view of the failure of political 
communication in both cases as the lack of effective public negotiation on the issues. As a result, this 
makes the image of election candidate and politician at risk. Political communication was not 
effectively planned and prepared for the intended outcome to occur. One of the ways to handle 
political communication effectively is for politicians and political parties to seek ways to manage free 
media and the information they provide to the free media and this leads to McNair’s (2011) definition 
of ‘political public relations.’ 
45 
 
McNair (2011) defines political public relations from a political communication perspective, having 
mainstream media as the link between political organisations and citizens. This definition of political 
public relations associates it with the management of political organisations and dissemination of a 
political message and construction of political images through ‘free media’, which McNair defines as 
‘those spaces and outlets in which political actors may gain exposure and coverage, without having to 
pay media organisations for the privilege.’ When politicians appear on free media, the control over 
coverage is by the media itself, which can make politicians’ image look ‘less manufactured’ and 
increase the ‘believability’ (ibid., p.119). At the same time politicians also try to have some control 
over the coverage of their image on free media, and McNair further proposes that this is when it 
becomes necessary to have public relations advisers who have professional skills to give suggestions 
to politicians and political parties on managing the relationship with free media.   
McNair (2011) identifies four activities that are subsumed under the term political public relations: 
media management, image management, internal communications and information management. 
Firstly, media management aims to maintain a ‘positive politician-media relationship’ (p.123) in order 
for politicians to maximise their access to free media. Secondly, image management consists of the 
construction of a personal image of an individual politician or political organisation to suit 
organisational goals. Examples of this can vary from the logo used to symbolise a political party to 
the type of language that a politician uses in political interviews or manifestos. Thirdly, internal 
communication looks at the channels of communication in which information is transmitted internally, 
the management and organisation of activities and the management of feedback. Finally, information 
management is the selection of information to disseminate (ibid., pp.118-150). Thus, political public 
relations becomes a process of managing different elements on the political organisation’s or 
politician’s side, which is the initiating party in political communication, and the attempt to manage 
communication and the relationship between politicians and the media to have a positive coverage of 
politicians.  
It must be noted here that political public relations is different from political advertising. Political 
advertising refers to ‘the purchase and use of advertising space, paid for at commercial rates, in order 
to transmit political messages to a mass audience’ (McNair, 2011, p.87), which means that political 
parties have full control on the content and image that they want to establish in political 
advertisements. From the same perspective, Craig (2004) comments that political advertising has 
become ‘one of the most powerful forms of political communication’ (p.131). However, in political 
public relations, free media have control on the content, but there are management processes 
involving political organisations and their public relations advisers to maximise positive coverage 
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about them. Free media is still the more effective channel of political communication for political 
actors because what is communicated through free media has been subject to ‘scrutiny’, but political 
figures take a risk on how free media reports them, and political figures deal with such risk by 
managing the information that they give to free media (ibid,. p.134).  
SNSs are free platforms of communication in that users do not have to pay to register for an SNS 
account. However, users would need to have digital technology such as a computer, internet access, 
operational skills, information skills, strategic skills and opportunity, time and effort to use digital 
technology (Van Dijk, 2006, pp.179-183) . With such access and skills, users can publish content on 
their SNS account free of charge. However, political parties or political figures who use SNSs for 
political communication and election campaigns might pay to employ political public relations 
personnel to advise them or manage their SNS pages on their behalf. Thus, SNSs can be considered as 
an advertising platform in such way. In applying McNair’s definition of political public relations to 
SNSs, it could be said that political public relations on SNSs is the way in which an individual 
political figure or political party seeks to manage SNS pages to maximise favourable coverage and to 
minimise that which is damaging to their interests during an election campaign or in political 
communication in general.  
On the other hand, Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) define political public relations to reflect 
contemporary understanding of public relations, as ‘the management process by which an 
organisation or individual actor for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, 
seeks to influence and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with 
its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals’ (p.8). Strömbäck and Kiousis further 
comment that their definition is an adaptation to politics and political communication, highlighting 
‘the communication of politics and the purposeful nature of communication for political purposes’ 
(p.9). Also, the definition can be integrated with theories and research in other fields such as political 
campaigning, political communication, political marketing, propaganda and persuasion, political 
science, public affairs, public relations and political management. The elements of public relations e.g. 
reputation management and relationship cultivation are also integrated in Strömbäck and Kiousis’ 
definition. As a result, it could be said that management of relationships is a core element in 
Strömbäck and Kiousis’ definition of political public relations.  
With reference to Strömbäck and Kiousis’ definition of political public relations, Sweetser (2011) 
coins the term ‘digital political public relations’ and proposes that ‘the understanding that 
relationships are central to successfully maintaining reputation, support, and a level of influence is 
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perhaps better realized through digital political public relations than other embodiments of the 
practice’ (p.308). When politicians communicate on social media with their followers, it is like 
politicians are communicating with their friends. Politicians can connect to a large number of voters 
on social media and at the same time, they are able to personalise their content, making their content 
less formal, which establishes a personal ‘relationship’ between politicians and their key publics 
(ibid.). The relationship between politicians and their key publics can have an impact on maintaining 
their image, the support that they gain from their followers and the level of influence that their 
communication on social media can have on the followers.  
Building from Strömbäck and Kiousis’s definition of political public relations, Baines (2011) provides 
another definition of political public relations in election campaigns as ‘winning electoral support by 
influencing public opinion and voting behavior, partly by outlining one’s own parties’ policies and 
leadership team and partly by damaging the credibility of the opponents’ policy platform and 
leadership aspirations’ (p.116). Baines explains that the political public relations communication cycle 
is the act of giving and proposing promises on policies that the candidate has for voters in exchange 
for the votes that candidate will get on the day of the election. The definition also makes reference to 
competitors in the election. To be more precise, Bauer, Huber and Herrmann (1996 cited in Baines 
2011, pp.116-8) clarify that political parties communicate about policy and the way in which they 
would govern the country if they win an election. Political parties explain how they are suitable to 
govern and amplify their credible commitments in the past with negative references to the candidate’s 
rivals. 
Strömbäck and Kiousis’ definition perceives political public relations as a management process of a 
wide range of tasks and activities that are related to political communication and managing 
relationships with the intention of achieving a particular goal, whereas McNair’s definition of political 
public relations has been very specifically conceptualised based on the different activities (i.e. media 
management, image management, internal communications, and information management) that are 
related to the management of the relationship between politicians and the media in consideration of 
how the media and public view politicians. Even though the two definitions of political public 
relations have different perspectives, when applying both definitions to SNSs, it could be said that 
McNair’s definition is a subset of Strömbäck and Kiousis’ in that specific activities of political public 
relations identified by McNair are associated with the management process of public relations of 
politicians or political organisation with the public, while Baines’ definition of political public 
relations has applied Strömbäck and Kiousis’ definition to the context of election campaigns and 
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Sweetser’s definition of political public relations has applied Strömbäck and Kiousis’ definition to the 
context of digital technology.  
It could be said that the concept of ‘political public relations’ is a development of the general concept 
of ‘public relations’, where both concepts have interrelated elements. With a wide variety of 
definitions of public relations, Harlow (1976) tries to combine hundreds of these definitions, and 
gives the following definition of public relations as a working definition: 
Public relations is a distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain 
mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between an 
organization and its publics; involves the management of problems or issues; helps 
management to keep informed on and responsive to public opinion defines and emphasizes the 
responsibility of management to serve the public interest; helps management keep abreast of 
and effectively utilize change, serving as an early warning system to help anticipate trends; 
and uses research and sound and ethical communication as its principal tools.  
  (Harlow, 1976, p.36) 
Harlow’s definition of public relations involves different aspects of management and communication 
between the organisation and the publics, attempting to keep them informed for the public interest.  
Harlow’s definition gives some indication of managing the image of an organisation, especially when 
the image might be at risk. The activities of public relations therefore involve specialisation of 
knowledge, skills and methods in managing communication, problems and the image of organisations. 
(ibid., p.36).  
The communication element of public relations involves selecting media to keep the relevant people 
informed, and one of the communication platforms used might be the free media to reach the public. 
Public relations personnel of an organisation also need to seek ways to manage the relationship 
between the organisation and the media and also manage the information that they provide to the 
media. On the other hand, an organisation might have its own channel of communication with the 
public, which might be SNSs.  
In another framework, Hutton (1999) draws upon the dimensions and domain of public relations, and 
defines public relations as ‘managing strategic relationships’. Hutton explains: “‘Managing’ implies 
planning, control, feedback and performance measurement. ‘Strategic’ implies planning, prioritization, 
action orientation and a focus on relationships most relevant to client-organization goals. Finally, 
‘relationships’ implies effective communication, mutual adaptation, mutual dependency, shared 
values, trust and commitment” (p.209). Although Hutton acknowledges that a relationship is not 
something that can be ‘managed’ and his definition of public relations is not a direct way of 
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promoting efforts in communication, defining public relations as ‘managing strategic relationships’ 
leads to a hierarchy of public relations primary roles, functions and tactics, where part of these 
elements encompass public relations acting as persuader, reputation manager, constructor of images 
and communicator with the publics in different ways. Thus, viewing political public relations as a 
more specific component of public relations would indicate that managing relationships is significant, 
which is the element that could lead to the support that an organisation can get from the public. This 
research will examine how the management of relationships is strategically undertaken by political 
figures communicating on SNSs.  
There has not been a definition of ‘political public relations’ specifically in the context of SNSs. But 
using McNair’s and Strömbäck and Kiousis’ definitions of political public relations and the functions 
and features of SNSs outlined in subsection 2.1.1, political public relations on SNSs encompass the 
management of communication involved in influencing voting decisions, which can comprise the 
management of the relationship between the message sender and message receiver, the coordination 
and dissemination of information and visual images on SNSs, and the dealing with complexities 
involved in political communication and election campaigning on SNSs. It also incorporates the 
management of relationships between political figures and their public relations personnel and the 
management of relationships between political figures and their followers are essential for political 
public relations on SNSs. The relationship between the political figure and their public relations 
personnel can be established and developed by public relations personnel getting to know the political 
figure’s background, personality and political views in order to be able to manage her/his SNS 
account. The relationship between political figures and their followers can be established and 
developed based on the types of messages and images that political figures or their public relations 
personnel post on the political figures’ SNS account on a regular basis and the level of interaction that 
the political figures have with their followers on SNS.  
Taking into consideration the globalised platform of SNS communication, it is plausible for political 
figures and public relations personnel to face challenges on the decentralisation of communication on 
SNSs from their side and from their followers’ side,  challenging them to ‘maximise favourable 
coverage’ of the political figures within a specific context of study.  The notion of ‘media 
management’ on SNSs is associated with the relationship between the agenda of a political figure’s 
SNS account and the agenda of the mainstream media, where mainstream media might use content 
from a political figure’s SNS page as their source of information (Subsection 2.1.3. will elaborate 
more on such relationships).  
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2.1.3. Role of public relations personnel in engaging with followers on SNSs  
Public relations personnel or public relations practitioners have played and continue to play an 
important role in organisational communication in Thailand. In surveying 130 public relations 
practitioners in Bangkok, Daradirek and Rosechongporn (2004) found that the top five duties of 
public relations personnel are press release writing, media relations, organisational publications 
production, public relations planning and special events. New communication technology has had an 
impact on public relations practice in Thailand, with a seminar on ‘PR Strategies via New Technology’ 
suggesting that it is an economical way to communicate online with internal staff and the public in 
order to ‘reach’ a larger target audience at a lower cost (cited in Daradirek and Rosechongporn, 2004). 
Research on the use of the internet and SNSs for election campaigns in other democratic countries has 
revealed the roles of campaign staff in assisting the candidate to communicate and manage the 
candidate’s SNS accounts on behalf of the candidate (Karlsen, 2010; Levenshus, 2010). Karlsen 
(2010) examined the use of campaign professionals and online technology in Norwegian elections and 
found that Norwegian political parties have different levels of trust given to internal and external 
campaign professionals during the election campaign while political parties still have autonomy to 
coordinate the election campaign. In the context of the 2002 Florida gubernatorial campaign, 
Trammell and Williams (2004) comment that campaign staff played a role in personalising campaign 
messages with the use of words such as ‘you’ to address readers directly through email, and Sweetser 
(2011) comments that such personalisation has made readers feel that candidate was the person 
writing the email even though it was the campaign staff. Linking the gap of political relations online 
in Thailand to this research on political public relations on SNSs, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between public relations personnel and political organisations is 
essential in knowing the operation of SNSs for political purpose. The use of campaign staff on SNSs 
questions the extent of the involvement of political figures in communicating on SNSs with their 
followers and the backdoor operation of SNS communication for political purposes in order to assess 
the reliability of message received by followers.   
There are various ways in which political figures and public relations personnel can engage voters and 
SNSs followers during election campaigns and political communication. In political communication 
and election campaigning in Thailand, the engagement of politicians with voters is important in 
establishing and building a relationship between the two parties. Sanit (1994) points out that Thai 
political figures attempt to establish a close relationship with voters through the use of language such 
as ‘phi nong’ (พี่นอ้ง). The literal meaning of phi nong is elder and younger sibling. Phi nong is used 
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with individuals who are not relatives, but are respected. Thai political figures use phi nong to 
establish a close relationship with voters, and to show their attempt to respect and consider the voters 
as their relatives and vice versa. Consequently, this allows voters to be optimistic about the 
politician’s ability in solving problems, and politicians can gain support from voters through such a 
relationship (p.169-170). Arguably, it is part of Thai political culture to establish such relationship as 
part of candidate’s image construction. There is no evidence to show that such relationship has impact 
on the result of an election. But this indicates that when Thai political figures use SNSs for political 
communication and election campaigning, phi nong would be used to address followers in order to 
establish a positive rapport with voters, reflecting upon the fraternal relationship between the 
politicians and the voters.  
On SNSs, campaign messages can be composed and framed in different ways to gain ongoing 
attention and support from candidates’ followers. In addition to the role that public relations personnel 
play in personalising a candidate’s campaign messages to make voters feel that the candidate was the 
person writing the message (Sweetser, 2011; Trammell and Williams, 2004), Zittel (2009) remarks 
that individual candidates in the German federal elections of 2005 used their websites to personalise 
their campaign, decentralising campaign communication as candidates had independent campaign 
material on their websites. Looking from Norwegian politicians’ perspective of personalisation, Enli 
and Skogerbø (2013) claim that social media provide space for Norwegian politicians to express their 
opinions, through defending, supporting or arguing about news stories broadcast or published by 
mainstream media. Also, social media give opportunities for Norwegian politicians to maintain a 
constant connection and interaction with the voters. This method of personalisation is associated with 
citizens having private exposure to the agenda posted by politicians on the internet.   
Bimber (2014) conceptualises personalisation of communication in relation to data analytics, whereby 
microtargeting of campaign messages was a fundamental element in Obama’s campaign to persuade 
undecided voters and to increase voter turnout in the 2012 U.S presidential election. Microtargeting 
enables campaign staff to acquire more specific data about voters, which was beneficial to framing the 
candidate’s campaign according to voters’ voting behaviour and to engage specific groups of voters 
during the election campaign. Stokes-Brown (2012) and Edgerly et al. (2013) agree that the concept 
of microtargeting has to be taken into consideration to personalise online politics, looking into online 
users’ background information e.g. age group, gender, location, occupation and political interests. 
Edgerly et al. (2013) point out that microtargeting allows the campaign to target certain voters with 
specific information while Stokes-Brown (2012) proposes that microtargeting is a technique that 
makes use of large-scale commercial poll data, which enables the campaign to preserve scarce 
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resources and maximise its campaign impact. Thus, another perspective of personalisation is 
associated with the way in which the candidate designs the campaign to suit a particular group of 
voters. There is little evidence of this kind of strategy being used in Thailand yet, but given its 
increasing centrality to campaigning in the US, it is likely it will spread globally as resources permit.  
 
Communicating on the internet has also allowed crowdsourcing. According to Brabham (2008), Jeff 
Howe and Mark Robinson proposed the term ‘crowdsourcing’ in the June 2006 issue of Wired 
magazine. Howe (2006), as cited in Brabham (2008, p.76), defines the term ‘crowdsourcing’ as ‘a 
new web-based business model that harnesses the creative solutions of a distributed network of 
individuals through what amounts to an open call for proposals.’ With this definition, Howe says that 
crowdsourcing enables people to collaborate and generate peer-production based on a particular 
project or problem that needs to be solved. The idea of crowdsourcing on the internet was further 
examined by Brabham (2009) based on public involvement for urban planners and the research found 
that the internet was an appropriate technology to ‘harness collective intellect’ compared to face-to-
face meetings as the internet can generate creative participation, and users can quickly exchange ideas 
with each other under the same network (p.242). Thus, it is possible for candidates to use 
crowdsourcing as another way to engage with followers, increasing their involvement in the 
candidate’s campaign by contributing visual images and textual content. Crowdsourcing can enhance 
the spreadability (Jenkins et al., 2013) of media content on SNSs (Section 2.3 will further analyse 
spreadability).  
The concepts of ‘agenda setting’ and ‘framing theory’ are further core elements in studying election 
campaigns.  Maxwell McCombs and Don Shaw examine news reports in relation to voting behaviour 
in the 1968 US presidential election, which leads them to conceptualise agenda setting as the daily 
selection and presentation of news done by editors and news directors in attracting media audiences’ 
attention and how they influence media audiences’ perception of ‘what are the most important issues 
of the day’ (McCombs, 2004, p.1). McCombs explains that because there are only a few things that 
matter to media audiences during the election campaign, the media plays a role in judging what is 
significant for media audiences to know and what they should think about, which have implications 
for personal behaviour. Dainton and Zelley (2005) note that as politics has many issues, news media 
assist media audience in what should be thinking. These guidelines could be achieved through setting 
the agenda, and selecting and presenting news which is relevant to the audience. In other words, 
agenda setting looks at what agenda has been set or what is being talked about in the media. Ridout 
and Mellen (2007) propose a possible coding category for election campaigns during the 2002 sub-
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presidential race, which was done according to issues such as taxes, defence, social security, health 
care, minimum wage, education, terrorism, and welfare.  
Extending from McCombs and Shaw (1972) statement on the importance of agenda setting in news 
media, the concept of framing takes a further step in examining how selected news is talked about in 
news media. Entman (1993) summarises the concept of framing as ‘to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described’ (p.52 cited in Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012, p.197). Schudson 
(2011) defines framing as ‘the principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little 
tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters.’ (p.28). De Vreese (2005) 
distinguishes agenda setting from framing theory by stressing that agenda setting looks at the 
importance of issues, while framing gives attention to the way issues are presented or talked about 
(p.53). Thus, the purpose of framing is to influence or have an impact upon the way the media 
audience reacts to news (Dainton and Zelley, 2005; Nelson, Clawson and Ocley, 1997; Scheufele and 
Tewksbury, 2007; Scheufele, 1999). The framing of news can depend on the interests of the media 
audience (Yang, 2003) as well as the ownership or who takes control of the media platform (Hamdy 
and Gomaa, 2012).  
 
Turning now to the Thai context, Sombat (2006) proposes that Thai media should assist in agenda 
setting and framing news with regard to debates in Parliament to facilitate how the media audience 
should think about them. The media are responsible for helping the audience make a judgment on 
political issues discussed by politicians in Parliament. As Thai politicians attempt to avoid replying to 
critical questions during debates, this means that the media audience of voters will not know ‘the truth’ 
from the politicians (ibid., pp.298-300). Therefore, the media play a significant role in agenda setting 
and framing news with regards to political issues discussed in Parliament.  
 
Savitri (2004) comments that political communication in the Thai Parliament consists of formality as 
well as entertainment in the sense that politicians retain the attention of audiences of various 
backgrounds watching the debates on television (p.100). The formal element that Savitri discusses is 
the ‘ritual beginning’ of a speech, whereby the politician introduces himself at the beginning of his 
speech, which is part of the parliamentary code of conduct that politicians have to obey (p.104). The 
introduction constitutes of the politician mentioning her/his full name, the constituency that the 
politician represents and the political party that the politician belongs to. The pronoun used by Thai 
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male politicians in the ‘ritual beginning’ of a speech would either be ‘kraphom’ or ‘phom’, both 
pronouns meaning ‘I’ or ‘me’ (ibid.), but ‘kraphom’ is more formal.  
During election campaigns in Thailand, media bias is also associated with agenda setting and framing 
of issues by mainstream media. Rattana (1998) found that the hosts of television debates set the 
agenda of campaign topics by playing a role in facilitating election campaign forums in Thailand; 
unequal opportunities were given to politicians to talk and interact with audiences about their policies. 
Another research concluded that Thai newspapers imposed gender stereotypes when it comes to 
framing the image of male and female candidates in the 2000 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign (Rattima, Kusakabe and Rosechongporn, 2006).  
In terms of news production, spokesmen  are considered as ‘primary definers’ as they are the source 
of the news, while journalists and the media play a significant role in reproducing news, enabling 
them to be considered as ‘secondary definers’ (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Robers, 1978, 
pp.58-9). Thus, as for political communication and election campaigning on SNSs, it could be said 
that SNSs can strengthen the relationship between the primary definers and secondary definers in a 
way that primary definers can use political figures’ SNSs page as their own platform of 
communication to the public and also to communicate with secondary definers. Moreover, political 
figures can also use their own SNSs page to express their opinion or clarify political news published 
by the secondary definers, which makes established the connection between the new media and old 
media.  
In the case of political communication on SNSs in Thailand, there has been a complex relationship 
between the agenda in mainstream media and in SNSs. Even though research on the 2004 presidential 
election in the United States shows that there is a limited relationship between news coverage on 
mainstream media and blog discussions (Wallsten, 2007, p.579), Supreeya (2009) found that political 
content on the OKnation blog reflects the mainstream media interest in agenda-setting. Moreover, 
Nuchada and Vikanda (2012) state that mainstream media in Thailand use SNSs to guide media 
audiences to seek for further detail on certain issues (p.96). Isriya (2012) points out that both Thai 
politicians’ SNS accounts and the mainstream media use each other’s content as part of their agenda 
in political communication (p.38). As new candidates in elections in Thailand tend to create 
recognition for themselves by referencing mainstream media reports about their campaigns (Sombat, 
1993, p.107), it is very likely that status posts on a Thai candidate’s Facebook page are related to 
mainstream media coverage about her/him, which is a way to increase the credibility of topics for 
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followers to interact on, integrating political communication in mainstream media and SNSs and 
motivating Thai SNS users to seek information from mainstream media and vice versa.  
The increasing interest in using SNSs for political communication in Thailand has heightened the 
need to understand Thai politicians’ management of SNS accounts and the roles of public relations 
personnel operating these to engage followers. Previous research has looked at how the agenda on 
SNSs is related to mainstream media and how candidates use mainstream media to give credit to their 
SNS posts (Isriya, 2012; Nuchada and Vikanda, 2012; Supreeya, 2009; Wallsten, 2007). Little 
attention has been given to political public relations in association with the dissemination of content, 
the selection of visual image and strategic planning of election campaigns in connection with each 
phase of the election campaign, which this research attempts to explore in.  
 
It is conceivable that in integrating the features of SNSs into political public relations, the temporal 
structure and mobility of SNSs would allow candidates to manage his/her status according to the 
candidate’s interest, management and instant publication of campaign messages for candidates in the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign to engage particularly with followers on candidates’ 
SNS accounts. Campaign messages are stored on candidates’ SNS accounts. The existence of swing 
voters (Boonlert, 2015b) and the time restriction for election campaigning set by the Election 
Commission suggest that management of the type and quantity of campaign content is likely to be 
related to different phases of the election campaign and the agenda on mainstream media, to establish 
and build momentum. As Bangkokians are pessimistic about the ability of elected politicians to solve 
problems (Suchit, 1996, p.195), it is plausible that public relations personnel would attempt to 
disseminate campaign messages on SNSs in such a way as to make Bangkokians optimistic about 
candidates’ ability. Candidate and public relations personnel would communicate on SNSs 
continuously challenge Bangkokians’ political culture of negative views of elected politicians. This is 
also to retain followers’ interest and make followers sense that messages posted have come directly 
from the candidate throughout the election campaign.  
 
Notwithstanding the Thai political culture of phi nong relationships between Thai political figures and 
their followers, the relationship between the political figures and their followers on SNSs would be 
individualistic relationships as political figures communicate more independently on SNSs in 
comparison to political communication in press conferences. Through the media affordance of SNSs, 
messages sent from political figures’ SNS accounts directly reach and appear on followers’ news 
feeds, which can enable their relationship to be closer as political figures send regular updates to 
followers.  
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2.2. Types of visual image of candidates  
The image of candidates is also a core element in political public relations, where candidates give 
prominence to the way they appear in public. The visual image that political figures construct can 
have various meanings for the public, which can impact upon the way public perceives the candidates. 
Thai political culture codes can also be used to interpret a candidate’s visual image and background. 
The objective of this section is to identify the different types and meanings of visual image that are 
likely to be seen during election campaigns and political communication. The first half of this section 
outlines the various frames based on how political figures tend to appear in public, while the second 
half analyses candidates’ images through a Thai political culture perspective. 
2.2.1. Frames of visual images during election campaigns 
The definition of ‘visual image’ has been examined by different scholars, providing an interrelated 
definition of what constitutes a visual image. In the context of journalism, Coleman (2010) defines 
‘visual’ to mean ‘media content that is processed by the eye alone’ which can be a photograph or 
moving image that contains elements such as facial expressions, body posture and gestures of the 
subjects within the image, while verbal content is written and spoken words (p.236)  Nimmo (1974) 
defines ‘image’ as ‘a human construct imposed upon an array of perceived attributes projected by an 
object, event or person’ (cited in Newman, 1994, p.92). According to Craig (2004), as a significant 
part of political figures’ political communication, their weight, type of hairstyle and clothing, and 
verbal communication and the general management of political figures’ images are seen when they 
appear in the media (pp.119-120). For example, the typical image of former President John Kennedy 
was always formal dress with a well-tailored suit and monogrammed shirt, with no other accessories 
other than a watch and a PT-109 tie clasp, a symbol of his World War II heroism (Giglio, 1991, 
p.272).  Hence, the visual image of political figures is what viewers see. Visual images can be shaped 
or tailored so that the subject has a particular kind of appearance. 
Lacey (2009) points out that the frame of a visual image is ‘the position from which the image is 
perceived’, which is ‘the border between the space we are allowed to see, and what is out of our sight’ 
(p.13). Thus, the visual image of a political figure can be a photograph or moving images which 
journalists or citizens see of political figures. Grabe and Bucy (2009) stress that the study of visual 
images in news coverage during an election campaign should include attention to the ‘specific and 
nuanced character frame building dimension’, meaning that analysis of visual images abolishes the 
simplistic division of coding images as ‘positive versus negative’ index measures (p.101). As a result, 
Grabe and Bucy offer three types of visual image from news coverage of presidential elections 1992-
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2004: 1 ideal candidate; 2 populist campaigners; 3 sure losers. (Appendix 3 shows the full coding 
scheme)  
1. The ideal candidate image is associated with the quality of the candidate, which consists of 
two themes: statesmanship and compassion. An image of statesmanship project ‘authority, 
power, and control’ (p.213). This image could include the juxtaposition of the candidate to 
flags and intellectual peers endorsing candidate. A compassionate image portrays sympathy 
or kindness to children or family. Examples of compassionate images include candidates’ 
holding or kissing babies.  
2. The populist campaigner image frames candidates as an ‘ordinary people,’ and consists of 
two themes: Mass appeal and ordinariness. Mass appeal reflect candidate being popular  by 
having large crowds supporting the candidate while ordinariness theme is displayed by the 
candidate wearing casual clothes and getting involved in informal activities.   
3. The sure loser image shows a candidate not confident of winning the election. Sure loser 
images can be coded from candidates’ facial expressions, photographs of small crowds or 
having voters showing negative messages about candidates within the picture.   
(Grabe and Bucy, 2013) 
Grabe and Bucy’s framework specifically reflects different aspects of the candidate during the 
election campaign, which tells voters different messages about the candidate. When applying a visual 
framework analysis to a candidate’s campaign on SNSs, Goodnow (2013) states that the ‘ideal 
candidate’ and ‘populist campaigner’ frames were relevant as candidates attempted to portray 
different positive images to win the election, but candidates would not select the ‘sure loser’ frame to 
post on their SNS accounts, preventing any weak image from having a negative impact on their 
campaign.   
 
Scholars analysing political images have also proposed ‘celebrity politician’ as another visual image 
frame, where politicians associate their image with the entertainment industry or popular culture; the 
celebrity politician image is also related to mass appeal.  For example, Arnold Schwarzenegger, star 
of Hollywood blockbusters like Terminator, used the techniques of popular culture to become the 
Governor of California in 2003 (Street, 2004) while Barack Obama, ‘whose campaign speeches were 
set to a hip hop beat, under the auspices of will.i.am of the Black Eyed Peas’ (Street, 2012), also used 
Hollywood and music celebrities to enhance his image (Barron, 2015) during the 2008 and 2012 U.S 
presidential campaigns. Politicians who use celebrities from the entertainment industry to support 
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their image are ‘borrowing’ the relationship of trust and admiration to associate with their image 
(Street, 2001, cited in Barron, 2015). Barron further noted that the visibility of celebrities in politics 
can draw media attention. 
 
This research is similar to Goodnow's (2013) study in the way that both study candidates’ selection of 
visual images to post on their SNS accounts during election campaigns, and will use Grabe and 
Bucy’s visual image framework of the ‘ideal candidate’ and ‘populist campaigner’ frames in relation 
to ‘celebrity politician.’ Thus, in addition to the statement in Section 2.1 that candidates in the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election would be expected to use SNSs to disseminate campaign information 
to reflect their potential of fulfilling the role of Bangkok governor, it is also likely that political public 
relations on SNSs will be associated with the management process of selecting and publishing 
distinctive visual images of the candidate. The visual image reflects how candidates establish and 
build a positive rapport with voters, leaving an impression for followers to recall the candidate in a 
particular way. It is conceivable that candidates and public relations personnel in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election would frame various images (e.g. profile picture, cover page and photographs 
posted during the election campaign) on their Facebook pages to portray the different aspects of their 
image.  
2.2.2. Image in Thai political culture  
Visual images of candidates outlined in the previous subsection are commonly seen during election 
campaigns as candidates attempt to construct different images to gain support from voters, which also 
enables voters to recognise candidates in a particular way on news media. Coming from another point 
of view, an image does not know always have to be ‘visual’ or based on how politicians appear or 
communicate in public. The social background, personality and hobbies or other interests of a 
politician are also part of his image. Craig (2004) mentions that the former British Prime Minister 
John Major had the image of ‘ordinariness’ and ‘real person’ based on his ‘modest’ social background, 
‘reserved’ and polite personality, and his interest in cricket  (p.113). In Thai political culture, there is a 
basic distinction in Thai discourse between nakleng (นกัเลง) and phudi (ผู้ ดี) images. The first half of 
this subsection defines and gives examples of nakleng images in relation to the notion of phakphuak 
or ‘informal group’, while the second half of this subsection characterises the phudi image.  
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Nakleng and phakphuak 
Askew (2008) identifies nakleng as someone who has a self-confident personality, has the courage of 
being tough and would bravely carry weapons around and share certain kinds of behaviour with local 
people. Atcharaphon (1994) characterises a nakleng as someone who is ‘มีจิตใจกล้าหาญอดทน นิยมการ
ต่อสู้แบบเผชิญหน้าและตดัสนิด้วยก าลงั ชอบท าอะไรท้าทาย และรักษาสจัจะ’(p.229), which can be translated as 
‘brave, unyielding, prefers to fight face-to-face, uses force to make decisions, likes challenges and 
keeps promises.’ Callahan and McCargo (1996) claim that nakleng politicians buy their way into 
politics as a way to take advantage of the financial opportunities, which indicates dishonesty among 
nakleng politicians contesting democratic power.  
 
Among Thai politicians, Samak Sundaravej was identified as a nakleng politician. Surapongse (2002) 
proposes that Samak had the image of a politician with an ‘old’ style of managing problems, while 
another research study by Rattima et al. (2006), found that Thai newspapers portrayed Samak’s image 
during the 2000 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, ‘an old, dogmatic, and quick-tempered’ 
candidate but experienced in politics (p.164). However, Samak had previous experience in politics 
and had held various position in politics, including being the leader of Thai Citizen’s Party, Member 
of Parliament, Minister of Interior, Minister in Transport and he was the 25
th
 Prime Minister of 
Thailand  for eight months in 2008 (“นายกรัฐมนตรีคนท่ี 25 นายสมคัร สุนทรเวช [25th Prime Minister Mr. Samak 
Sundaravej],” n.d.). Thus, Samak’s previous political experience and skills could be an advantage to 
him in formulating and implementing policies for Bangkok Metropolis and also in coordinating work 
with the Thai government. His leadership of the Thai Citizen’s Party at the time of election could 
strengthen his leadership image, which could be additional political experience for his profile and 
image. As a result, Surapongse argues that as Samak had been in politics for a long period, his image 
was ‘clear’ and well-recognised among Bangkokians during the election campaign (p.203), regardless 
of his nakleng image.  
Examples of the other nakleng Thai politicians are Banharn Silpa-archa and Thaksin Shinawatra.  
Ockey (2004) describes the Banharn government as ‘plagued with allegations of corruption’ (p.17). 
As Banharn was not originally from Bangkok, his image was known as lower-class, having a 
provincial origin based on the way he spoke and behaved (ibid.). On the other hand, Thaksin was able 
to portray himself as a decisive leader in a nakleng manner by integrating a ‘middle-class’ success 
story and his reputation as an effective CEO in his image (ibid., p.19), illustrating a slightly different 
subset of the nakleng archetype. Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai party had rapid and significant work 
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performance with the use of political marketing concept (Kalan, 2005; Nanthana, 2006; Nichapa, 
2004; Surapongse, 2002), which placed the focus of their campaign on their target market (voters), 
and had a clear idea on the political, economic and social problems that Thai people were facing. With 
reference to Newman's (1994) concept of political marketing, Thai Rak Thai Party used the candidate 
and the party policy as a product to sell in the election, in exchange for votes. Nanthana (2006) argues 
that Thai Rak Thai Party policies were relevant, easy to understand, easy to put in practice, were 
directly related to people/voters. The party understood their target group and the party was able to 
make their campaign messages reach the target group efficiently. As a result, the party was able to 
have clear work performance and was able to communicate well with Thai citizens on their progress. 
According to Kalan (2005), the party showed that they can quickly turn the proposed policies into 
practice.  
Ockey (2004) notes that a nakleng can also be perceived as a ‘criminal’ or dangerous person in 
society, but they are respected, admired and necessary in rural life. In the context of the patronage 
system, Atcharaphon (1994) describes a nakleng leader or ‘luuk phi’ (ลกูพี่) in Thai as one who 
protects the ‘luuk nong’ (ลกูน้อง), who are henchmen. It must be noted here that the literal meaning of 
luuk nong in Thai is employee or servant working for a boss or leader, who might or might not have a 
nakleng personality or image. The relationship between henchmen and a nakleng leader relates to the 
way henchmen obey and respect the nakleng leader. The result of this relationship is the formation of 
phakphuak, which Chai (1994) proposes can be viewed from different perspectives. Firstly, 
phakphuak are people having a certain relationship established within a group, whether the same 
family, occupation or political party. Secondly, in Thai spoken language, the meaning of phakphuak 
refers to close friends, and can also be used as to address close friends. Thirdly, in practice, the 
phakphuak system contains elements of prejudice, considering the advantage to people in the same 
group and intending to take advantage of others. This system overlooks the rules, and this could lead 
to attacks on ‘other’ phakphuak (Chai, 1994, pp.172-173). Thus, nakleng can be viewed as in both an 
individual and group-based image, while phakphuak is a group-based image containing nakleng 
elements.  
Applying phakphuak to politics, Nelson (2001 cited Askew, 2008, p.24) defines this term as ‘informal 
local political groups’, ‘local political groups’ or ‘cliques’.  According to Askew (2008), phakphuak 
are employed in political activities to build networks and express their loyalty during vote-canvassing 
in election campaigns. Thus, the notion of phakphuak in Thai political culture implies informal and 
small political groups with the same interests gathering together to achieve a particular objective for 
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their own benefit. This benefit can be money or power. If a political group has more phakphuak 
support in comparison to their rivals, they are very likely to win or achieve their objective.  
It is also worth noting here that during the Yellow Shirt political social movement in the year 2008, 
the nakleng image of Thaksin and Samak were highly disapproved of by the Yellow Shirt protesters 
or the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) (McCargo, 2009). However, the Red Shirt protesters 
or the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), who were mainly  people from the 
northern and northeastern provinces of Thailand, were later mobilised to bring Thaksin back to power 
(Naruemon and McCargo (2011). The contrast in support indicates differences in Thai political 
culture of political image perception among people of different regions in Thailand and shows how 
the notion of phakphuak is implemented in the political social movements to show support for a 
particular candidate or political party.  
Phudi  
The character of a phudi is the opposite of that of a nakleng. According to the dictionary definition 
(พจนานกุรมฉบบัราชบัณฑิตยสถาน, 1982), cited in Khwandee (1994), phudi are individuals born into 
good family backgrounds with a positive family lineage, which makes the individuals well-mannered 
and courteous. But individuals not born into families with pedigrees can also be characterised as 
phudi if they behave and speak like phudi (Kosal Dusamraan, cited in Khwandee, 1994). Ockey (2004) 
proposes that the term phudi in Thai was used to describe members of the aristocracy who are in a 
higher social class and are wealthy in money and power. Phudi are literally the ‘good people’ in 
society, who have moral goodness and are ‘well-mannered’ (p.6).  
In Thai politics, politicians of the Democrat Party such as M.R. Sukhumbhand Paripatra, Apirak 
Kosayodhin, Chuan Leekpai and Abhisit Vejjajiva can be viewed as having a phudi image. M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s title (Mom Rajawongse) indicates that he is the great-grandchild of a Thai sovereign. 
M.R. Sukhumbhand is a great-grandson of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V).
7
  M.R. Sukhumbhand was 
educated overseas, worked in academia and had political experience as Member of Parliament under 
the Democrat Party. Apirak had various experience working in the private sector. His experience 
before competing for the 2004 Bangkok gubernatorial election included Governor of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand and President of the Marketing Association of Thailand (“อภิรักษ ์ โกษะโยธิน 
                                                             
7
 Cited from Fry, Nieminen and Smith (2013) 
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[Apirak Kosayodhin],” 2009). Chuan was widely believed to be relatively free of corruption (Ockey, 
1996) and also had the image of being committed and willing to work in politics with a sense of 
morality and honesty as a politician (Kalan, 2005, pp.50-53), while Abhisit’s image reflected ‘an ideal 
brand politician’ (แบรนด์ในฝัน) and ‘good class politician’ (นกัการเมืองฉนัดี) (Kalan, 2005, p.49).  
To conclude this section, in addition to the message that political figures disseminate to build 
relationships with their followers on SNSs, it could be said that the visual image that political figures 
post on their SNSs page is another significant activity of political public relations on SNSs. Visual 
images are more conspicuous and spreadable than textual messages. By viewing visual images, 
followers can see political figures’ appearance and any non-verbal communication feature framed 
within the visual image. For election campaigning on Facebook in particular, the selection and 
management of visual images and the placement of signs on candidates’ profile pictures, cover pages 
and timeline photographs would be fundamental for followers’ perception of the candidates’ 
campaign and for followers to identify and recognise it. This research will use Grabe and Bucy’s 
visual image framework of the ‘ideal candidate’ and ‘populist campaigner’ and the notion of 
‘celebrity politician’ to study the visual images of candidates of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign on Facebook. As Grabe and Bucy’s framework was designed to study moving 
images on television of candidates in the United States Presidential election, this research attempts to 
also determine if they would be any other cultural signs significant in designing and selecting visual 
images published on the candidates’ Facebook pages. Based on the candidates’ background and 
personality, this research will take into consideration Thai political culture of image perception as 
well as Grabe and Bucy’s framework. As candidates have different career backgrounds, it is also 
plausible that candidates would have professional images based on their skills and specialist 
knowledge, which they might use to formulate their policies during the election campaign.  
2.3. Interaction and spreadability of content  
Research done on online media and election campaigning in democratic countries suggest that it is 
challenging to determine that the use of the internet for political communication and election 
campaign has an effect on voting behaviour (Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014; Strandberg, 2013). 
The definition of McQuail (2005) of ‘media effect’ is ‘the consequences or outcomes of the working 
of, or exposure to, mass media whether or not intended’ (p.554), which Potter (2011) added that 
media effect is the change in outcome that can occur within a person or social entity as a result of 
exposure to a mass media message (p.903). Thus, when studying election campaigns online, it can be 
problematic to determine the effect of campaigning online on the result of the election and the effect 
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on voting behaviour, as various variables are associated with voters’ media consumption. However, 
some of the effects of campaigning on SNSs can be assessed based on the interaction and sharing of 
information posted on SNSs.  
The interaction feature of SNSs enable campaign messages to reach a wider group of SNS users. 
Interacting with respect to campaign messages enables the spreading or interchanging of campaign 
messages to other users, which this activity can be stored on SNSs. These features have been viewed 
as both advantages and disadvantages in political public relations. To gain a better understanding of 
the complication that the interaction feature has brought to political public relations on SNSs, this 
section starts off by defining the meaning of ‘interaction’. This section then conceptualises interaction 
and spreadability of media content on SNSs in relation to political public relations by using a 
traditional network of communication of two-step flow and vote-canvassing systems as the theoretical 
basis. Lastly, this section problematises how interaction on SNSs can challenge political public 
relations on SNSs.  
2.3.1. Defining ‘interaction’  
Before looking into the interactive feature of SNSs, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by 
‘interaction.’ In the field of communication studies, various definitions of interaction are found. On 
the other hand, Fuery (2009) proposes that interaction concerns what information is exchanged and 
the way it is exchanged by different media users through technology (p.33). This refers to the message 
content exchanged during communication and the technology in which the exchange occurs.  
Downes and McMillan (2000) identify the process of the level of interactivity in the respect of 
message-based dimension and participant-based dimension. With regards to the message-based 
dimension, the level of interactivity increases as there is two-way communication for participants to 
communicate ‘actively’ with each other, there is no time restriction in communication and the 
communication environment is suitable to interact. In terms of the participant-based dimension, 
interactivity increases when participants perceive that they are regulating communication environment, 
participants can get feedback from the communication, and participants have an objective of 
exchanging information (p.173).  
 Van Dijk (2006) proposes that a general definition of ‘interaction’ is ‘a sequence of action and 
reaction’ (p.8), which can occur at four different levels. Firstly, the elementary level of interaction 
looks at the space dimension of interaction, whereby interaction offers the possibility to establish two-
sided or multilateral communication. The second level of interaction is time dimension or the degree 
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of synchronicity, which looks at the time available to reply to the person that one is communicating 
with. The third level of interaction looks into the behavioural dimension or the extent of control 
exercised by the interacting parties. As a result, this will influence their intervention in 
communication. The last and highest level of interaction looks at the way interactors act and react 
with each other, which is a mental dimension for full interaction to exist (pp.8-9).  
All the above definitions of interaction are related in a way that interaction concerns the response 
given, which means that in interactive communication, messages are not communicated by one-way, 
but rather two-way communication, allowing the receiver to give feedback to the message sent by the 
sender. In other words, the relationship between the sender and the receiver of the message is further 
established through the response to the message being exchanged, which allows the receiver to 
participate in the communication. Looking specifically at Van Dijk’s definition, the identification of 
different levels of interaction shows that it is too simplistic to generalise at once if interaction occurs 
in a conversation. This means that one must look into the space dimension, time dimension, 
behavioural dimension and mental dimension of the conversation to make a judgment on the level of 
interaction which exists.   
Applying Van Dijk’s definition of the different level of interaction to Facebook, we see that Facebook 
allows interactive communication to occur as there is space provided for other users to respond to 
messages. This interaction can be achieved by leaving comments, clicking the ‘Like’ tab or sharing 
the message with the user’s network. In terms of the time dimension, the interaction could be 
synchronous, immediately uploaded and updated on Facebook once the respondent clicks on the ‘like’ 
or ‘share’ tab, or asynchronous, when occurring later. With regards to the behavioural dimension, 
Facebook users are in control their interaction without others intervening in what they communicate. 
Finally, Facebook offer two-way communication for interactors to act and react with each other. As 
the four dimensions of interaction proposed by Van Dijk outline the different elements that constitute 
interactive communication, this research will use Van Dijk’s proposed levels of interaction to 
examine political public relations through the interactive feature of SNSs.  
It must be acknowledged here that researchers have criticised politicians for being reluctant to interact 
with their followers on their SNS accounts as interaction on SNSs occurs only among followers, 
without further responses from the politicians, while followers have used the interaction feature to 
express their political thoughts. Bailard (2012) studied the internet’s effect in the Tanzanian general 
election in 2010 and found that the internet encouraged citizens to evaluate and be critical of 
inefficient governments which can motivate citizens to act and organise themselves and could lead to 
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political change in the country. In examining political parties’ use of social media in Switzerland, 
Klinger (2013) found that Swiss political parties mainly use social media as an another channel of 
political communication to spread information and electoral propaganda, without two-way 
communication between politicians and voters. Another research finding (Dang-Xuan, Stieglitz, 
Wladarsch, and Neuberger, 2013) also supports Klinger's (2013) analysis; during the 2011 
parliamentary election campaign period in Germany, politicians were not interactive on Twitter but 
only made use of social media to publicise their messages.  
In the context of local government use of social media in the United States, survey research conducted 
by Graham and Avery (2013) reports that social media were underutilised by local government 
officials, with the further comment that the use of social media by government officials in the context 
studied was more towards one-way communication, with government officials making 
announcements or advertisements (pp.13-15). Graham and Avery (2013) state that digital media can 
allow a disengaged public to participate in public debates and decision-making, making democracy its 
‘richest’ (p.13), but only when this usage is promoted or supported. In the 2007 and 2012 French 
presidential campaigns, online campaigning on websites was more associated with candidates 
providing information instead of interacting or having debates (Koc-Michalska, Gibson, and Vedel, 
2014, p.228). According to Hopkins (2014), when the Malaysia Prime minister  Najib Razak faced a 
variety of questions on his social media account, he chose to answer questions which were less 
sophisticated or problematic (p.18).  
Thus, it could be said that interacting on SNSs is a choice, where users can choose the amount of 
interaction that they want to participate. The interaction feature provided on SNSs is another way for 
SNS users to participate in politics through the space given to them to interpret political content 
without mainstream media interference. For various reasons, one could expect a limited level of 
interaction between politicians or government officials and their followers. However, as SNSs 
emerged as another channel of political communication and election campaigning in many democratic 
countries, it might be the only way for citizens to express opinions on politicians with the expectation 
of receiving a specific response. Direct responses from politicians to citizens on SNSs seem to be 
limited and politicians can also anticipate that followers will criticise politicians for not interacting 
with them on SNSs.  
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2.3.2. Interaction and spreadable content: traditional two-step flow of 
communication and vote-canvassing systems  
Interacting on a Facebook post brings the possibility for the content to be spread to other SNSs users.  
In the context of election campaigns, the spreading of content can be associated with the theory of 
two-step flow and the notion of traditional vote-canvassing systems in Thai political culture. This 
subsection explains how interaction on a Facebook post has the potential to enable more Facebook 
users to be exposed to a campaign message posted on a candidate’s Facebook page and how this 
feature of Facebook is a development from the traditional vote-canvassing system.  
According to the definition provided by Jenkins, Ford, and Green (2013), the terms ‘spread’, 
‘spreadable’, or ‘spreadability’, are used to describe ‘the increasingly pervasive forms of media 
circulation’ (p.3). To be specific, ‘spreadability’ refers to the ‘potential -- both technical and cultural -
-for audiences to share content for their own purposes, sometimes with the permission of rights 
holders, some--times against their wishes’ (ibid., p.3), which means that once people have the content, 
they can spread it. There are different possible reasons why social media users spread media content, 
which Jenkins et al. outline. Social media users might take into consideration of the merit of engaging 
with the content and the merit of sharing the content with others, the interest that other people would 
have in the content and if spreading the media content would reflect upon the person spreading it and 
the platform that is appropriate to spread the content (ibid., p.13).  
On SNSs like Facebook, content can be spread by users intentionally and unintentionally. For 
example, after a Facebook friend posted a picture, the ‘share’ tab underneath the photograph allows 
users to ‘share’ publicly and privately (Miller, 2011, p.75). The sharing of content and the notion of 
‘connectedness’ of Facebook that Van Dijck (2013) mentions, enables shared content to appear as a 
news feed on a third person’s Facebook page, allowing the third person to view and also to further 
‘share’ the content. The person who initially posted the content would not be notified about the 
spreading of content on Facebook regardless of whether the initial person grants the permission for 
the content to be further spread on Facebook or not. As a result, sharing of content on Facebook 
spreads the content to other users, who get to view the content, interact with the content and have the 
choice to share further the content on Facebook. This is an example to show the content was 
purposefully shared by the initial person to his Facebook friends, but it is also possible for the content 
to be further spread on Facebook without the first person knowing, indicating both intentional and 
unintentional spreading of content.  
67 
 
Another example of spreading content on Facebook is associated with users clicking the ‘Like’ tab or 
leaving a comment on the post. Depending on the Facebook algorithm, there is a possibility that 
information about either of these actions will appear on the user’s friend’s timeline showing that the 
user had interacted and how the user interacted. Andrejevic (2006) as cited in Humphreys (2011, 
p.577) states that the user can act as ‘literal surveillance’ to monitor the friend’s interaction on his/her 
Facebook timeline. This can occur if Facebook does not notify the user’s news feed of the friend’s 
interaction.  
The interaction Facebook feature of clicking the ‘Like’ tab or commenting can explicitly spread the 
content to other Facebook users, and the initial user might or might not know about this. In other 
words, the spreading of content and the users interacting with the content is one of the social media 
features that Kent (2010) outlines, mentioning that users can construct and develop a network of 
anonymous ‘friends’ by sharing information on their network (p.647). This means that 
communicating on SNSs has the potential for one message to reach and be spread to people who are 
connected directly or indirectly to the individual who makes the initial post.  
The spreadability of content from one Facebook user to another is linked to the concept of two-step 
flow, based on the relationship and personal influence from opinion leaders and the people who are 
connected to the opinion leaders. Katz and Lazarsfel (1955) state the underlying idea of two-step flow 
is that ‘ideas often seem to flow from radio and print to opinion leaders and from them to the less 
active sections of the population’ (p.32). Based on the way people are related, there are possibilities of 
distributing influential information from opinion leaders to less active population groups. One-step 
flow of information is described by Norris and Curtice (2008) as the idea of political messages on 
mainstream media are broadcast directly to a mass audience.  
In the state election in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany in 2010, Marcinkowski and Metag (2014) 
discuss that the idea of ‘two-step flow of campaign message’ occur in a way that what candidate 
expect journalists to access the information that candidates published on Web sites and use it to 
communicate with voters who receive campaign information from traditional news media. 
Marcinkowski and Metag state that candidates of the election were not motivated to use social media 
to win votes, but such idea of ‘two-step flow of campaign message’ has more potential for them to 
win votes and traditional news media are perceived to be more influential (pp.161-162). Moreover, 
Copeland and Römmele (2014) discuss that people who receive campaign posts on social media acted 
as opinion leaders during the 2009 German Federal Election campaign as they were the intermediaries 
between the political party and the larger group of voters, for them to discuss political ideas with.  
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Thai political figures’ use SNSs account as their own channel of communication can be source of 
information for both followers and mainstream media. Facebook users or followers of Thai political 
figures’ SNSs accounts, who share or interact with the political content on a Facebook page, can be 
referred to as ‘opinion leaders’ in a two-step flow network, while friends of such followers who do 
not follow candidates’ SNSs accounts are considered as ‘less active’. As a result, for followers who 
interact with candidates’ campaign content on SNSs, there is the possibility for the content to appear 
on the followers’ friends SNSs accounts as the content has been spread in ‘two-step’, allowing the 
followers’ friends at the third level of the network to be exposed to the content. Consequently, when a 
Facebook user spreads content on her/his Facebook network, her/his friends who might or might not 
be following any politically related Facebook page, would be exposed to the content without actually 
seeking the political information. The spreading of content on Facebook therefore reflects upon the 
concept of two-step flow of content from one Facebook user to another.  
A few researchers have commented that the spreading of political content online and offline have 
created possibilities of gaining attention from less active voters as they get exposed to political 
content from people who they are related to. In the research that Norris and Curtice (2008) undertook 
about the flow of political messages on the internet during the 2005 British general election, they 
found that the more sources of political information that someone used to search about the election, 
the more likely that person would talk about the election to someone who might not use the internet to 
the acquire information themselves. In another study on the effect of social media on political 
participation and candidate’s image evaluation in the 2012 Iowa caucuses, Dimitrova and Bystrom 
(2013) noted that when citizens compose and post political messages on the internet, this can lead to 
the possibilities to affect political outcomes as social media are able to influence citizens’ perception 
of the candidates. This implies that even though nothing has been found in relation to the direct 
influence of spreading political content on voting decisions, the internet is an additional source of 
political information for opinion leaders, who are very likely to disseminate political information to 
friends and family members around them. Such friends and family members might rely on these 
opinion leaders to give them information about the election.  
From the perspective of Thai political culture, the traditional vote-canvassing system, the commitment 
of incumbents and the patron-client network have been fundamental in rural areas elections. The 
spreading of content on Facebook in part mirrors the traditional ‘vote-canvassing system’ (ระบบ
หวัคะแนน) in terms of the importance of networks. Both the network on Facebook and traditional 
‘vote-canvassing system’ involve the idea of network expansion, influential communication and 
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development of relationships between people connected on the network. Ockey (2004) defines the 
literal meaning of ‘vote-canvassing system’ as ‘vote-chief system’ (p.27). Callahan and McCargo 
(1996) state the literal meaning of vote-canvassers or hua khanaen as ‘head vote’ and they act 
practically as canvassers, vote gatherers and vote banks. The electoral ties of vote-canvassers lie 
under the notion of the vote-canvasser distributing money or gifts to ensure that voters vote for the 
particular candidate that the vote-canvasser is working for, and the vote-canvasser can somehow 
determine the number of votes that the candidate will get in the election (ibid.). Callahan and 
McCargo give an example of vote-buying that prevents voters from betraying vote-canvassers: the 
vote-canvasser buys the vote and ‘hires’ the voter’s identification card, which agents of the vote-
canvasser can use to pretend that they are voters (p.387). 
Sombat (1993) characterises vote-canvassers as people who are respectable, responsible and related to 
the candidate in one way or other and are well-known in the community (p.119). Anek (1996) 
identifies vote-canvassers in rural areas as village heads, landlords, shopkeepers, and school teachers, 
who are personal supporters of the candidate. These people act as village representative of political 
figures, and political figures have vote-canvassers to assist them in elections and keep in touch with 
voters (p.206). Selecting the ‘wrong’ canvassers can cause the candidate to lose elections (Surin and 
McCargo, 1997, p.138).  
Campaigning in a traditional vote-canvassing system consists of a multiple-layer of relationships in 
offline communication, introducing a candidate to more voters and exposing more voters to the 
candidate’s campaign. Based on a study of the campaign of a candidate (Kom) in suburban Bangkok 
in 2005, Anyarat (2010) found that there were three layers of vote-canvassers shown in Figure 2.1.: 
Core vote-canvassers, intermediate vote-canvasser, and cell vote-canvassers. The intermediate vote-
canvassers are progressively more familiar with the local electorate than core vote-canvassers. Cell 
vote-canvassers are members of a village or community who are responsible for distributing cash to 
voters face-to-face and ensuring that voters turn up for the election. Regardless of the roles of the 
different types of vote-canvasser, the networked relationships between the candidate, vote-canvassers 
and voters are significant in engaging and spreading information about the candidate from one vote-
canvasser to another.  
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Figure 2.1: Kom’s vote-canvassing network in the 2005 general election, compiled by Anyarat (2010). 
Also, the traditional vote-canvassing system in Thai political culture occurs through a patron-client 
network and relationships, whereby politicians (patrons) who win elections can meet the financial 
needs of the rural people (clients) (Anek, 1996, p.202). In judging the value and the suitability of Thai 
politicians, the idea phonngan (achievements) is as important too. Callahan and McCargo (1996) 
claim that incumbents or former MPs in Thailand’s Northeast tend to campaign based on their work 
performance during their time as MPs and their contribution to local communities. In a more recent 
analysis of politicians’ performance, Walker (2008) also found that local politicians’ sacrifice and 
commitment to projects in the local community and involvement in village events still matter locally 
(pp.91-92).  
Anek's (1996) analysis of the division between political culture among rural and urban is outdated as 
more recent papers have provided conflicting analysis (Anyarat, 2010; Stithorn, 2012). Anyarat (2010) 
concludes that traditional vote-canvassing systems occurred together with a political marketing 
approach in the 2005 general election campaign. What can be taken away from the traditional Thai 
political culture of campaigning and relationships between politicians and voters is that firstly, 
political public relations on SNSs should take into consideration of how candidates use other tactics 
for campaigning. Secondly, a candidate’s relationship with voters matters in voters deciding who to 
vote for. Thus, adding to the proposal of Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) and Sweetser (2011) that the 
relationship between politicians and their key publics is a core value in political public relations and 
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can have an impact on the support that they gain from the public, the literature on Thai political 
culture also suggests that the electoral tie between political figures or political parties and voters is 
also fundamental for voters in voting. How such electoral tie or relationship is established or managed 
done on SNSs will be further examined in this thesis. However, it is plausible that the establishment 
of a relationship between candidates and voters on SNSs might be more demanding due to the diverse 
background of followers connected to candidates’ SNS pages.  
In short, developing from two-step flows and traditional vote-canvassing systems in election 
campaigns, it could be said that SNS features of interaction, interchangeability, and spreadability of 
content are part of information management in political public relations on SNSs. These features have 
potential benefits for expanding candidates’ SNS networks and getting direct access to followers’ 
feedback, enabling candidates to know followers’ thoughts based on the political issues that they have 
posted. It is likely that public relations personnel would take into consideration the features of 
interactivity, interchangeability, and spreadability to post campaign messages and visual images on 
candidates’ SNS accounts in a way to increase the spreadability of content on SNSs. Also, 
crowdsourcing can be related to the spreadability of content on SNSs, with possibilities for public 
relations personnel to initiate and encourage crowdsourcing of content in relation to candidates’ 
campaigns, as a way for followers to show their support and engage with a particular candidate’s 
campaign. However, as the relationship among Facebook users and friends varies, users who receive 
content spread on Facebook might or might not be voters in a particular election. 
2.3.3. Regulation and interaction as a challenge to image management 
Internet regulation is another important issue when studying online communication in Thailand. As 
discussed by Pirongrong (2001), the evolution of the internet in Thailand has led to children using the 
internet inappropriately or accessing inappropriate content. Different actors in Thailand, parents, 
schools, Internet Service Providers and the police, have taken their own actions with different levels 
of involvement in regulating the internet in Thailand. A similarly diffused responsibility exists for 
regulating political public relations on SNSs during election campaign in Thailand. To gain a better 
understanding of how interaction on SNSs has affected the image of politicians, this subsection 
reviews the way followers have used SNSs to challenge politicians’ images and the possible ways in 
which politicians deal with such challenges. This will identify the issues of interaction and storage 
that this research should take into consideration when analysing political public relations on SNSs in 
the Thai context.  
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In the rise of online political communication, the officials of Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology (MICT) are responsible for regulating and censoring content on the 
internet in Thailand (Isriya, 2012, p.25).  However, there have been changes in the framework of 
regulating and censoring content on the internet in Thailand. Before the September 2006, the Thai 
government censored websites without a legal framework. From September 2006 to July 2007, the 
Thai government censored websites using the Order Number 5 of Council of National Security (CNS). 
After July 2007 until now, the Thai government censored websites using the Computer Crime Act 
2007 (cited from Chalisa, 2012; Isriya, 2012). Computer Crime Act 2007 Section 14 and Section 15 
state:  
Section 14. If any person commits any offence of the following acts shall be subject to 
imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than one hundred thousand 
baht or both: 
(1) that involves import to a computer system of forged computer data, either in whole or in 
part, or false computer data, in a manner that is likely to cause damage to that third party or 
the public; 
(2) that involves import to a computer system of false computer data in a manner that is likely 
to damage the country’s security or cause a public panic; 
(3) that involves import to a computer system of any computer data related with an offence 
against the Kingdom’s security under the Criminal Code; 
(4) that involves import to a computer system of any computer data of a pornographic nature 
that is publicly accessible; 
(5) that involves the dissemination or forwarding of computer data already known to be 
computer data under (1) (2) (3) or (4); 
Section 15. Any service provider intentionally supporting or consenting to an offence under 
Section 14 within a computer system under their control shall be subject to the same penalty 
as that imposed upon a person committing an offence under Section 14. 
Source: (“Computer Crime Act B.E 2550 (2007)”) 
As part of Section 14 of Computer Crime Act 2007, it is a crime to import or disseminate false 
computer data which is likely to cause damage to third party or the public, national security or create a 
public panic. According to Section 15 Computer Crime Act 2007, service provider shall be subject to 
the same penalty if they ‘intentionally supporting or consenting to an offence under Section 14 within 
a computer system under their control.’ Thai authorities have been playing an active role in 
monitoring online content. According to the website ‘Freedom House’, there were nearly 21,000 
URLs blocked by Thai courts in 2012 and this figure includes thousands of URLs related to anti-royal 
content (“Thailand: Freedom of the press 2013,” n.d.). Isriya (2012) identifies that websites in 
Thailand that have been blocked in the past tend to be the ones which are associated with pornography, 
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criticism of the Thai Royal Institution, ‘political enemies by citing the  lèse-majesté law8 or national 
security’, gambling websites, religion websites that contain inappropriate Buddha’s images, terrorists 
and separatists associated with the violence in the Southern of Thailand, online gaming leads to high 
addiction from parent networks, proxy and anonymity software, and unknown or accidental websites 
(pp.26-27).  
There is a wide spectrum of political opinions among Thai internet users. As political communication 
on the internet started to emerge in Thailand, Pitch (2002) claims that systems of  moderation 
emerged, including web masters blocking  the internet protocol address of certain users (p.157). After 
the 1992 political instability in Thailand, the political discussion via internet message board 
constitutes of issues that are ‘the politics of personality’, ‘the politics of development’ and ‘the 
politics of memory’ where the discussion would consist of disagreement, lack of mutual 
understanding and lack of solution to various issues (ibid., pp.158-162). As for social media, Kent 
(2010) identifies that moderation as one of the characteristics of social media, where Facebook and 
LinkedIn require users to grant permission to others to join their networks, controlling access to the 
content that is posted on users’ SNSs accounts (p.645). Moderation enables users to select the people 
to become part of their network to communicate with each other. The storage capability and temporal 
structure of SNSs allow the public to know the ‘identity’ of people who interact, how they interact 
and the time they interact, which the identity of SNSs users used as their username might be 
pseudonyms. Thus, as for political communication on SNSs, it is plausible that political figures and 
their public relations personnel would regulate content at individual level based on content which is 
inappropriate in Thailand and based what they perceive in be inappropriate on their SNSs network.  
Thais who anonymously use SNSs to challenge Thai politicians’ images are known as ‘nakleng 
keyboard’, which can be translated as ‘keyboard warrior.’ The notion of ‘nakleng keyboard’ in 
Thailand was initiated from a pop song entitled ‘Nakleng Keyboard’ (นกัเลงคีย์บอร์ด) by Stamp Apiwat 
Ueathawonsuk, about the behaviour of young lovers relying heavily on keyboards to communicate 
anonymously with someone they admire (lyrics and translation attached in Appendix 4). ‘Nakleng’ is 
used ironically in this song because it refers to someone who hides their identity when communicating 
online. The notion of nakleng keyboard in this song indicates that the nakleng does not have the 
courage to communicate verbally or face-to-face; but using keyboards, ‘nakleng’ are able to 
                                                             
8
 Stated in Section 112 of Thai Criminal Code ‘Whoever, defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-
apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.’ (“Criminal Code” ) 
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communicate more confidently. In other words, communication via a keyboard is totally different 
from face-to-face communication.
9
 This usage obviously differs from conventional usage when the 
term  nakleng is used to describe certain politicians, as analysed in Section 2.2.2, or where the term  
nakleng literally means gangsters (or tough guys), who are brave in action, decision-making and 
speaking. While the term ‘nakleng keyboard’ can be viewed pejoratively, as a kind of cowardice, it 
should be appreciated that by not revealing their identity online, SNSs users can sometimes express 
their opinion more honestly. As it is challenging to be nakleng face-to-face, especially in the face of 
important politicians, the implications of anonymising interaction can increase the ability and self-
assurance of SNS users to communicate critically.  
Based on the requirement of operational skills and information skills to handle with digital technology 
that Van Dijk (2006) outlines, the barrier for citizens to enter political communication on the internet 
is low, especially for citizens whose occupation and age motivate them to use the internet. As a result, 
there have been cases where citizens took the advantage of the low barrier to enter political 
communication on the internet to challenge or support political figures. On Obama’s ‘MyBO’ 
campaign website, Harfoush (2009) raises the concern that people would create accounts using fake 
email addresses to post negative comments on the website. The intention of the ‘MyBO’ campaign 
website was to make it as quick and easy as possible for people get connected to the campaign so that 
there was no requirement for people to confirm their email address. Another study by Gueorguieva 
(2007)  found that YouTube and MySpace challenged election campaign strategies on the ability to 
deliver a clear and consistent message that reflected candidates’ images due to the reduced control 
that candidates have over their image and message. Candidates were not able to control the content 
that supporters and opponents posted. This shows that the ability to access SNSs has created obstacles 
for candidates in maintaining their image.  
In the Malaysian context, online technology has been used by citizens to challenge the image of the 
government, developing the democratic value of online political communication. George (2005) states 
that there are daily updates on online media about political issues in Malaysia that challenge the 
ideological hold of local mainstream media. As a result of the strict control of media ownership in 
Malaysia, Lim (2013) claims that many youths choose to express their political views and criticism 
through video blogging. Moreover, Chinnasamy and Griffiths (2013) argue that as the internet 
democratises political communication, it is likely to encourage ‘new forms of democratic participation’ 
                                                             
9
 However, the term ‘nakleng keyboard’ can also be used to describe those who write aggressive comments, without hiding 
their identity. 
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(p.59). As a result of the low barrier to enter communication on SNSs, political communication 
becomes decentralised.  
Similar to other in the context of the United States and Thailand, citizens participating in online 
communication might or might not reveal their real identity when communicating on the internet. In 
the context of Malaysia, Rosyidah (2015) claims that the Malaysian government employs cyber 
troopers to respond to online political attacks on them in order to narrow the political spectrum and to 
manage images from a particular political side (p.286). Thus, online political communication 
strengthened democratic values and at the same time, challenged the government’s image, which the 
Malaysian government seems find ways to balance off the wide political views online. As followers 
interact to give feedback, evaluate and criticise political figures on SNSs, making it is difficult for 
them to control how followers comment about them. Negative comments also imply that the 
spreadability of content on SNSs might not enhance the image of political figures’ on SNSs.  
Turning to the Thai context, Thai politicians have a few strategies when dealing with interactive 
political communication in parliamentary debates, which gives clues on the way they would deal 
questions or debates in election campaign on SNSs. According to Sombat (2006), ‘silence is golden’ 
when Thai politicians face critical questions in parliament, as they choose to ignore questions that 
other politicians ask them. Sombat also found that there are Thai politicians who may also deny or 
admit charges about them and attack the questioners in return. Nevertheless, the most frequent way 
for Thai politicians to respond is the non-reply or no-answer responses (ibid., p.[47]). Sombat’s 
research shows the methods that Thai politicians could manage their image and defuse difficult 
situations by delaying responses to criticism.  
So far, there has been little discussion about how Thai people’s access to interaction features on SNSs 
can be a drawback for a candidate’s image during an election campaign and political communication 
on SNSs. How citizens participate in political communication on the candidates’ SNSs is not under 
their control. The moderation feature of Facebook that Kent (2010) identifies would allow political 
public relations on SNSs to occur in a way that Thai political figures and their public relations 
personnel would regulate and manage comments. Thus, as interaction on SNSs is stored and is visible 
to the public online, it is possible that Thai political figures and their public relations personnel would 
manage critical comments and deal with followers who use fake identities to set up accounts on SNSs 
and interact critically or ‘inappropriately’ on the political figures’ SNS accounts. The regulation might 
be done on individual basis. At the same time, it is also possible for Thai politicians to use the ‘silence 
is golden’ strategy (Sombat, 2006) to deal with interaction on SNSs in order to manage their image. 
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As interaction on SNSs is a choice (Dang-Xuan et al., 2013; Klinger, 2013), it is unlikely that there 
would be ongoing two-way communication between Thai political figures and individual follower. 
Conclusion  
The objective of this chapter was to develop a framework for understanding the operation of political 
public relations on Thai political figures’ SNS accounts. Based on the literature reviewed in this 
chapter and background knowledge of this research in Chapter 1, the following framework is 
formulated.   
Political public relations in the third age of political communication on the internet constitute a few 
interrelated management elements such as information, image, relationship and challenges. Applying 
political public relations to SNS election campaigns, as a specific period of time where candidates 
communicate with voters to convince voters, the basis of political public relations is associated with 
the management of the relationships between candidates and their followers, and between personnel 
and candidate. The management of the relationship between personnel and candidate is essential in 
the internal communication and operation of the candidates’ SNSs for political purposes, where 
candidates are likely to rely on the professional skills of public relations personnel to operate their 
SNS pages, make strategic plans and maximise positive coverage of the candidates’ campaigns based 
on written texts and visual images framed and posted throughout the election campaign.  Prior to the 
election campaign or at the beginning of the election campaign, public relations personnel would have 
sufficient background knowledge about the candidate to be able to personalise the SNS accounts that 
they are responsible for.  
Communicating on Facebook is beyond one-way communication of political communication or 
political advertising on billboards or brochures. The relationship between the candidate and her/his 
followers can be developed based on what the candidate communicates on Facebook on a regular 
basis, the way in which the candidate and her/his public relations personnel disseminate campaign 
information and the candidate’s image constructed in order to engage with followers during the 
election campaign. The interaction feature of Facebook can establish a ‘digital vote-canvassing 
system’ (a concept which will be developed throughout this thesis) as the functionality of Facebook 
can increase the number of Facebook users exposed to the candidate’s Facebook messages. Based on 
the algorithms of Facebook, the various ways in which followers interact on Facebook can spread the 
content from the candidates’ Facebook networks to their followers’ networks. Candidates intend to 
gain votes through the development of such relationships.  
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However, considering the wide political spectrum of Facebook users, candidates could also encounter 
difficulties in enhancing their image on SNSs, as unidentified followers interact to challenge this 
image. The decentralisation of communication on SNSs as an emerging platform of communication in 
Thailand can also bring complications in terminating interaction, which can be problematic during the 
election campaign as there are rules that candidates have to obey. As a result, it is likely that the 
operation of SNSs for political purposes is also associated with the management of interaction in 
transmitting content related to election campaign on candidate’s Facebook network. The management 
of such challenges would be based on knowledge and skills that public relations personnel have and 
their relationship with the candidate. The management of the spreadability of the content on SNSs is 
done with the intention to minimise drawbacks to the candidate’s image and campaign. The analytical 
framework formulated in this chapter leads to Chapter 3 to define the research questions and research 
methods chosen for data collection and data analysis.  
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Chapter 3 : Data Collection and Research Methods 
 
Introduction 
The study of political public relations on SNSs aims to explore the management process and issues 
involved in operating communication on SNSs for political purposes. Annette Markham (2011) 
proposes ‘The internet is a social phenomenon, a tool, and also a field for qualitative research’ (p.111), 
which can be studied in the following ways: 1. using the internet to collect, store and analyse data; 2. 
mediation of the internet and people’s experience of using the internet; and 3. capabilities and features 
of the internet (p.112). This research employs these three ways to approach the study of political 
public relations on SNSs by collecting and studying candidates’ Facebook posts and exploring the 
way in which followers of Thai political figures are mediated by campaign messages and how the 
affordance features and functions of SNSs establish and develop a network, enabling SNSs users to 
interact continuously and spread messages across networks during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign. The following are the research questions.  
1. What features of visual image management were found on candidates’ Facebook pages 
during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign?  
The first research question seeks to examine the type of core visual images of candidates portrayed on 
candidates’ Facebook pages during the election campaign. This question also looks at the 
management and selection of their visual images and takes into consideration images that candidates 
used in other media.  
2. What features of multimodal image and information management were found on candidates’ 
Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign? 
The second research question examines the core aspects of the way in which candidates’ publish and 
communicate campaign information, particularly their policy-related content. This research question 
seeks to determine how candidates draw followers’ attention to their campaign on Facebook, how 
candidates facilitate followers in interpreting about their campaign and how candidates provide a 
broader aspect of their campaign.  
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3. What was the relationship among the individuals who were part of the candidates’ 
networks on social networking sites during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign? i.e. public relations personnel and followers.  
The objective of the third research question is to determine the way in which candidates attempted to 
relate to followers and the relationship between people who were connected with candidates’ SNS 
pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. This research question examines the 
roles of public relations personnel in order to visualise the candidates’ networks based on the 
operation of the election campaign on SNSs and the plausibility for the SNS networks to interchange 
through the relationship among SNS users and their interaction on SNSs. 
4. How did the features of social networking sites challenge political public relations 
during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign and political 
communication in Thailand?  
The final research question aims to identify and discuss the challenges that Thai political figures 
encounter when using SNSs for election campaigns and political communication in Thailand, taking 
into consideration features of SNSs in storing and decentralising communication. This question seeks 
also to identify the regulation of political SNS accounts.  
The study of communication on the internet in this study is complex and involves a combination of a 
number of research methods to approach the exploratory challenge in this research field. Patton (2002) 
mentions that there is no single source of information that are reliable as a single source of 
information provide limited perspective while Gillham (2005) explains that having more than one 
research methodology allows research to give confirmation ‘more precisely and accurately’ (p.164). 
Furthermore, there is no core methodological approach or theoretical guidelines in studying the 
internet (Markham, 2011). Thus, this research uses a qualitative research method to approach the 
challenge of such research where no definite design or technique is available to collect and analyse 
data.  
Silverman (2011) says that a qualitative research method involves a range of different and conflicting 
activities, but can be characterised as research that attempts to study phenomena arising through 
observation of material with the aim of giving an explanation in the wider context in which the 
phenomenon arises (p.17). There is no one single way to analyse qualitative data and basic numerical 
analysis can be used to give an overview of the data in qualitative research (ibid., p.5).  The study of 
political public relations on SNSs in this research is a new area of qualitative research, which still 
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lacks a specific research method or procedures to explore political public relations on SNSs. 
Therefore, this research employs two sets of research methods, a multimodal analysis and elite 
interviews, to answer the research questions.  
This chapter reviews research methods undertaken in this research to respond to the research question. 
As data collection and data analysis for this research constituted various challenges, this chapter also 
acknowledges the difficulties encountered. This chapter is structured as follows.  Section 3.1 reviews 
the details of multimodal analysis, which constitutes of basic content analysis, framing analysis and 
semiotic analysis to determine the ways of disseminating campaign information that M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used to distinguish their campaigns on their Facebook pages during the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. Without prior knowledge and expectation of the 
ambiguity of dealing with data, a pilot study was done for content analysis as part of the multimodal 
analysis. Section 3.2 justifies why elite interviews was another primary method in this research used 
to explore the experience and decision-making of Thai politicians and their public relations personnel 
in using SNSs for political purposes. This research employed 14 interviews in total with Thai 
politicians and candidates of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election and their SNS public relations 
personnel. The interviews were conducted between January and November 2013, which included the 
campaign period of 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. The small number of interviews carried out 
was because of the difficulty in obtaining interviewees’ consent. Three observation studies were done 
to explore further the operation of SNSs and experience the atmosphere of the field campaign during 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election.  
3.1. Multimodal analysis  
A multimodal analysis was used to study the Facebook pages of candidates in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign. Kress and Leeuwen (2006) define ‘multimodal texts’ as ‘any text 
whose meanings are realized through more than one semiotic code’ (p.177). Jewitt (2009) says that 
the approach of multimodality to understanding communication and representation beyond the 
language used in communication takes into consideration other communicational forms that people 
use, such as image, gesture, and posture (p.14). The multimodal analysis adopted in this research 
consists of basic content analysis, framing analysis and semiotic analysis taking into account 
traditional features of visual and linguistic communication as well as the multimodal elements of 
Facebook as an internet artefact and social networking site. The following is the framework and 
ethical issues that this research has taken into consideration in multimodal analysis.  
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 Content analysis aims to quantify and determine patterns and features of policy-related posts 
on candidates’ Facebook posts during the election campaign.  
 Basic textual framing analysis identifies any aspects of candidate’s slogan that candidates 
intend to make more salient or which are associated with Thai political culture.  
 Basic semiotic analysis of the candidates’ Facebook profile pictures and cover pages, 
encompassing both connotation and denotation of the visual images determining how signs 
are represented on candidates’ core photographs posted on their Facebook page.  
 Intersubjectivity profile analysis looks at candidates’ core background information such as 
family, education, career and hobbies. Intersubjectivity refers to both subjective and objective 
interpretation of experience, behaviour, actions and meanings, which occur between two or 
more separate subjects (Schwandt, 2015, p.169).  The analysis of candidates’ profiles will 
review basic information that candidates revealed about themselves, and interpret how such 
information is associated with the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election.  
 Comments analysis seeks to examine the types of comments which are shown on M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s profile picture and cover page on Facebook.  Interviewees 
in this research have characterised ‘nakleng keyboard’ or ‘keyboard warrior’, who have 
shown intention to destroy Thai political figure’s image.  
 Research ethics:  The ethical issues related to internet research are not well defined and are 
debatable (Markham, 2011, pp.122-123). This research is aware of the ethical and 
confidentiality issues of social science research and internet research. The research ethics of 
this research has been approved by the University of Nottingham Research Ethics Committee. 
The multimodal analysis involves the collection of data from M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and 
Pongsapat’s Facebook pages that have been set for public access. As for the small number of 
comments posted by candidates’ followers that this research also examines in Chapter 7, 
followers have joined the interaction with the candidate’s campaign, knowing that their 
identity would be shown as part of the interaction. However, the followers’ comments in this 
research have been kept to minimal and have also been translated from Thai to English.  
The following subsections outline how this research used this method and explains its relevance. 
3.1.1. Content analysis  
With a large amount of status posted on political figure’s SNSs page, this research developed an 
approach from Klinger's (2013) study of Swiss parties’ Facebook and Twitter updates during the 2011 
national election, by using content analysis as part of the qualitative approach to examine the overall 
content posted on candidates’ Facebook pages. Content analysis allows a large number of 
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communication materials to be analysed in a precise and systematic way, enabling researchers to 
make an objective judgement (quantitative content analysis) and subjective judgement (qualitative 
content analysis) on the communication text (Burnham, Gilland, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2004). The 
strength of content analysis is that it provides a numerical overview of the results (Grbich, 2013). In 
research on internet content in particular, content analysis enabled researchers studying the Polish 
parliamentary election of 2011 to examine how features of internet and the content that candidates and 
political parties posted on the internet were used to engage with voters during election campaign 
(Koc-Michalska, Lilleker, Surowiec, and Baranowski, 2014, p.192).  
This research used Nvivo 10 software to capture and download M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and 
Pongsapat’s Facebook pages, which include the texts of the posts, photographs and videos that 
candidates posted, followers’ comment and user’s information about followers. Nvivo 10 was chosen 
as the software is not only able to navigate and organise both qualitative and quantitative data, but 
was able to capture SNSs content for research purposes.  
Actual study: Sample size for actual data collected  
In terms of the sample size in the analysis of candidates’ Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election, out of the twenty-five candidates, this research focused on the Facebook pages 
of the two ‘frontrunner’ candidates, ranked by the number of votes they gained in the election; these 
were Mom Rajawongse Sukhumbhand Paribatra and Police General Doctor Pongsapat Pongcharoen, 
as shown in Table 3.1:  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of data sample size. 
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As M.R. Sukhumbhand used Facebook for a few years before the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election while Pongsapat only started using Facebook about one week before the official election 
campaign started, this research studies the Facebook text and visual images that M.R. Sukhumbhand 
and Pongsapat posted from 14 January to 4 March 2013, which was from one week before the official 
election campaign started and to day after the election. Data was analysed by looking at the different 
phases of the election campaign as defined below:  
Phase 1: 14 – 25 January 2013  
Phase 2: 26 January – 6 February 2013  
Phase 3: 7 – 18 February 2013  
Phase 4: 19 February – 2 March 2013  
3 March 2013: 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election  
 
Pilot study for content analysis  
According to Treadwell (2011), a pilot study is ‘a small study conducted prior to a full-scale study to 
ensure that the full-scale study will work successfully’ (p.213). Wimmer and Dominick (2006) 
propose that the purpose of a pilot study is to improve the research design and data collection process 
as pilot study can allow researchers to take note unexpected issues. Therefore, a pilot study of 
Facebook content analysis was conducted to test the coding scheme and to gain a basic understanding 
of any patterns in data which candidates posted during the election campaign as well as to alter any 
unforeseen difficulties in dealing with Facebook posts on Nvivo 10.  
The pilot study of this research was done on Pongsapat’s Facebook posts. A total of 150 posts on 
Pongsapat’s Facebook were used as the sample for the pilot study. The results of the pilot study on 
Pongsapat’s Facebook posts suggest the following:  
1. Inductive coding: The initial coding scheme (Appendix 5) for this research was generated 
inductively according to the themes emerges as the researcher explored into Pongsapat’s 
Facebook posts. What was found using this coding scheme was that there was a lack of 
description of each code and groups of codes, which led to difficulty in deciding the 
appropriate code for a particular post. Also, there were new ‘codes’ and ideas generated 
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throughout the sample used in the pilot study, which makes the researcher uncertain in 
deciding the post should be coded into which theme.  
 
2. Policy-related and non-policy-related posts: In the pilot study, Pongsapat’s Facebook posts 
were categorised into policy-related and non-policy-related posts. The pilot study found that 
there were two types of policy-related posts. The first type contains a clear statement and 
identification of what the candidate was proposing as a policy. This was done in a numbered 
sequence, which led readers to expect further posts related to what was posted earlier. In other 
words, this type of posts gives a sense of ‘sequence’ to gain complete information of the 
whole set of policies.   
 
The second kind of policy-related post was a repetition of the first kind, but structured in a 
less formal way. In this kind, the candidate explains further or analyses officially proposed 
policies or reminded followers about a policy to get the campaign on Facebook going.  
 
3. Double coding: Throughout the pilot study, it was found that some posts contain more than 
one code, which means that one post made by the candidate could be referring to multiple 
issues. This made the number of codings greater than the number of sources (posts) studied.  
 
4. Keyword search versus manual coding: Nvivo 10 allows researchers to do ‘keyword 
searches.’ Keywords such as ‘ขอบคณุ (thank you)’, ‘นโยบาย (policy)’ and ‘พรรค (party)’ were 
used to auto code Pongsapat’s Facebook posts. Nvivo 10 coded all posts containing the 
keyword, which assisted the initial stage of data coding. However, some posts which were 
auto coded were not relevant to what this research was looking for, which meant that the 
context of the posts needed further examination in order to make a judgment if a particular 
post should be coded that way. The entire dataset was also coded manually. It was found that 
even though manual coding was time-consuming, the researcher was able to become familiar 
with the entire dataset and gain a deeper understanding of the keywords used in a particular 
post and the context that the candidate was referring to. Moreover, manual coding allows 
notes to be taken on any unforeseen issues for further content analysis.  
 
5. Generating results and reports from Nvivo 10: The initial stage of the pilot study started 
with printing three pages of the dataset and coding them manually on A3 paper. Due to the 
large number of notes taken and codes generated, the dataset was too large to manage on 
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paper. Nvivo 10 was then used to organise the different posts into different codes. However, a 
few types of reports could not be produced using Nvivo. For example, after each post was 
categorised into policy-related and non-policy-related, Nvivo was not able to produce a report 
on the number of policy-related and non-policy-related posts per day. This analysis could 
only be done manually. 
Based on what was found during the pilot study, the coding procedure was further developed to 
increase the flexibility of content analysis with the use of both keyword search and manual coding to 
cross-check results.  
Actual study: The coding scheme and coding procedure  
Based on the results of the pilot study, the coding scheme and coding procedures were redefined for 
the actual study, with detailed descriptions and grouping of codes. The actual study started off by 
numbering every Facebook post studied in this research on a Microsoft Excel spread sheet. The date 
of the post on Facebook was recorded for future reference. The electronic copy was saved while a 
hard copy was printed one-sided on A3 paper.  
To find the distribution of policy and non-policy-related posts that M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat 
posted on their Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, two steps 
were taken. Firstly, a keyword search on the sample was done to find those posts containing the word 
‘นโยบาย (policy)’. All posts containing this keyword were coded as policy-related. Then, the 
researcher read through the hard copy of each candidate’s posts and manually coded as policy-related 
the posts related to the candidate’s policy which did not contain the word ‘policy’. Lastly, the number 
of policy-related posts was deducted from the total sample number to get the number of non-policy-
related posts for each candidate (results presented in subsection 5.2.1).  
To review the daily number of policy-related posts that candidates made on their Facebook pages, a 
Gantt chart was produced via the following steps. Firstly, posts were condensed so that only policy-
related posts remained for examination in this part, so that non-policy-related posts with the keyword 
would not be detected. Secondly, to set a baseline of the standard policies that candidates were 
proposing in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, policy keywords of used in the 
candidates’ brochures were extracted and used as the keywords to search for candidates’ policy-
related posts (Appendix 6). Finally, each keyword related to a particular policy was searched. A 
spread sheet was used to record the number of times a particular keyword appeared in each post. This 
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enables the identification of the Facebook posts (by the number used to characterise the post) which 
contain keywords on a particular policy (results presented in subsections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3)  
The different districts in Bangkok have different features. A few districts have been developed for 
tourism and commercial purposes, and some have been retained as government or residential areas. 
This research also examined the extent to which candidates associated their policies to specific 
districts in Bangkok to judge which district each campaign intended to target. To do this, a keyword 
search of district names on policy-related posts of both candidates noted the percentage of policy-
related posts containing the name of a particular district in Bangkok (results presented in subsection 
5.3.3). 
The results of the content analysis show the number of posts that contain a particular code, not the 
number of times a particular code was detected. The percentage of posts containing a particular code 
was calculated. This research used a deductive approach in combination with an inductive approach to 
allow flexibility in generating new codes and to ensure that content analysis followed the research 
framework. Both soft and hard copies of the dataset were used in the content analysis and 
multimodality analysis. 
3.1.2. Semiotics analysis  
The study of the visual images in this research seeks to find frames which candidates use in their 
profile pictures and cover pages of their Facebook pages to construct their image and distinguish 
themselves, also taking into consideration other visual images that they have posted on their Facebook 
pages during the election campaign. This research takes the basic approach of semiotic analysis to 
study visual images. Silverman (2011) defines ‘semiotics’ as the science of ‘signs’, which expresses 
how signs are related to one another to construct particular meanings (p.329). Another definition of 
semiotics provided by Chandler (2002) is ‘the study of signs’ or the way in which reality is 
represented through signs e.g. words, images, sounds, odours, flavours, acts or objects (pp.1-2). To 
understand the meaning of signs, codes are used to provide a framework. ‘Codes’ link the producer 
and interpreters of signs together, which can help to simplify phenomena and make the transmission 
of the message easier (ibid., p.157). For example, social codes vary from culture to culture, and social 
codes can be used to identify social identities, which is reflected in our images (ibid., p.153).  
Visual images studied in this research were coded according to the basic notions of denotation and 
connotation. Machin (2007) defines ‘denotation’ as the literal or basic meaning of an image, which 
involves the selection of what have been included in the image (p.24), while ‘connotation’ is defined 
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as the representation of ideas and values that are transmitted through the image (p.25). The 
semiotician Roland Barthes (1977) refers to these ideas as the ‘informational level’ and ‘symbolic 
level’ respectively. These terms are also related to what Lacey (2009) refers to ‘technical coding’ and 
‘symbolic coding’. Technical coding includes formal aspects of decoding conventional meanings 
based on the angle of the image taken, distance, composition, depth of field, lens type, mobile frame, 
and lighting, while symbolic coding interprets the visual image according to non-verbal 
communication and looks at the nature of society as a whole (ibid., pp.20-32). In additional, Lacey 
also proposes that coding of visual images can take into consideration written text related to the visual 
images (p.32). Thus, this research codes visual images technically and symbolically and also codes 
the written text to gain both the literal meaning and the political values of the visual image transmitted 
through the photograph studied.  
In terms of a coding scheme, the visual images studied in this research were coded according to the 
scheme of Grabe and Bucy (2013): 1. the Ideal Candidate; and 2. the Populist (as shown in Appendix 
3). This research does not use the Sure Loser image as candidates are unlikely to post a negative 
image on their SNS pages (Goodnow, 2013). The semiotic analysis also takes into consideration of 
signs of election campaign such as candidate’s election campaign used as part of their identity during 
the election campaign, the colours that they used to edit their visual images, SNSs sign and 
candidate’s SNSs username. This is done in order to determine how candidates construct their image 
in relation to other signs associated to their campaign.   
To sum up, the multimodal analysis was adopted to explore the textual and visual content of 
candidates’ Facebook pages in relation to the way in which candidates set their agenda-related 
policies over the period of the election campaign and the specific frames which candidates adopted to 
promote a particular image and aspect of their campaigns. Results of the multimodal analysis provide 
an overview of the campaign messages that candidates communicated and the images that they 
constructed and developed.  What is still lacking is the justification for the operation of candidates’ 
SNS pages; interviews and observation studies were used for this.  
3.2. Elite interviews  
Previous research on the use of social media for political communication and election campaigning in 
other contexts has used interviews with politicians, campaign managers and SNS public relations 
personnel, with a more focused sample (Enli and Skogerbø, 2013; Karlsen, 2010; Leong, 2014; 
Levenshus, 2010) in comparison to Marcinkowski and Metag (2014) use mail-out/mail back paper-
and-pencil questionnaire, sent out to 679 candidates in the state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, 
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Germany in 2010. This research also conducted interviews with such groups to gain a deeper 
understanding on their use of SNSs. According to Gillham (2000), an ‘elite’ is someone who is in a 
privileged position in terms of knowledge and expertise (p.81). Burnham et al. (2004) propose that 
elite interviews will enable researchers to gain new ideas, distinctive viewpoints and interpretations 
related to the central research question and research framework (p.29). The exploratory approach 
taken by this research used interviews to identify the rationales of these groups and their decision-
making processes on problems and strategies for communicating on SNSs. Interviewing elite players 
also aimed at identifying what they consider to be challenging for themselves and their image when 
using SNSs.  
The interview questions were open-ended, allowing interviewees to express their opinions fully. Due 
to the different experience and professional background of the interviewees, semi-structured 
interviews were used. According to Braun and Clarke (2013), a semi-structured interview is one 
where the researcher has prepared a list of questions based on the research scope, but interviewees are 
allowed to raise issues that the researcher has not anticipated. This type of interview allows other 
matters to emerge in the interview, enabling the research to capture the range of participants’ 
responses. Burnham et al. (2004) propose that semi-structured interviews are the most efficient way to 
obtain information about decision-making processes. Therefore, as this research aims to analyse the 
different experience of interviewees using SNSs in the election campaigns, semi-structured interviews 
allowed a range of individual issues to be examined in detail.  
3.2.1. Interview sample  
Access to interviewees can be the main problem when studying elites (Hertz and Imber, 1995 cited in 
Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p.147). Contacting interviewees might not be too challenging if the 
researcher has initial contacts with them through previous work experience in the same field as 
mentioned in Phansasiri's (2013) research. Due to very limited initial contacts the researcher had with 
Thai politicians, candidates in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election and their public relations 
personnel, the researcher tried different ways to contact people to gain access to these elites by using 
purposive sampling and snowball sampling.  
 
Patton (2002) defines purposive sampling as a way to select data cases (participants, texts) on the 
basis that they will be able to provide detail and rich information for the researcher to analyse (p.45-
46). While in snowball sampling, Burnham et al. (2004) explain that the researcher starts out with a 
few participants, then asks them to suggest other key individuals who they perceive to be able to give 
useful information to the research (p.207).  The use of elite interviews takes advantage of establishing 
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contact networks and access to other people in the profession (Richards, 1996 cited in Harrison, 2001). 
Therefore, purposive sampling and snowball sampling were chosen to allow this research to gain 
access to the network of individuals who use SNSs for election campaigning and political 
communication in Thailand  
 
Since the start of data collection in January 2013, the researcher followed Thai politicians from the 
government and the opposition party who used Facebook for political communication, candidates in 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election who used Facebook in the election campaign and Thai 
journalists who used Facebook professionally. This accessed public information about where these 
three groups were going and if there were any possibilities of contacting them in person. The 
researcher was also able to communicate with a few of the independent candidates by telephone after 
the researcher got their phone numbers from their Facebook pages. The researcher met others during 
their campaigns, at public forums and debates that they attended.  
 
As a Ph.D. student trying to get in touch with Thai political figures in the Bangkok gubernatorial 
election, the researcher could not estimate how many would be available for interview. As most of 
these political figures made substantial use of SNSs for the election campaign and political 
communication, the researcher was able to make use of Facebook to keep track of where they were 
going. This tracked them in real-time, which involved much waiting on standby. By using Facebook 
as a way to get in touch with political figures, the researcher realised that planning about where the 
political figures were going was published only day-to-day. Though the researcher might know some 
of the places that the candidates were going, by the time they got there, the researcher might not be 
able to find them, or they might have left. With the use of snowball and purposive sampling, the 
researcher was able to conduct 14 interviews.  
3.2.2. Interview procedure  
All interviewees were told about the research objectives, research ethics, interview procedures and 
any changes during the research. Any sensitive questions developed during the semi-structured 
interviews were handled carefully, minimising harm to interviewees. Data collected in this research 
was anonymous, and interviewees were allowed to withdraw from the research at any time. 
After each interviewee had given permission to be interviewed, the researcher asked for their email 
address to send to the interviewees an electronic copy of research information (Appendix 7), basic 
interview questions (Appendix 8), research ethics forms and participant consent forms (Appendix 9) 
before conducting the interview. The research ethics form was translated into Thai.  
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Before the start of the interview, the interviewee and the researcher both signed participant consent 
forms. The interviewee and the researcher kept one copy each. For telephone interviews, having 
turned on the recorder, all the research ethics points were explained to interviewees on the phone, 
making them aware that the research ethics were according to the university rules. After that, the 
researcher asked for verbal approval to record the interview.  
The researcher then asked interviewees if they would prefer answering the interview questions in 
English or Thai. Where interviewees were capable and comfortable expressing their opinions in 
English, the interviews were conducted in English. Otherwise, the interviews were conducted in Thai. 
At the end of each interview, each interviewee had a chance to ask any questions that they might have 
about the research.  
The interviews conducted in Thai language were transcribed into Thai then translated into English. 
The researcher transcribed every interview conducted in this research. The researcher used ‘unfocused 
transcription’, which Gibson and Brown (2009) describes as ‘creating a record of what happened 
within a given recording of speech or action’ (p.113), focusing on the ‘intended meaning’ of the 
recorded speech and action without attempting to show the detailed contextual or interactional 
characteristics (ibid., p.116). In other words, interview transcripts were transcribed according to 
interviewees’ responses during the interview. The transcripts were typed into Microsoft Word.  
3.2.3. Interview analysis   
The coding process for interview transcripts was done in two steps. Firstly, interview transcripts were 
printed out, and the researcher became familiar with the data by actively and analytically reading 
through it. Based on the background knowledge the researcher had about each candidate studied in 
this research, the researcher wrote notes beside interesting answers or comments. By becoming 
familiar with the data in such way, the researcher was able to think critically about ‘what the data 
mean’, which is part of the basic qualitative coding procedure proposed by Braun and Clarke (2013).  
Secondly, all interview transcripts were coded ‘selectively’ on Nvivo 10 software to identify aspects 
of the data in relation to the research questions.  According to Braun and Clarke (2013), the aim of 
selective coding is to determine the data which the research is interested in analysing and this was 
done to reduce the quantity of data and to focus on identifying anything relevant to this research. Also, 
‘researcher-derived’ (ibid.) codes were also used to identify implicit meaning in the interview 
transcripts, with the assumption that interviewees might not truly express their challenge in using 
SNSs during the election campaign.  
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Like other research methods, data collected from interviews contains weaknesses. Gillham (2005) 
notes that even though one elite interview can provide in-depth information and further direct and 
develop the research approach, elite interviews can be ‘politically’ acute and controlling, based on 
what the interviewee says and does not say (p.59). Also, Berger (2014) outlines problems with 
interview material in that interviewees do not always tell the truth, interviewees do not remember 
things accurately and interviewees do not always have useful information to tell. This means that 
interviewees might tell the researcher what they think the researcher wants to hear, and they might use 
language in a different way to express their experience (ibid., pp.173-174). Therefore, this research 
interpreted the interview data with the support observation studies as a research method secondary to 
elite interviews. 
3.2.4. Observation studies  
Observation studies were done during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign to allow the 
research to be able to validate and cross-check findings and to gain an understanding of the practical 
work of using SNSs and the atmosphere in which candidates interact with voters during the election 
campaign. Patton (2002) defines observation study as a ‘fieldwork description of activities, 
behaviours, actions, conversations, and interpersonal interactions, organisational or community 
processes, or any other aspect of observable human experience’ (p.4). Plowright (2011) defines 
observation study as a way of collecting data through using different sensory experiences, and the two 
main senses of researchers are sight and sound (p.76). Gillham (2005) mentions that interviews in 
combination with participant observation studies allow the researcher to gain justification based on 
what they have observed, which can guide the researcher’s interpretation (p.166).  
This research was able to observe the campaigns of a total of three candidates, both party-based and 
independent, in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. This enabled the researcher to gain live 
visual images of candidates campaigning in public and how the reality was transformed into messages 
and images before posting on candidates’ SNS pages. Observation study is an informal way to collect 
data and can provide rich and detailed field notes, gathering the thoughts, beliefs and rationales of 
candidates and campaign staff behind what they were attempting in their SNSs.  The researcher also 
attended a social media forum organised by The Nation Channel on 16 February 2013, to listen to the 
opinions of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Suharit Siamwalla, an independent candidate, who both used 
social media in their election campaigns.  
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Conclusion  
The two main research methods used in this research were chosen to gather different information on 
candidates’ SNS pages for the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election and political communication in 
general. The multimodal analysis allows this research to gain raw material in the form of content 
communicated during the election campaign and to quantify data into different themes. However, the 
experience of candidates and their personnel in using SNSs for the election campaign and political 
communication were not known through multimodal analysis. Thus, elite interviews and observation 
studies were conducted to gain further information on the operation of SNSs and support multimodal 
analysis.  Using more than one research method allows cross-checking of data collected where the 
strength of one method may compensate for the weakness of another.    
In terms of blank spots, it must be acknowledged that the data from Facebook captured for content 
analysis was not done during the election campaign, it was done retrospectively. After several 
attempts to find a method and software to capture and extract data from Facebook about six months 
after the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign that the researcher found the (recently 
released) NCapture tool in Nvivo 10 to extract data from SNSs for analysis. Consequently, some 
Facebook data may be missing from the content analysis as it is unknown how long Facebook retains 
user’s data posts and photographs, and other content may be missing due to Facebook’s internal 
operations, algorithms and changing privacy settings over time. Also, the researcher was not able to 
contact all candidates in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election for interview and to conduct 
observation studies with all the candidates, but believes that the interviews conducted corroborate one 
another sufficiently to establish clear insight into the issues discussed.  
As internet research is a growing area of interest, institutions should provide well-defined research 
ethics guidelines for qualitative internet research by taking into consideration of the different social 
media and social networking sites. A better distinction is needed on what information is ‘public’ and 
‘private.’ This would allow internet research to be conducted in an ‘ethical’ way that accords with 
requirements based on the specific platform of communication that researchers are undertaking. 
Nonetheless, all attempts have been made to protect the privacy not just of all those interviewed, but 
all those whose comments on candidate’s pages were used as objects of study. Even though these 
comments were made in public form, it is important to protect individuals’ ‘privacy via obscurity’ if 
they could be harmed in any way by attention being drawn to their comments. The process of 
translation and judicious selection or paraphrasing of representative comments has hopefully achieved 
this goal. 
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The first two chapters of data analysis, Chapters 4 and 5, present and discuss mainly the results of the 
multimodal analysis of the Facebook pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat during the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. The final two chapters of data analysis, Chapters 6 and 7, 
focus on the interviews. Even though the data analysis chapters in this thesis are divided according to 
research method, the discussion in each chapter integrates different findings that emerge from other 
research methods. The conclusions of each chapter build upon the findings of previous chapters.  
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Chapter 4 :  Candidates’ Core Information and Visual Images on 
Facebook 
 
Introduction 
In the study of the processes of managing political public relations during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election, it is essential to know the core information that candidates reveal about 
themselves to reflect on candidates’ skills and knowledge in relation to having the potential to win 
and fulfil the role of Bangkok governor. A candidate’s visual image based on how the candidate looks, 
what clothes they wear or their facial expression, is constructed to create the image of how they would 
like voters to perceive them. Core visual images, such as the photographs used on their profile 
pictures, could create the first impression that voters have of the candidate. Other signs associated 
with a candidate’s campaign can play a significant role in communicating the candidate’s campaign.  
With the use of Grabe and Bucy’s framework for the analysis of candidates’ visual images during 
election campaigns in combination with the Thai political culture of images, this chapter examines 
political public relations based on the publication of background information on candidates and the 
framing of candidates’ visual images on Facebook in relation to how candidates intend to target and 
relate to followers and potential followers. This chapter sets out to answer the research question: 
‘What features of visual image management were found on candidates’ Facebook pages during the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign?’ 
The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section gives an overview of 
biographical information on M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat introduce themselves on Facebook at 
the beginning of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. The second section uses a 
semiotic analysis to analyse and relate non-verbal communication signs of candidates’ profile pictures 
uploaded to their Facebook accounts in relation to their biography, also looking particularly at the 
type of frames used and the symbolism of signs used as their main visual image on Facebook. The 
chapter then examines the different frames of the visual images used in candidates’ Facebook cover 
pages posted during the election campaign. The final section of this chapter analyses the symbolism 
of signs such as SNS logos, candidates’ usernames, candidate numbers, political party logos and 
colours used on the candidates’ cover pages. (Candidates’ campaign slogans will be analysed in 
Chapter 5)  
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4.1. Candidates’ core information  
To establish a basic framework for analysing candidates’ images established during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign, this section reviews the way M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat 
introduced themselves on their Facebook page. This section first briefly describes the information that 
each candidate published under the ‘About’ tab, which this section will interpret candidates’ core 
information according to Grabe and Bucy’s framework and the Thai political culture of political 
images. This section then moves on to review the first Facebook post of M.R. Sukhumbhand and 
Pongsapat at the start of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign.  
4.1.1. ‘About’ tab  
M.R. Sukhumbhand, also known as the ‘Number 16’ during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, 
was a veteran politician nominated by the Democrat Party, which was in opposition at the time of the 
election. Before the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, M.R. Sukhumbhand was the incumbent 
15
th
 governor, competing for a second term. According to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s official Facebook 
page (https://www.facebook.com/Sukhumbhand.P), M.R. Sukhumbhand was born on 22 September 
1952 (aged 60 at the time of 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign), and his hometown is 
Bangkok. He is married, and his religion is Buddhism. He also included the name of his spouse, his 
workplace, and his sons’ education level and the universities that they are studying at, which gives a 
broader perspective on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s private life and his family biography.   
M.R. Sukhumbhand gives information about his education as a graduate from Oxford University 
(1977) and Rugby School (1970). Apart from being Bangkok Governor (2009-2013), he used to hold 
different political positions including Member of Parliament for Bangkok under the Democrat Party 
and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. He held an academic position as Associate Professor in the 
Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. M.R. Sukhumbhand also included contact 
information by phone, mobile, email, website and links to his other social networking pages such as 
Twitter, Instagram and YouTube.  
Police General Doctor Pongsapat Pongcharoen, also known as the ‘Number 9’ for the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign, was the candidate nominated by Pheu Thai Party under the Yingluck 
Shinawatra administration at the time of the election. According to Pongsapat’s official Facebook 
page (https://www.facebook.com/Pongsapatbkk), he was born in Chanthaburi Province on 9 
December 1955 (aged 57 years old at the time of 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign). He 
is married, and his religion is Buddhism.  During his childhood, Pongsapat studied in Chanthaburi 
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Province. His tertiary education was at the Police Cadet Academy, and he was granted a scholarship 
to study Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University, United States of America, until he finished 
his Ph.D.  
In his career, Pongsapat held various positions in the Royal Thai Police. Based on Pongsapat’s 
biography stated on his Facebook page, Pongsapat did not have any previous relationship with the 
Pheu Thai Party, but Pongsapat states on his Facebook page ‘สร้างอนาคตกรุงเทพฯร่วมกบัรัฐบาลอย่างไร้
รอยต่อ Like พงศพศั, Share อนาคตกรุงเทพฯ’, which can be translated into English as ‘Build Bangkok’s 
future by working seamlessly with the (national) government. Like Pongsapat, Share Bangkok’s 
future’. This message establishes Pongsapat’s relation with the government party, which nominated 
him for the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. (Pongsapat’s slogan will be further analysed in 
Chapter 5.) 
The background information that M.R. Sukhumbhand published about himself consists of phudi 
elements in combination with ordinariness and a professional image in his career. As stated in Chapter 
2, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s title (Mom Rajawongse) indicates that he is the great-grandchild of a Thai 
sovereign. M.R. Sukhumbhand is a great-grandson of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V).
10
 M.R. 
Sukhumbhand overseas education and previous work in academia in combination with his long-term 
career in politics enrich his quality of being phudi. As a result, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s biographical 
information also portrays his image of having competence and experience in the political field and 
working with ordinary citizens. This phudi image therefore shows that the candidate has elite family 
lineage. In mentioning his family members’ names and the schools they attended, M.R. Sukhumbhand 
combines his individual phudi image and that of his family.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand presentation of his political background may be understood as showing he was as 
experienced as the 13
th
 Bangkok Governor, Samak Sundaravej had previously had various political 
roles and was the leader of the Thai Citizen’s Party before competing for Bangkok Governor in 2000. 
Samak was also the Thai prime minister almost a year since December 2007. Despite the nakleng 
image of Samak, his long-term experience as a politician was similar to that of M.R. Sukhumbhand, 
making voters recognise both politicians according to their previous political positions. 
                                                             
10
 Cited from Fry, Nieminen and Smith (2013) 
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On the other hand, Pongsapat had a hybrid image, which is a mixture of a few attributes. Pongsapat’s 
education background of his scholarship and Ph.D. reflects on his determination in education and 
specialised knowledge in the field of criminal justice. His overseas education is the only evidence of 
Pongsapat having a phudi image of being highly educated. As Pongsapat’s career was in the Royal 
Thai Police (similar to Thaksin’s background prior to joining politics), Pongsapat’s career is 
associated with working with the public, dealing with lawbreakers in Thailand and having contacts 
and relationships with Thai people. His work shows an image of arresting drug dealers or enhancing 
security forces to increase safety for different areas in Thailand.  
A review of past governors since 2000 shows there has been none with a police background, except 
for Chalerm Yubamrung and Police General Seripisut Temiyavet, independent candidates of the 2004 
and 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election respectively, who were ranked in fourth and third place 
respectively in the election.
11
 Pongsapat’s image is a hybrid type of image in having a phudi image of 
being highly educated, while his career requires courage and skills in decision-making and dealing 
with lawbreakers, so that his image also has nakleng elements. Moreover, a long-term career as a 
police officer means that Pongsapat did not have experience in the field of politics, but has been 
working with policemen and sectors associating with such field. Arguably, candidates with such 
background might be perceived as authoritarian as such image seems to be a challenging image to 
Bangkokians voters.  
Based on the inter-subjective profile analysis of core information that candidates published on their 
‘About’ pages, it could be said that political public relations on the candidates’ Facebook pages was 
associated with the management of core information about the candidates as political figures, 
selecting and providing background information about the candidates based on what the candidates 
think is relevant for potential followers to know about them and the candidates’ campaigns. Both M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat have similar qualities as ‘ideal candidates’ (Grabe and Bucy, 2013), 
despite their career differences: M.R. Sukhumbhand has a political background while Pongsapat has a 
police background.  
                                                             
11
. Cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้่าราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทติยท์ี่ 3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.). and (“เลือกตั้งผูว้่าฯมหานคร 2556 ผลเลือกตั้ง [BKK Election 
2013: Election Result],” 2013)  
98 
 
However, there were significant differences. M.R. Sukhumbhand had listed a variety of facts in his 
biography while Pongsapat focused on the different positions that he had held as a police officer. Also, 
M.R. Sukhumbhand provided various contact details for the public and journalists to be able to 
communicate with him during the election campaign, which Pongsapat did not do, indicating a 
difference in candidates’ approach to public communication. Pongsapat did not give any information 
related to his family members or his hobbies but mentioned that his origin was Chanthaburi Province, 
which shows that in selecting biographical information he kept his private life away from the public. 
It could be said that management of information in this way supports the basic idea of using SNSs for 
microtargeting (Bimber, 2014; Edgerly et al., 2013; Stokes-Brown, 2012), whereby M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used different aspects of their biographies to target various groups of 
voters, with different political interests, living in different locations, and with different occupations 
and ages. 
Although the information under the ‘About’ tab does not appear on the news feeds of followers’ 
Facebook pages, the information is stored and remains accessible to the public during the election 
campaign, in contrast to the information that candidates post on their Facebook timeline, where new 
posts made by candidates replace earlier posts. The information under ‘About’ tab is significant in 
establishing the core image of the candidate. As M.R. Sukhumbhand was an incumbent of the election, 
followers might already have some background information about the candidate, whereas for new 
candidates like Pongsapat, information on the ‘About’ tabs can be the first impressions that potential 
followers have about the candidate and potential followers seek to find a relationship with the 
candidate. Even though followers might not click on the ‘About’ tab to read the candidates’ 
biographies, neither candidate, particularly M.R. Sukhumbhand, overlooked the type and amount of 
information that they provided to the public there. Core information that candidates publish under the 
‘About’ tabs leads to a further examination of how candidates elaborate this core information in visual 
images and Facebook posts during the election campaign.  
4.1.2. First Facebook posts for the election campaign  
Previous to the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, M.R. Sukhumbhand was already 
using his Facebook page but Pongsapat created his Facebook page just for the election campaign. As 
stated earlier, on 9
 
January 2013, M.R. Sukhumbhand resigned as the 15
th
 Bangkok Governor
12
.  
                                                             
12
cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้่าราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทติยท์ี่ 3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.). 
99 
 
However, M.R. Sukhumbhand did not make any Facebook post about resigning. It was only two days 
after he resigned that he made a Facebook comment showing ‘the atmosphere at the opening of the 
Election Centre.’ 
 
Figure 4.1: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s first Facebook post mentioning about election, 11 January 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุขมุพนัธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013j).  
As shown on Figure 4.1., M.R. Sukhumbhand’s first Facebook post in relation to the upcoming 
election shows the official opening of the Election Centre by the political party that nominated him. 
Based on the photograph together with the text, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s first image was established in 
relation to politicians of the Democrat Party, Apirak Kosayodhin sitting on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
right, and Abhisit Vejjajiva sitting on his left. This indicates his affiliation with these politicians. His 
first Facebook post showed his relation with the political party, leaving out the individual image of his 
profile picture or cover page.  
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Figure 4.2: Pongsapat’s first Facebook post, 15 January 2013 (พงศพศั พงษเ์จริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013k). 
Figure 4.2 shows Pongsapat’s first Facebook post on 15 January 2013, after he had published his 
biography, profile picture and cover page. Referring to Savitri's (2004) research on the ‘ritual 
beginning’ and the formality of politicians’ speeches political communication in the Thai parliament, 
whereby politicians introduce their full names, the constituency that the politicians represent and the 
political party that they belong to, political figures communicating on Facebook were less formal and 
more personal. Pongsapat begins his first Facebook post by saying ‘พี่น้องประชาชนชาวกรุงเทพมหานครที่
เคารพครับ’ which means ‘Respected brothers and sisters in Bangkok.’ The literal meaning of ‘พี่น้อง’ 
(phi nong) in Thai refers to elder and younger siblings of either gender.  Sanit (1994) points out that 
Translation of post:  
Respected brothers and sisters in Bangkok,  
In the current world, Facebook and various social media have enabled us to communicate with each other more 
easily than before. This not only brings us closer to each other, but enables our voices to be heard better whether by 
clicking ‘like’, or ‘share’ or participate in ‘comment’ in this platform.  This will make us gradually get to know each 
other better.  
I would like to invite everyone to “share” my Facebook page so that many people will click “like” on my page 
because today is the first step of my election campaign.  
Let’s discuss together.  
I, Pongsapat Pongcharoen 
would like to welcome everyone.  
 
พี่น้องประชาชนชาวกรุงเทพมหานครท่ีเคารพครับ  
ในโลกปัจจุบนั facebook และโซเชียลมีเดียต่างๆได้ท าให้
เราสามารถติดต่อซึง่กนัและกนัได้ง่ายกนัมากขึน้กวา่แต่ก่อน มนั
ไม่เพียงท าให้เราใกล้ชิดกันมากขึน้เทา่นัน้ แต่มนัยงัเพิม่เสียง
ของเราให้ดงัขึน้อีกด้วย ไม่วา่จะเป็นการกด like กด share 
หรือร่วม comment ในพืน้ท่ีแหง่นี ้ สิง่นีจ้ะท าให้เรารู้จกักนั
มากขึน้เร่ือยๆ  
ขอเชิญชวนทกุทา่นร่วมกนัแชร์ facebook ของผมนีใ้ห้มีพี่
น้องมากด like เยอะๆ เพราะวนันีเ้ป็นก้าวแรกในการหาเสียง
ของผมครับ 
มาร่วมพดูคุยกนันะครับ  
ผมพงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ  
ยินดีต้อนรับทกุทา่น 
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Thai political figures use phi nong to establish a close relationship and to show the respect that they 
have for voters in order to make voters become optimistic about the politician’s ability in solving 
problems (p.169-170). Pongsapat’s use of phi nong in his first Facebook post shows the sense of 
closeness and equality in the relationship that he would like to establish between Bangkokians and 
himself. In addition, a candidate’s use of phi nong in an election campaign shows that she/he is 
considering her/himself as a ‘friend’ and/or ‘family member’ of the voters. Pongsapat and the voters 
might not have had such a relationship before, but with the use of phi nong, it somehow indicates that 
Pongsapat attempted to establish such a relationship to show that there is no division between the 
voters and the candidate and to show that he considered himself and voters as being in the same 
family.  
The word ‘เคารพ’ (khaorop) means ‘respect’, which a formula used in formal speech in Thai and it 
also shows between the writer/speaker and reader/listener. By using khaorop to address readers, 
Pongsapat showed the respect that he had for potential followers and his intention to listen to their 
opinions. Also, with the polite particle khrap shows Pongsapat’s sense of politeness and manners in 
speaking or writing. Throughout Pongsapat’s Facebook posts, he would end certain sentences with 
khrap.  
As Pongsapat’s Facebook page was created for the purpose of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign, his first posts introduced himself and established his network on Facebook. 
Pongsapat encouraged his followers to interact on his first Facebook posts, clicking ‘Like’, ‘Share’ or 
making comments so the post would appear on the users’ friends’ status page, expanding the 
candidate’s network on Facebook, as will be further analysed in Chapter 6. When more people follow 
him on Facebook or when his network expands, he can be sure that his campaign message is being 
broadcast to a mass audience, which include voters and non-voters of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election. Interaction also enables candidates to know voters’ thoughts on particular posts. Pongsapat’s 
first Facebook post indicates the way Pongsapat relied on Facebook users to expand his network. The 
fact that he signed his first post using his full name in Thai, without stating that he is a candidate from 
the Pheu Thai Party indicates an individualistic approach to start the campaign.   
While M.R. Sukhumbhand established his image on his first Facebook post by including Democrat 
Party politicians, Pongsapat invited users to interact on his Facebook page through creating awareness 
of the importance of using Facebook and other social media to communicate, and wanting a closer 
relationship with voters.  Pongsapat’s first Facebook post used his profile picture and SNS logos and 
links as part of the photograph, which will be analysed in the section 4.2. The way Pongsapat 
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structured his first Facebook post could be considered appropriate because Pongsapat was new in the 
political field and did not have an extensive network of voters following him on SNSs. Rather than 
talking about his biography, problems and policies for Bangkok, his first Facebook post could give 
people the impression of welcoming them into his network and showing his attempt to know more 
about people on Facebook. This was done at a conversational and respectful level of communication. 
Looking from a political marketing perspective, Pongsapat’s first Facebook post initiated the use of a 
political marketing strategy based on phi nong and approachability through asking for followers’ 
opinion and wanting to know more about his followers.  
4.2. Facebook profile pictures  
With the use of semiotic analysis at the informational and symbolic levels, this section analyses the 
profile pictures of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat on Facebook with reference to the visual image 
frames of Grabe and Bucy (2013). The analysis in this section takes into consideration the candidates’ 
biographies, facial expressions, gaze, clothing and the portraits used in their billboards and brochures 
in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, and compares the type of photographs used as 
candidates’ profile picture with other forms of medium.  This analysis will provide an understanding 
of the core visual impression that candidates tried to give to their potential followers in relation to 
their biographies and personalities.   
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the Facebook profile pictures of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat 
during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. Table 4.1 gives an outline of the semiotic 
analysis of these. 
 
Figure 4.3: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s profile picture on Facebook before (left) and during (right) the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election, uploaded on 8 August 2012 and 21 January 2013 respectively (ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2012, 2013i) 
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Figure 4.4: Pongsapat’s profile picture on Facebook for the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, 
uploaded on 14 January 2013 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013i).  
 
 
Table 4.1: Semiotic analysis of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook profile pictures. 
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Both profile pictures were taken in medium close-up, showing the upper part of the subjects’ body, 
enabling viewers to see candidates’ facial expression as well as the candidates’ chosen clothing. Both 
M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat look directly at the camera at the same level as the camera lens, 
and their heads are positioned slightly towards their right, not leaning against the backdrop, which is 
different from how photographs for Thai identification cards or passports are taken. Candidate 
‘Number 7’ in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election used Figure 4.5 as his Facebook profile 
picture, where he is smiling, wearing his official uniform and is positioned directly in front of the 
camera. This gives a more formal and authoritarian impression of the candidate, compared to the 
Facebook profile pictures of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat. Therefore, facial expressions and 
postures of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat attempt to portray a friendly personality and 
informality. This could be done to suggest an approachable image of the candidate, which may attract 
more Facebook users to follow them.  
 
Figure 4.5: Facebook profile picture of candidate ‘Number 7’ in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign, uploaded on 4 February 2013 (ณัฏฐ์ดนัย ภูเบศอรรถวชิญ์  [Natdanai Phubesauthawit], 2013).  
Based on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s facial expressions and postures in their profile 
pictures in combination with their chosen clothing, both candidates’ images are associated with what 
Grabe and Bucy refer to as ‘ordinariness’, rather than ‘statesmanship’. An ordinary image may lessen 
the gap between citizens and candidates as both candidates showed an attempt to use Facebook to 
communicate with citizens by omitting any symbols of their careers. Neither candidate’s profile 
picture gives a visual indication of the candidates’ origins and educational background, but their 
overall image and clothing symbolise them as middle-class. As both M.R. Sukhumbhand and 
Pongsapat chose to wear casual clothing in their Facebook profile pictures, it could connote that their 
profile pictures make them look less formal and less official, giving the sense of equality between 
candidates and voters. Despite M.R. Sukhumbhand being Bangkok Governor (2009-2013), former 
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Member of Parliament and a former Associate Professor, his plain and simple white collared shirt 
chosen for his Facebook profile picture does not indicate his background. Pongsapat’s black jacket 
gives some indication about him being a plainclothes police officer, but omits any sign that he is a 
Thai police in general or a Ph.D. holder.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s chosen profile picture on Facebook before and during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign was the same photograph, except that later had ‘16’ printed at the 
bottom right corner of the picture, giving an indication of the political figure being in election 
campaign mode. M.R. Sukhumbhand might have intended to highlight the fact that having an election 
number shows that he is in the election campaign, which could also assure people searching for M.R. 
Sukhumbhand on Facebook that the page is M.R. Sukhumbhand’s official Facebook page. Having the 
candidate number as part of the profile picture also shows that the candidate is a candidate, so voters 
can notice the candidate and his election number, as the candidate number is a significant piece of 
information for voters in recognising the candidate in Thai elections (to be analysed further in 
subsection 4.4.3). On the contrary, Pongsapat might have thought that the candidate number did not 
matter as much as his appearance, and, therefore his profile picture on Facebook truly focused on his 
clothing and facial expression. Whether candidate numbers appear on Facebook profile pictures 
depends on how the candidate decides to select and design their profile pictures.  
 
Figure 4.6: Facebook profile ‘picture’ of candidate ‘Number 6’ in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign (สัณหพจน์ สุขศรีเมือง[Sanhaphot Suksrimuang], 2013).  
As shown in Figure 4.6, candidate ‘Number 6’ of the election designed his Facebook profile image 
with his candidate number, ‘6’. This image does show that the Facebook page belongs to number 6 in 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, but Facebook users will not have any idea about the 
candidate’s appearance. Even though the candidate’s number plays a role in representing and 
identifying him, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook profile pictures give prominence to 
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their visual image, their facial expression, gaze and positioning of the candidate in the profile pictures 
to depict an ordinary image with positive personality to suit the communication platform.  
 
Figure 4.7: Photographs of M.R. Sukhumbhand used in the media during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign. (Facebook profile picture from Figure 4.3, other photographs: Author)  
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Figure 4.8: Photographs of Pongsapat used in different media during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign (Facebook profile picture from Figure 4.4, other photographs: Author) 
Comparing the Facebook profile photographs of both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat with the 
photographs on their billboards and brochures as shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8, M.R. Sukhumbhand 
used 3 different photographs for his billboards and brochure, all different from his Facebook profile 
photograph, while Pongsapat used the same photograph as on his Facebook profile except for one 
billboard (E).  A possible reason for this could be that M.R. Sukhumbhand was the incumbent in the 
election, while Pongsapat was a new candidate. It is appropriate for an incumbent candidate who has 
been in the political field for an extended period to use different photographs with different clothing 
in various media to portray both a formal and informal image. The small size Billboard A, Billboard C 
and brochure suggest a casual image. Billboard A and his brochure, in particular, symbolise the 
resilient fighting spirit to compete for another term as governor, portrayed through casual clothing and 
raising his left fist to chest level. M.R. Sukhumbhand chose formal clothing in Billboard B and on his 
campaign vehicle, portraying himself as a managerial person, with the impression that M.R. 
Sukhumbhand is able to fulfil the role of Bangkok governor as the head of the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration, as stated in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Act 1985. Thus, with an early 
recognition and relationship between M.R. Sukhumbhand and voters, the use of different photographs 
on his Facebook profile picture, billboards and brochure enable him to portray the different image of 
himself.  
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On the other hand, as a new candidate in the Bangkok gubernatorial election and with a lack of 
experience in the political field, Pongsapat used the same portrait in most media. Pongsapat’s 
Facebook profile picture was used on his campaign vehicle, one of his large size billboard designs 
(Billboard D) and his brochure. A possible reason for using a single photograph for all media is that 
he was not as well recognised as M.R. Sukhumbhand. Billboard E shows a Pongsapat in a different 
posture of raising his hands to about shoulder level, portraying the candidate giving an explanation or 
demonstration. This allows viewers to visualise what Pongsapat looks like when communicating. 
Although Billboard E gives a different image of Pongsapat, his clothing is the same as in his 
Facebook profile picture, which could enable viewers to be familiar with Pongsapat’s image. This 
means that the decision to use the same clothing on his campaign vehicle, billboards and brochure can 
raise people’s awareness of Pongsapat’s appearance, which would avoid confusion on whether the 
portrait is Pongsapat. However, as candidates’ name and political party slogan are shown in the 
medium, voters could still recognised the candidate’s identity.  
The overall image that Pongsapat portrayed in the different media does not significantly differ, which 
could be considered suitable for a candidate who is new in the political field. Nevertheless, whether it 
is appropriate to duplicate photographs in different media would depend on how candidates attempt to 
make voters perceive their image. Voters might be exposed to different media, which means using the 
same photograph for all media would allow voters to recognise the candidate better, but using a 
different photograph presents another perspective of the candidate. Another important finding is that 
both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat do not use body language as part of their Facebook profile 
pictures, which might be due to their intention to portray clearly their appearance, facial expression 
and clothing through their Facebook profile pictures. Both candidates’ use of gesture on billboards 
and brochures give a different perspective of the candidates’ images.  
Based on the semiotic analysis of the Facebook profile pictures of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat 
in this section, symbolism coding suggests that the profile pictures were framed to reflect what Grabe 
and Bucy (2009) refer to as ‘ordinariness’ rather than ‘statesmanship’ as neither profile pictures give 
an indication of power, authority or leadership. Both Facebook profile pictures clearly show their 
appearance with a very limited indication of their social class or leadership style, which might be the 
way they seek to establish a relationship with potential followers and current followers throughout the 
election campaign. There were minimal signs on both candidate’s Facebook profile pictures that relate 
to the biographical information published under the ‘About’ tab (as analysed in the previous section). 
It was only the candidate’s number attached to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s profile picture which implies 
that M.R. Sukhumbhand was campaigning in the election while Pongsapat’s outfit gives some sense 
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of Pongsapat being a plainclothes police officer. This information could only be confirmed through 
his biography information. Since Facebook is an interactive channel in the election campaign, where 
candidates can build a network and engage with Facebook users from different backgrounds, the 
different signs interpreted from M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook profile pictures 
reveal how the candidates want people to perceive them. M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat projected 
their visual image as ordinary people with a kind and approachable personality.  
The Facebook profile pictures were one core visual identity during the election campaign, which 
remained unchanged during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, indicating the 
importance of the profile pictures selected. Surapongse (2002) claims that establishing a candidate’s 
image is part of winning an election as the candidate’s image helps voters recognise the candidate. 
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s selection and management of their Facebook profile picture 
reflect that. Not changing their profile pictures during the election campaign also shows that their 
Facebook pages are the official ones, which is a sign to the public that they are in control of their 
posts and the campaign messages and information on these pages come directly from the candidate. In 
particular, Pongsapat’s use of the same image on Facebook and other media eliminates confusion over 
his image enabling viewers to recognise it.  
Although neither M.R. Sukhumbhand nor Pongsapat changed their Facebook profile picture during 
the election campaign, both of them made changes to their Facebook cover pages every 1-3 days 
throughout the election campaign. The cover page is another significant form of communication by 
which to interpret a candidate’s campaign in relation to the textual message, candidate number and 
symbolic colours used.  The next two sections present multimodal analyses of the cover pages of the 
Facebook pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat. 
4.3. Visual image on Facebook cover pages    
Candidates’ Facebook cover pages were another core form of communication of candidates’ 
campaigns during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. The cover page is displayed at 
the top of the front page or timeline page of users, inset with the profile picture, enabling the visual 
image of the cover page to be shown in a larger size than the profile picture. After users search for a 
candidate’s name on Facebook and decide to explore the candidate’s Facebook page further, the 
candidate’s cover page is the first image that appears.  
The Facebook cover pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat were changed every few days 
during the election campaign. Using Grabe and Bucy's (2013) framework for visual image analysis, 
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this section examines the symbolism of signs and visual images on the Facebook cover pages. Grabe 
and Bucy's (2013) framework for the visual image analysis was used to analyse moving visual images 
of candidates on the ABC, CBS and NBC broadcast networks for presidential elections in the United 
States during 1992-2004. This subsection analyses the visual images within the Grabe and Bucy 
framework, with the objective of determining the relevance of their framework to visual images on 
the Facebook cover pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat. The analysis in this section 
considers all Facebook cover pages that both candidates uploaded, selecting a few significant cover 
pages for presentation in this section.  
Statesmanship theme  
The statesmanship theme was the primary theme used in both M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s 
Facebook cover pages. This theme consists of features such as the candidates’ pictures used in their 
Facebook profile pictures, billboards and brochures, the candidates delivering speeches on stage, 
photographs with the leader of their political party or former candidates for the Bangkok gubernatorial 
election from the same political party.  
 
Figure 4.9: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s first cover page on Facebook using a statesmanship theme, uploaded on 14 
January 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013b).  
The statesmanship theme of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s cover page in Figure 4.9 shows M.R. 
Sukhumbhand wearing formal attire (suit and tie). This dress was different from the one in his 
Facebook profile picture. The clothing in Figure 4.9 gives a better indication of statesmanship, 
reflecting managerial skills in decision-making and problem-solving. The visual image chosen for 
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook profile picture, portrays M.R. Sukhumbhand as an ideal candidate. 
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Figure 4.10: Pongsapat’s first cover page on Facebook using a statesmanship theme, uploaded on 14 January 
2014 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013a).  
The first official picture used for Pongsapat’s Facebook cover page, shown in Figure 4.10, was the 
same as the one used for his Facebook profile picture, which further emphasises the image that 
Pongsapat intended to portray there. Although it was argued in Section 4.2 that Pongsapat’s Facebook 
profile picture portrays an image of being ordinary, this visual image when chosen as the first cover 
page can be categorised as a statesmanship theme because it is in juxtaposition with the candidate’s 
campaign slogan on the left and other SNS signs at the bottom of the cover page, enabling the overall 
image of the cover page to show the statesmanship of the candidate. Pongsapat’s use of the same 
image for both his profile picture and the first cover page could increase the likelihood of Facebook 
users to recognise his image and eliminate confusion as he was a new candidate for the election. 
Arguably, the use of different photographs could give another impression of the candidate as viewers 
get to see another aspect of the candidate.  
 
Figure 4.11: Example of M.R. Sukhumbhand using a statesmanship theme, showing him speaking in public, 
uploaded on 1 February 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพัตร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013a).  
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Figure 4.12: Example of Pongsapat using a statesmanship theme, showing him speaking in public, uploaded on 
22 February 2013 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013c).   
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show visual images of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat delivering campaign 
speeches. Arguably, these two images can be categorised under the statesmanship theme as both 
images focus on the candidates’ hand and body position of delivering a speech even though such an 
image was not one that the Grabe and Bucy’s framework characterises as being a visual image of an 
ideal candidate.  Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show images of the candidates giving delivering campaign 
speech, their leadership potential, the candidates’ confidence in their campaigns and the potential of 
the candidates to win the election. The text added on the cover page informs SNS users of the 
schedule of the next campaign speech. The image on the Facebook cover page shows the main theme 
at the particular time of the election campaign. This can also encourage and mobilise more supporters 
to campaign to listen to and meet the candidate.  
 
Figure 4.13: Example of M.R. Sukhumbhand using a statesmanship theme with politicians of the Democrat 
Party, uploaded on 4 February 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013h).  
Another type of statesmanship image consists of visual images including officials and influential 
persons. The Facebook cover pages of both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat also associated their 
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image with other politicians of the same political party. The medium to long shot photograph of 
Democrat Party leaders shown in Figure 4.13 delivers the message of M.R. Sukhumbhand 
establishing a strong relationship with politicians of the Democrat Party, delivering a sense of the 
Democrat Party’s power and determination to compete in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. 
The number of politicians shown in such visual images gives weight to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
campaign. Overall, the facial expressions and body language of politicians reflect the image of the 
Democrat Party and the significant support that other politicians gave to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
campaign.  
 
Figure 4.14: Example of Pongsapat using a statesmanship theme with politicians of the Pheu Thai Party, 
uploaded on 25 January 2013 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013f).  
Figure 4.14 is a medium shot showing a statesmanship image of Pongsapat in relation to politicians of 
the Pheu Thai Party. The photograph shows Yingluck Shinawatra, the Prime Minister of Thailand at 
the time of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, giving a campaign speech for 
Pongsapat, accompanied by other Pheu Thai Party politicians. This image portrays the positive 
relationship between Pongsapat and politicians of the Pheu Thai Party. The frame translates into a 
visual image Pongsapat’s campaign slogan, which is to work with the government seamlessly. As 
Pongsapat was a new representative of the Pheu Thai Party in the election, this image further informs 
the public of his recognition by and relationship with the Pheu Thai Party. The photograph shows the 
Pheu Thai Party accompanying Pongsapat in his campaign, and if he was successful in the election, 
both Pongsapat and the Pheu Thai Party would be able to work with each other efficiently. The 
continuous projection of Pongsapat’s relationship with the Pheu Thai Party on Pongsapat’s Facebook 
cover page is a reminder of Pongsapat’s identity in relation to the Pheu Thai party.  
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Figure 4.15: Example of Pongsapat using a statesmanship theme with politicians of the Pheu Thai Party, with 
Khunying Sudarat Keyuraphan standing on his left and Paveena Hongsakul on his right, uploaded on 22 January 
2013 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013e).  
Figure 4.15, is another Facebook cover page of Pongsapat posted during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election, with Khunying Sudarat Keyuraphan standing on his left and Paveena 
Hongsakul on his right, losing candidates in the Bangkok gubernatorial elections in 2000 and 2004. 
Khunying Sudarat was a candidate nominated by a newly established Thai Rak Thai Party at the time 
of the 2000 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, while Paveena was nominated from Chart 
Pattana Party in the same the same election and was an independent candidate in the 2004 election. In 
addition to the four woman candidates competing the in 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, women 
politicians seemed to play a more supporting or secondary role in the election campaign. As the leader 
of the Pheu Thai Party was Yingluck Shinawatra, her feminine personality and appearance were used 
as part of the party-based image of Pongsapat’s campaign on Facebook. As female candidates had 
never won any Bangkok gubernatorial elections, this gives some indication that the Bangkok political 
culture is still associated with having men govern the city.  
The statesmanship theme of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat in relation to their political parties 
shows the support for the candidates from the political parties that nominated them. The appearance 
of other politicians in both candidates’ campaign suggests that both M.R. Sukhumbhand and 
Pongsapat borrowed the credibility of their political parties and fellow members. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the image of candidates in Bangkok gubernatorial elections is focused on the candidate 
while the image of candidates in general elections is constructed according to the political party 
(Surapongse, 2002, p.43). Also, new candidates such as Mitt Romney had to establish more credibility 
on Facebook, as opposed to Barak Obama, who was the incumbent in the 2012 Presidential election 
(Goodnow, 2013, p.1594). Findings in this subsection, so far, show that as party-based candidates, 
both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat made use of their political party image as part of their 
Facebook campaigns. A possible reason for this could the highly competitive nature of the election, 
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the similarity in suitability of both candidates, enabling statesmanship theme to be focused on the 
candidates’ image as well as the image of the political party. However, as the Democrat party had 
won all 3 Bangkok gubernatorial elections since 2004, the statesmanship image of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was different to that of Pongsapat as the image portrays winners and losers in elections. 
The credibility of the political party image can, therefore, be perceived as the political party who has 
won the Bangkok gubernatorial election in comparison to the Pheu Thai Party that won the general 
election in 2011. As a result, perceptions of credibility can increase the spreadability of the candidates’ 
cover pages and campaign on Facebook, which Chapter 6 analyses further. 
Compassion theme  
 
Figure 4.16: Example of M.R. Sukhumbhand using  compassion theme, uploaded on 29 February 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุขุม
พันธ์ุ บริพัตร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013g).  
 
Figure 4.17: Example of Pongsapat using a compassion theme, uploaded on 31 January 2013 (พงศพัศ พงษ์เจริญ 
[Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013h).  
The compassion theme is another theme under the ‘ideal candidate’ frame, in which both M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat associated themselves with physically challenged people and children 
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respectively. This theme as shown in Figures 4.16 and 4.17 portrays the candidate being able to 
interact with different groups of people, for whom the candidates are formulating and will be 
implementing policies. The ideal candidate image, therefore, has been constructed in relation to the 
candidate being able to work with diverse groups of voters. Such images during election campaigns 
might allow critical voters to think that candidate would do anything to gain votes. The theme of these 
images overlap with the theme of ordinariness as the images show candidates approaching the lives of 
voters where they live and/or work. As candidates strive to win the election, there is nothing wrong if 
they do everything they can to construct such an image and gain votes. Candidates might also gain 
votes from followers who view these images on the candidates’ Facebook pages if the followers 
believe in the candidates’ attempts to construct such images.  
Mass appeal theme  
 
Figure 4.18: Example of M.R. Sukhumbhand using a mass appeal theme, uploaded on 21 February 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุ
ขุมพันธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013e).  
 
Figure 4.19: Example of Pongsapat using a mass appeal theme, uploaded on 22 February 2013 (พงศพัศ พงษ์เจริญ 
[Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013d).  
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The mass appeal images on the Facebook cover pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat shown in 
Figures 4.18 and 4.19 did not contain any celebrities from the entertainment industry and this could be 
due to doubts about the restrictions stated by the Election Commission on the involvement of 
celebrities in candidates’ campaigns (Chapter 7 will analyse this further). Therefore, neither 
candidate’s campaigns on SNSs incorporated the notion of ‘celebrity politicians’ that Barron (2015) 
and Street (2004) conceptualised, but both candidates instead portrayed themselves as celebrities 
through visual images, which seemed to be a significant aspect of their image on SNSs.  
The mass appeal theme is related to the notion of celebrity politicians in that such theme consist of the 
candidate (not necessarily his campaign staff or other politicians from the candidate’s political party) 
surrounded by the public, or gaining attention from the public near him, as shown in on Figures 4.18 
and 4.19. This theme intends to highlight the degree of attention that the candidate generates in the 
audience, and portrays the candidate and politicians next to the candidate as celebrities. The angle of 
the photograph in Figure 4.18 is from behind the candidate to capture his appearance on the 
photograph as well as the large audience listening to his campaign speech delivered from the stage. 
This photograph portrays an image of the candidate as popular and enjoying high recognition and 
support from the public.  
The medium shot celebrity candidates photo in Figure 4.19 in particular highlighted the amount of 
attention that Yingluck and Pongsapat gained from the public and at the same time the photograph 
shows the facial expression of Yingluck and Pongsapat in response to this support.  Both types of 
celebrity shots, or what Grabe and Bucy refer to as ‘mass appeal’ theme, are significant on candidates’ 
Facebook cover pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. As M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was the incumbent while Pongsapat was a new candidate, celebrity shots used on 
Facebook cover pages can draw followers’ attention to the candidates’ campaigns, which can also 
increase the spreadability of the candidates’ campaign on Facebook as the size of crowds confirm the 
approval of the candidates. 
The candidates’ non-policy-related posts on Facebook, relating to future campaign schedules, can 
construct the image of mass appeal. Such messages provided information on the candidates’ campaign 
movements, letting followers know where the candidates planned to go and do next. This type of 
message is not only a way to engage followers on the Facebook page and to ensure continuous 
momentum on SNS ‘live feed’, but it can promote the candidates’ campaign schedule, and mobilise 
supporters to the campaign sites, giving them the chance to meet and interact with the candidates. 
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Figure 4.20: Example of M.R. Sukhumbhand receiving garlands from voters, uploaded on 19 January 2013 (ม.ร.
ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013d). 
Arguably, the giving of marigold garlands and flowers, shown in Figure 4.20 is a cultural tradition in 
Thai elections, which can also be a sign and coded as mass appeal frame. Although the origin of 
marigold garlands in relation to Thai elections is not known, these flowers give a sense of welcome 
when voters give them to election candidates.
13
 No background knowledge was found about the visual 
image in Figure 4.20. But Sombat (1993) refers to ‘การเลน่ละคร’ which means ‘play-acting’, and the 
observation studies done in this research found that candidates’ image frame of mass appeal is 
constructed as campaign staff give advance notice and distribute flowers and garlands to people 
around the area, alerting people and gathering them ready for the candidates’ arrival. When the party-
based candidate arrived at campaign site, a large crowd competed with each other to give flowers and 
garlands to the candidate and at the same time, the media competed to get mass appeal shots of the 
candidate. The scene looks natural if no one knows that the flowers and garlands which people give 
to candidate were prepared in advance by campaign staff. Voters might voluntarily want to approach 
and greet the candidates, but the image of the candidate receiving many flowers and garlands from 
voters has to be constructed to give the impression that the candidate is a popular public figure.  At 
this point, it could also be said that campaign staff played an enormously important role in setting up 
these scenes in order for the candidates to look like celebrities on their arrival, which means that the 
campaign staff had to gather nearby supporters who would like to be involved in the image 
construction.  
                                                             
13
 (“ ‘พวงมาลยัดอกดาวเรือง' วฒันธรรมโชวพ์าว...การเมืองไทย ["Marigold garlands” show proud culture … Thai politics],” 2011) 
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On one hand, the construction of a mass appeal image is a benefit to a candidate with the financial and 
human resources, but it is unfair to less well-known candidates in the same election who struggle to 
gather as many supporters or have limited financial and human resources to construct scenes of ‘mass 
appeal’. This was mentioned publicly by Seripisut Temiyavet, an independent candidate in the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election, on a Thai PBS debate forum 3 days before the election. Another 
noteworthy point is that even though mainstream media know that the celebrity candidate’s frame is a 
set up during the election campaign, they still capture these images and obscure the fact that such 
images were created. However, if celebrity candidates did not set up their image, they might get less 
attention from mainstream media and if celebrity candidate images were lacking from candidates’ 
SNS pages, it would mean there was a lack of recognition of party-based candidates. Consequently, it 
is unlikely that they would gain their followers’ attention on SNSs.  
Ordinariness 
 
Figure 4.21: Example of M.R. Sukhumbhand using an ordinariness theme, uploaded on 16 January 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุ
ขุมพันธ์ุ บริพตัร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013c).  
 
Figure 4.22: Example of Pongsapat using an ordinariness theme, uploaded on 27 January 2013 (พงศพัศ พงษ์เจริญ 
[Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013g).  
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The candidate image of ordinariness was not used significantly in visual images on Facebook cover 
pages. Other than the image of M.R. Sukhumbhand holding a Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) 
single ticket and Pongsapat riding a bicycle, shown in Figures 4.21 and 4.22 respectively, the visual 
image frames were more clearly associated with statesmanship, compassion and mass appeal. Except 
for the everyday clothing of both candidates, their visual images of ordinariness show their 
involvement in the activities of ordinary Bangkokians to understand the problems that they face and to 
propose realistic policies for these problems. Interestingly, the result of content analysis shows that 
‘ordinary’ images are the least number of images uploaded on both candidates’ Facebook cover page 
during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, which might suggest that ‘ordinary’ 
images might be not as influential as images associating with statesmanship, compassion and mass 
appeal elements.  Despite this, it could be said that both candidates attempted to construct their image 
of being ‘ordinary’, suggesting efforts had made to show that they can be part of everyday life of 
people, abolishing citizens’ belief that potential Bangkok governor for politicians would be arrogant 
and distant, similarly to how Thai national politicians would be formally portrayed in traditional 
media such as election campaign posters and brochures during the 2011 general election (Jones, 2014). 
Thus, when the election campaign is about the contestation of power for governing Bangkok for the 
next four years, the significance of candidates’ image of being ‘ordinary’ and involved in voter’s 
everyday life activity signify the lack of social or economic gap between the candidates and the 
citizens, leading to citizens believing that they are approachable and down-to-earth. The image of 
candidates being ‘ordinary’ diversifies the type of image that the candidates portray on their Facebook 
cover page. On the other hand, ‘ordinary’ images have been taken during the election as the result of 
the action the candidates’ photographers chose to focus on, the angle of the photographers and the 
distance between the candidate and the photographer. Furthermore, filtering the images to upload as 
cover pages on candidates’ Facebook pages is also about the images that public relations personnel 
choose to project the candidate at the time of uploading the image and how the public relations 
personnel want the candidate to be perceived as. 
In short, the management and integration of different visual image frames allow both candidates to 
portray various aspects of their campaign, which diversify their image throughout the election 
campaign. Both candidates’ visual images on the Facebook cover pages posted during the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign were related to the statesmanship theme, the compassionate 
theme, the mass appeal theme and the ordinariness theme. There was no ‘sure losers’ element found, 
because the visual images posted on the Facebook pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat were 
controlled by the candidates and their SNS campaign staff, who would select images to portray the 
candidate having the potential to win the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election and to perform the role 
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of Bangkok governor efficiently. Whereas in Grabe and Bucy's (2013) study of news broadcasts in the 
presidential election campaign, news media framed candidates in different aspects, including ‘the sure 
loser’ frame of visual images that have linkages to a small number of audience, disapproval audience 
or negative facial expression and body language of the candidate. As one would expect, the selection 
of visual images on Facebook cover pages, being the primary image shown on the candidates’ 
Facebook timelines, is intended to construct positive images to influence their followers’ perspective 
on the candidates, as ideal candidates and populist campaigners during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign. Flexibility needs to be allowed when using Grabe and Bucy's (2013) 
framework. Cultural signs or the giving of garlands to candidate could also be coded as part of 
statesmanship theme and mass appeal theme respectively. Overlapping of themes could also occur 
within a single image.  
4.4. Signs on Facebook cover pages  
Developing from section 4.3, there are also other signs that play an integral role in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign. Candidates used a few core signs to distinguish their campaigns. 
This section identifies the candidates’ chosen campaign colours, SNS information and the candidates’ 
numbers placed on their Facebook cover pages.  
4.4.1. Colours  
Candidates placed their political party logo and used the colours of their political party on their cover 
pages, confirming with potential followers that the candidate is nominated by their political party, 
which is another important identification to distinguish one candidate from another. Both candidates’ 
cover pages used the colours of their political party. The distinctiveness of the design and colours of 
each political party logo contain a few meanings, depending on which perspective one takes to 
interpret the colour.  
  
Figure 4.23: Example of the designs of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook cover page in relation to the Democrat 
Party logo (Source: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s cover page from Figure 4.9, Democrat Party logo from 
http://www.democrat.or.th/th/about/history/ )  
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In Figure 4.23, the three colours that can be identified are blue, white and green, which accord with 
the logo of the Democrat Party, which has blue as the core colour, white as the background. M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s Facebook posts also contain the phrase ‘หวัใจฟ้า’, which can be translated as ‘blue 
heart’, was used in the context of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Democrat Party assembling supporters to 
either accumulate the voting bloc or disperse themselves to canvass votes during the election 
campaign. Blue represents the Democrat Party. Thus, the significant use of blue colour in M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s campaign is associated with the overall meaning of ‘Democrat’, which according to 
the Democrat Party website, means ‘ประชาชนเป็นผู้ทรงไว้ซึง่อ านาจอธิปไตย’ which can be translated as ‘the 
people are the ones who hold sovereign power.’ On the Democrat Party website, no information was 
found particularly on the symbolism of colours used in the Democrat Party’s logo,14  but in 1946, the 
Democrat Party in Thailand was formed as ‘a pro-royalist party grouping’ (Pasuk and Baker, 1998, 
p.223). The royal colours are yellow, pink and blue, with blue associated with the birthday of the 
Queen of Thailand (McCargo, 2009, p.12). Using blue as the main colours in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
campaign, this clearly relates his campaign to the Democrat Party and his campaign can also be 
perceived as royalist. ‘Blue heart’ can imply that supporters are not only constructing the image to 
support Democrat Party, but their minds and thoughts are truly allied with Democrat Party campaign 
and they are true Democrats.  
Pongsapat used red in combination with white and dark blue in his election campaign and cover pages, 
which are the colours of the Thai national flag and the logo of the Pheu Thai Party, as shown in Figure 
4.24:  
  
Figure 4.24: Example of the designs of Pongsapat’s Facebook cover page in relation to the Thailand national 
flag and the Pheu Thai Party logo (Source: Pongsapat’s cover page from Figure 4.10, Pheu Thai Party logo 
from http://www.ptp.or.th/page/2 , Thailand national flag: Author)  
                                                             
14
 (“บทความ: แมพ่ระธรณี [Article: Mother Earth],” 2009, “ประวติัพรรคประชาธิปัตย ์[History of Democrat Party],” 2009) 
123 
 
On Figure 4.24, the selection and combination of colours used in Pongsapat’s campaign on Facebook 
accord to the colours of the logo of Pheu Thai Party, which has some reflection on the national flag of 
Thailand. According to Pheu Thai Party website (http://www.ptp.or.th/page/2), the name ‘Pheu Thai 
Party’ means ‘knowing the love of harmony and being united as a single power of the people in the 
nation’.
15
 The logo of the Pheu Thai Party is the Thai letters of ‘พ’ and ‘ท’, the initial letters of the 
Thai name, in dark blue with the backward sloping strokes in dark blue, red and white stripes (the 
colours of the national flag).  The meaning of these letters is ‘knowing the love of harmony and being 
united as a single power of the people in the nation by following in the footsteps of His Majesty the 
King who has the royal intention for the Thai people to know the love of harmony and be united as a 
single power’.
16
 พรรคเพ่ือไทย (Pheu Thai Party) printed in dark blue means ‘the commitment to bring 
together Thai people from all sectors to mobilise wisdom and set short-, medium- and long-term 
policies to jointly develop the Thai nation for prosperity, security and sustainability forever’.
17
 
 
The colours of Thai national flag symbolise nation (red), religion (white) and the monarchy (blue). 
Thai national flag has been used in different occasions. Peeranant and Kettawa (2015) outline that the 
Thai national flag has been used for: 1. Sports competition where the national flag represents Thailand; 
2. Political symbol e.g. the political protest of People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), 
where the designs of various products contain the national flag printed on the product for people to 
show their love for the nation, religion and the King; 3. Used to cover coffins or cremated bones of 
individuals who have been killed when they were on duty, showing their courage and the sacrifice 
they had for Thailand; 4.  Welcoming His Majesty the King; 5. Showing the government’s ownership 
of places such as government premises. The use of Thai national flag colours in Pongsapat’s 
campaign could also be perceived as nationalist.  
On the other hand, the use of red in Pongsapat’s campaign might be associated with the Red Shirts or 
the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) social movement, who are supporters of 
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. According to Naruemon and McCargo (2011), the Red 
                                                             
15
   Translated from ‘การรู้รักสามคัคีและรวมกนัเป็นพลงัอนัหน่ึงอนัเดียวกนัของคนในชาติ’ (“รู้จกัพรรคเพือ่ไทย เคร่ืองหมายพรรค [Get 
to know Pheu Thai Party: Party’s mark],” n.d.) 
16
 Translated from ‘การรู้รัก สามคัคีและรวมกนัเป็นพลงัอนัหน่ึงอนัเดียวกนัของคนชาติไทยโดยตามรอยพระยคุลบาทของ 
พระบาทสมเด็จพระเจา้อยูห่วัฯท่ีทรงมีพระราชประสงคใ์ห้คนไทยรู้รักสามคัคีและรวมกนัเป็นพลงัอนัหน่ึงอนัเดียวกนั .’Ibid.  
17
 Translated from ‘ความมุ่งมัน่รวมเอาคนไทยจากทกุภาคส่วนมาระดมสติปัญญา ก  าหนดนโยบายทั้งระยะสั้น ระยะกลางและระยะ
ยาว  เพื่อร่วมกนัพฒันาชาติไทยให้เจริญรุ่งเรือง มัน่คง ย ัง่ยืนตลอดไป.’ Ibid.  
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Shirt protesters in 2010 were mainly working-class Thais from the North and Northeast. It could be 
said that the nomination of Pongsapat by the Pheu Thai Party under Yingluck Shinawatra, who was 
Prime Minister at the time of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, is further connected to the Red 
Shirt protesters in Thailand. The use of red in Pongsapat’s campaign material can be perceived as the 
candidate’s approach to governing Bangkok in accordance with Yingluck’s and Thaksin’s populist 
policies.  
In short, the selection and symbolism of colours in 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election on Facebook 
is significant as it reflects certain meanings, depending on which perspective one takes to interpret the 
colour. The difference in colours used by M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat campaign on Facebook 
represents the ideological origin of the political party that nominated them for the election campaign, 
which clearly distinguish both candidates’ campaign. Blue colour has always been used to represent 
Democrat Party or candidate nominated by Democrat Party in previous general elections or Bangkok 
gubernatorial elections. The significance of using the blue colour in M.R Sukhumbhand’s campaign 
shows the direct relationship between his campaign and Democracy Party. Blue colour also 
conspicuously portrays his campaign associating with pro-royalists groupings, based on how the 
political party was formed. On the other hand, blue colour also represents the meaning of being 
Democrat Party i.e. ‘the people are the ones who hold sovereign power.’ As for Pongsapat’s campaign, 
the use of red, dark blue and white colour are aligned with the origin of Phue Thai Party, which is the 
banned Thai Rak Thai Party, founded by Thaksin. Thus, both candidates’ usage of colours was 
identical and was used as their political symbol before the social movements of Red Shirt and Yellow 
Shirt.  
4.4.2. Social networking information  
SNS logos and candidates’ usernames appear on candidates’ cover pages.  M.R. Sukhumbhand and 
Pongsapat regularly used SNS logos to remind viewers of the SNS platforms used, with an identical 
username for SNS platforms. 
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Figure 4.25: Example of the designs of M.R. Sukhumbhand Facebook cover page that contains his SNS 
information and candidate number, uploaded on 21 January 2013 (ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพัตร [M.R. Sukhumbhand 
Paribatra], 2013f).  
 
Figure 4.26: Example of the designs of Pongsapat’s cover page that contains his SNS information and candidate 
number, uploaded on 21 January 2013 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013b).  
As shown in Figure 4.25 and 4.26, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook cover pages contain SNS logos of 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and Google Plus, while Pongsapat’s cover pages contain 
SNS logos of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram. M.R. Sukhumbhand’s SNS username is 
‘Sukhumbhandp’, which is a combination of his given name and the initial letter of his family name. 
Pongsapat’s SNS accounts have only one username, i.e. ‘PongsapatBKK’, which is a combination of 
his given name and the abbreviation of ‘Bangkok’. Both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used one 
username for all SNS platforms, which made their SNS identities consistent, creating convenience 
when people search for them on SNSs. Presenting candidates’ usernames for the SNSs platforms that 
they were using during the election campaign shows that both candidates tried to expand their 
networks on SNSs as much as possible. Over half of the candidates’ Facebook pages contain 
information linked to other SNS platforms, implying a ‘network of networks’ that candidate strive to 
expand from their Facebook cover page. The SNS logos show different channels of SNS 
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communication and guide viewers to connect with the candidate on SNSs, ensuring that users can 
receive the candidates’ campaign message according to their preferred platforms. 
It should be noted here that Pongsapat’s first four cover pages contained the message ‘Like พงศพศั, 
Share อนาคตกรุงเทพฯ’, meaning ‘Like Pongsapat, Share the future of Bangkok’, showing the Facebook 
‘Like’ logo, a hand with a raised thumb. A few connotations could be interpreted from this. Firstly, 
the word ‘Like’ symbolises the act of interacting to agree on content on Facebook and it can also be 
used to ‘follow’ Facebook users. Secondly, the word ‘Share’ encourages people to spread Facebook 
content or suggest the Facebook page to other users. Also, the word ‘Share’ could refer to Pongsapat’s 
intention of ‘sharing’ his ideas on SNSs to build Bangkok. As a result, the words ‘Like’ and ‘Share’ 
used as part of SNS slogan can give a sense of encouragement for Pongsapat’s followers to interact. 
Acquiring a reasonably high number of followers would be more important for Pongsapat as he is a 
new candidate who did not have a network on SNSs prior to the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign.  
Both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat constantly used SNSs logos in the design of their cover 
pages, which shows the significance of SNS logos and their usernames as part of their campaigns, 
informing viewers about the SNS platforms that candidates use with the same usernames for different 
SNSs platforms. This is a way to increase the number of followers in the candidates’ networks and 
accommodates followers’ preference in SNS platforms. Pongsapat in particular also encourages 
followers to follow him or interact with him on SNSs, which can expand his SNS network.  
The design of both candidates’ Facebook cover pages is a digital format of other print media used 
during the election campaign as shown in Figure 5.24 and 5.25 (below):  
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Figure 4.27: SNS information on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s brochure (middle) and mini billboard (right) reflect 
SNS information provided on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s first Facebook cover page (left) (Source: M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s first Facebook cover page from Figure 4.9, other photographs: Author)  
 
 
Figure 4.28: SNS information on Pongsapat’s brochure (middle) and billboard (right) reflect SNS information 
provided on Pongsapat’s first Facebook cover page (left) (Source: Pongsapat’s first Facebook cover page from 
Figure 4.26, other photographs: Author)  
Based on Figure 4.27 and 4.28, the holistic information, visual images and colours used and presented 
on candidates’ Facebook cover pages, billboards and brochures are a reflection of each other, which 
strengthens the identity of the candidates’ campaigns. This can be an advantage for potential followers 
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searching for the candidates’ Facebook pages, who might have some familiarity with the visual 
images on billboards and brochures. Referring to McNair's (2011) definition of political 
advertisements, designs of candidates’ Facebook cover pages that incorporate with the designs of their 
billboards and brochures can be considered as political advertising. The Facebook cover pages 
transmit similar messages to the holistic image of candidates’ billboards and brochures. Candidates 
have control over the messages shown on these media. Traditional print media remained relevant 
during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign to introduce the candidate and their social 
networks. Candidates did not have to pay commercial rates to upload the different Facebook cover 
pages as they did to print election campaign brochures and billboards, but surely human and financial 
resources were needed to assist candidates in designing the Facebook cover pages. Candidates 
changed their Facebook cover pages every few days during the election campaign. The political 
advertisements on print media and digital media were developed as candidates’ Facebook cover pages, 
billboards and brochures contain signs of SNSs and links to their SNSs accounts.  
The SNS logos, websites and usernames stated on candidates’ billboards and brochures is a way for 
candidates to increase awareness of their use of SNSs and at the same time the SNS links introduce 
viewers to the candidates’ SNS pages. In other words, SNS information stated on candidates’ print 
media could attract more voters to ‘follow’ the candidate on his social networking pages or website. 
Instead of voters decoding campaign messages only from candidates’ billboards and brochures, they 
are introduced to another platform of communication, where voters would be able to receive 
campaign messages ‘directly’ from the candidates. As a result, voters are able to know different 
aspects of the candidates, their policies and updates about the candidates during the election campaign. 
At the same time, more voters following candidates on SNSs would mean that candidates are able to 
broadcast their campaign to a larger number of voters, increasing the spreadability of digital vote-
canvassing networks, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Social networking links and logos shown on 
billboards and brochures establish a relationship between ‘old’ media and new media, which develops 
the way that voters receive campaign information.  
4.4.3. Candidates’ election numbers  
Another significant feature of Thai elections is the candidate number, as shown in Figure 4.25 and 
4.26. Example of the designs of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s cover page that contains their 
SNS information and candidate number, which has been a fundamental identification item for voters 
to recognise candidates. In Thai elections, candidates and vote-canvassers keep reminding voters of 
the candidates’ election numbers so that voters will remember it when they vote (Sombat, 1993, 
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pp.92-93). Candidates believe that getting number 1 or numbers close to it makes it easy for voters to 
remember (Surapongse, 2002, p.186).  
21 January 2013 was the official start of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, allowing 
candidates to register officially for the election and draw their candidate number. The process of 
candidates drawing their number out from the ballot becomes the climaxes on 21 January 2013. 
According to ASTV Manager Online (2013) news report, the director of the Election Commission for 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election drew number out of the ballot in order to arrange the 
sequence of the candidate who will be drawing their candidate number from the ballot, which M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was the fourth candidate to draw his number, while Pongsapat was the last candidate to 
draw his candidate number.
18
 As a result, M.R. Sukhumbhand drew out ‘16’, while Pongsapat drew 
out ‘9’. This research also found that the election numbers of M.R. Sukhumbhand (16) and Pongsapat 
(9) were an integral part of their campaigns on Facebook and the design of their cover pages and their 
campaign. Both candidates showed an attempt to be optimistic about their election numbers by 
continuously reminding followers about their numbers throughout the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign. 
‘Number 16’ does not have a significant meaning in Thai culture, but the ‘Number 16’ reminds Thai 
people of the drawing of the national lottery in Thailand, which occurs every 1
st
 and 16
th
 day of the 
month by the Government Lottery Office. M.R. Sukhumbhand tried to interpret ‘Number 16’ in a way 
that was relevant to his campaign. On the day that M.R. Sukhumbhand drew ‘Number 16’, he posted 
on his Facebook page ‘Number 16’ is a nice number. I am ready to be the 16th Bangkok Governor’. 
This shows that M.R. Sukhumbhand perceived ‘Number 16’ as auspicious or lucky for himself. The 
statement indicates that the candidate believes in superstition as the candidate made a spurious claim, 
using his election number to predict the result of the election.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand also made use of his candidate number by summarising his policies as ‘10 
มาตรการเร่งด่วน + 6 นโยบาย ร่วมสร้างกรุงเทพฯ คือ 16 งานที่ต้องเดินหน้าทนัที’, which can be translated as ‘10 
urgent measures plus 6 policies to build Bangkok make 16 jobs to take forward immediately’. This is 
a way to remind voters that the ‘Number 16’ signifies the 16 main policies that the candidate is 
offering in the election and ensuring that the number of his policies reflects his election number.  
                                                             
18
(“รับสมคัรผูว้า่ฯ กทม.คึกคกั! ‘สุขมุพนัธุ’์ หยบิเบอร์ 16 ส่วน ‘พงศพศั’ เฮงไดเ้บอร์ 9 [Lively registration of candidates for Bangkok Governor ! 
Sukhumbhand picks number 16 while Pongsapat luckily gets number 9],” 2013).  
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M.R. Sukhumbhand also used hashtag signs (#) in his Facebook posts throughout the election 
campaign e.g. #vote16, which personalises consumption of online information (Papacharissi, 2010) in 
a way that it can direct users to related topics (#vote16) within the network, providing convenience for 
people who are interested in the topic to read and interact more with the content. The use of #vote16 
is also a sign to remind voters of the candidate’s number as well as to centralise all campaign 
messages within one click. This shows that the candidate number is not only significant in Thai 
election campaigns, but candidates use their number to integrate with hyperlinks tools on Facebook.   
On the day after Pongsapat drew his candidate number, he noted on Facebook that he saw many 
newspapers teasing him for his good fortune in drawing ‘number 9’, but he wanted to inform them 
that ‘number 9’ was the last ball in the ballot. This means as he was the last candidate to draw an 
election number, there was no other number for him to choose. ‘Number 9’ has certain meaning for 
Thai people. The current King of Thailand, King Bhumibol Adulyadej is also known as Rama IX, 
because King Bhumibol Adulyadej is the ninth monarch of the Chakri Dynasty. King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej has been making major contributions and development to rural areas, enabling the 
relationship between the King and Thai people to be a ‘unique relationship’ (Pasuk and Baker, 1998, 
pp.240-242).   
In Pongsapat’s campaign, Pongsapat related his election campaign to a near homophone. The 
pronunciation for ‘nine’ kao (เก้า) in Thai language is a near homophone of kaao (ก้าว), meaning ‘to 
take a step’ or ‘to move forward’. Kaao (ก้าว) can be used in compounds like kaao klai (กา้วไกล) or kaao 
na (ก้าวหน้า), which both mean ‘to advance’ or ‘to progress’. Pongsapat used this homophony as part 
of his campaign. This was found on his Facebook posts i.e. จบัมือไว้ แล้ว ‘เก้า’ ไปด้วยกนัครับ, meaning 
‘Hold hands and step forward together’. Pongsapat used the spelling kao เกา้ (9) in this message 
instead of the correct spelling kaao ก้าว (moving forward). Pongsapat introduced his policies at the 
Pheu Thai Party headquarters, with a backdrop displaying kaao na, kaao klai, kaao pai phrom kan, 
which means ‘move forward, move far, move together’. Making use of the homophony led to an 
optimistic, enthusiastic and confident campaign, showing the candidate’s intention to move forward 
together with voters and the government, Pongsapat was able to give his campaign an auspicious
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sense by playing on the homophony of ‘number 9’.19 Thus, it could be said that another major aspect 
of political public relations in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was trying to make 
sense of candidate numbers, regardless of what number candidate drew out. The candidates created 
subjective interpretations of their numbers but the most important role of a candidate number is to 
identify the candidate.  
To conclude, the candidates’ cover pages on Facebook during the election campaign were designed 
and adapted to the features of campaigning on Facebook by including items such as social networking 
site logos, candidate usernames, political party logos, candidate numbers, visual images and colours 
that are symbols of their political parties. It could be said that these items reflect purposeful 
communication, seeking to present an image of the candidates and expand the candidates’ SNS 
networks. The changes and management of the candidates’ cover pages could draw the attention of 
and engage followers and potential followers to the candidates’ campaigns on Facebook.  
Conclusion 
This chapter sets out to answer the research question: What features of visual image management 
were found on candidates’ Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign? After analysing the fundamental elements of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s 
Facebook pages, this chapter argues that one of the primary aspects of political public relations on the 
candidates’ Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was the 
management of core information that candidates revealed and the main visual images that candidates 
portray in their Facebook profile pictures and cover pages to show their suitability as Bangkok 
governor. Political public relations with respect to the candidates’ core information and visual images 
consisted of deciding the image that the candidates intended to establish and the selection of other 
signs to enhance the visual representation so that followers could easily understand, assimilate and 
spread the visual image.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand could be viewed as having a phudi image based on his title and long-term 
political background, but he also takes acre to portray himself as an ordinary person working with the 
                                                             
19
 Pongsapat’s biography on his Facebook page, notes that he was born on 9 December 1955. But based on a content 
analysis of his Facebook page, Pongsapat did not mention ‘number 9’ in relation to his birthday.  
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political elite and local people. Pongsapat has a hybrid background as highly educated and a career 
police officer, which also indicates his ability to work with officers from different areas and Thais of 
various social-economic backgrounds. Each candidate used their career and education background 
information to introduce themselves on Facebook, which was also able to relate to followers of 
different in political interests, occupations and demographics.  
With the use of Grabe and Bucy’s framework to analyse M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s 
Facebook profile pictures, this chapter found that both candidates’ Facebook profile pictures used 
during the election campaign were framed in a similar way to portray them as ordinary people having 
a pleasant personality, blending their image to SNSs platforms as an informal channel of 
communication, with limited signs of the candidates having direct statesmanship qualities or symbols 
associated with their career background or social class. Both candidates’ Facebook profile picture 
omitted from their image anything based on whom they used to be, but have approached their election 
campaign on Facebook in more a welcoming way. The single profile picture used on each candidate’s 
Facebook page clearly distinguished each candidate from other candidates in the same election, 
enabling voters to recognise the candidates according to how the candidates wanted voters to perceive 
them.  
In terms of Facebook cover pages, both candidates integrated different themes of images to give 
different overviews of their campaigns, changing their cover pages every 1-3 days. This chapter found 
that the ideal candidate and populist campaigner frame were significant in representing the overall 
image of the candidates’ campaigns. Visual images associated with statesmanship and mass appeal 
were based on the response that candidates got from crowds. As the candidates’ Facebook cover 
pages are the first visual image that followers and potential followers saw when they clicked onto the 
candidates’ Facebook pages, the significant use of statesmanship and mass appeal visual images can 
be the first impression that followers and potential followers had, directing the connectedness of other 
politicians and using their image to endorse candidate’s campaign. However, visual images that 
contain compassionate and ordinariness elements enabled the candidates to relate to voters better as 
these images showed the candidates communicating with voters and giving attention to particular 
voters.   
Grabe and Bucy’s framework in Appendix 3 remains relevant in studying visual images of candidates 
during the election campaign, but the use of the framework has to be adapted to the platform of 
communication, this particular election and the culture. Significant cultural practices such as giving 
and receiving marigold garlands can be used as predefined codes, categorised under mass appeal 
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theme. As the Election Commission did not allow candidates in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election to use the endorsements of celebrities in the entertainment industry, this category was missing 
from the criteria to code mass appeal theme.  
As analysed in section 4.4 of this chapter, the design of candidates’ Facebook cover pages involved 
careful selection of visual images and the inclusion of different signs such as SNS logos, candidate 
usernames, candidate election numbers, political party logos and colours, to clearly communicate core 
information about the candidate. Colours used on the candidates’ Facebook cover pages reflected the 
candidate’s political party ideology. Candidates’ SNS usernames and the use of SNS logos inform 
also directed potential followers to candidate social networks. Candidate’s election numbers represent 
candidate’s campaign numerically. Thus, signs associated with individual platforms of 
communication, elections and culture are important visual representations of candidates’ campaigns 
on SNSs and should, therefore, be included as part of the semiotic visual framework.  
The argument on political public relations on SNSs initiated in this chapter provides an understanding 
of candidates’ management of core information and visual images to communicate their campaign. To 
gain a broader perspective of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s campaigns on Facebook during 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial  election campaign, Chapter 5 analyses Facebook posts published on 
their Facebook pages during the election campaign.  
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Chapter 5 : Management of Policy-related Posts on Facebook 
 
Introduction 
The policies that candidate’s proposed is another fundamental element in election campaign. Viewed 
from election campaign perspective, Baines (2011) proposes that political public relations is ‘winning 
electoral support by influencing public opinion and voting behaviour, partly by outlining one’s own 
parties’ policies and leadership team and partly by damaging the credibility of the opponents’ policy 
platform and leadership aspirations’ (p.116). As Facebook puts candidates and their public relations 
personnel in control of the posts about candidates’ campaigns, the candidates and public relations 
personnel can strategise communication with the candidates’ followers based on policies.  
This chapter sets out to answer the research question: ‘What features of multimodal image and 
information management were found on candidates’ Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign?’ The chapter explores information management on M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
with particular focus on posts which are related to candidate’s policy in order to determine the 
patterns of disseminating campaign information and the way in which candidates and their team takes 
control on the flow of campaign information on candidate’s Facebook page to engage and influence 
follows.  
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the campaigns of M.R. Sukhumbhand and 
Pongsapat by reviewing how each of their campaign slogans was framed with regard to their approach 
to governing Bangkok. The second section moves on to determine the different ways and patterns that 
candidate adapted to communicate about their policies on Facebook during the election campaign. 
The final section focuses on how candidates make their campaign and policy-related posts more 
influential by incorporating their policies to other elements of the election campaign in order to assist 
followers in interpreting the candidates’ campaigns in accordance with different perspectives.  
5.1. Framing of campaign slogans  
The concept of framing is related to the way an issue is being talked about (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972) or how any aspects of the issues are more salient than others in order to promote the issue in a 
particular way (Entman, 1993, p.52 cited in Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012, p.197). The use of frames, 
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therefore, aims to influence the way the media audience reacts to news (Dainton and Zelley, 2005; 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007; Scheufele, 1999). This section 
examines the way in which M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat framed their campaign slogans to give 
an overview of their policies.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign slogan in his first Facebook cover page in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign was ‘รักกรุงเทพฯ ร่วมสร้างกรุงเทพฯ เลอืก ม.ร.ว. สขุมุพนัธุ์ บริพตัร’, which can 
be translated as ‘Love Bangkok, build Bangkok together, elect M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra’, while 
Pongsapat’s campaign slogan in his first Facebook cover page was ‘วางยทุธศาสตร์ สร้างอนาคตกรุงเทพฯ
ร่วมกบัรัฐบาลอย่างไร้รอยต่อ’ meaning ‘Set strategy, build Bangkok’s future with the government 
seamlessly’. Pongsapat’s slogan relates his strategy to work with the government seamlessly, meaning 
‘lack of joints.’ The metaphorical meaning of Pongsapat’s slogan would be interpreted as claiming 
that the ‘cause’ of problems in Bangkok is the existence of ‘joints’ or junctions between the Bangkok 
governor, including the incumbent governor, M.R. Sukhumbhand, and the Thai national government, 
which might not produce a smooth result.  
As for Pongsapat’s slogan, the phrase ‘work with the government seamlessly’ refers to the 
interdependent co-operating relationship of phakphuak between Pongsapat and the government if 
Pongsapat or the Pheu Thai Party wins the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. The government at 
the time of the election, was led by a woman (Yingluck Shinawatra). This also shows the link between 
Pongsapat and the government in the same elite ‘group’ working together. As the Pheu Thai Party 
nominated Pongsapat, Pongsapat made use of his affiliation in his campaign. Consequently, 
Pongsapat’s integrated his relationship with the government in his slogan to receive democratic 
mandate by winning the elections to govern Bangkok as the law dictates, which can minimise 
conflicts of interest between the Bangkok governor and the Thai government. Difficulties arise when 
judging whether the notion of phakphuak portrays a positive image of the candidate and the political 
party. With reference to Chai's (1994) point of the phakphuak system containing prejudiced elements, 
it could be said that the domination of political power by the Thai government and Pongsapat could 
bring a negative impact in that they might implement policies and make decisions based on their own 
interests, without facing any objection or challenges. If a voter is pessimistic on Pheu Thai Party or 
Thai Rak Thai Party, or the notion of Bangkok Governor being the same phakphuak as the Thai 
government, the slogan of to ‘work with government seamlessly’ could challenge their voting 
decision.   
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Pongsapat elaborated his slogan and approach to work with government by phrases such as ‘ประสานกบั
รัฐบาล’ which can be translated as ‘coordinate work with government.’ For example, Pongsapat’s final 
set of policies on ‘Revitalize Bangkok’, launched on Pongsapat’s Facebook page by his strategic team 
two days before the election day, mentioned increasing the ‘green space’ in Bangkok and initiating a 
‘Creative Economy’ by coordinating with the government. Other examples of policy coordinated with 
the government include Pongsapat’s transportation policy for northern Bangkok with an ‘International 
Transportation and Logistics Centre’ in preparation for the introduction of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC). Pongsapat explains his approach to working with the government seamlessly by 
proposing his policies in relation to working with the government.  
Another phrase that Pongsapat used in his campaign on Facebook was ‘จบัมือไว้แล้วไปด้วยกบั’ which can 
be translated as ‘Hold hands then go together’ and ‘จบัมือไว้แล้ว เก้า (ก้าว) ไปด้วยกับ’ which can be 
translated as ‘Hold hands then step forward together.’ These two phrases can be interpreted in two 
ways when used as a more informal campaign slogan, which Pongsapat might have attempt to 
integrate with his initial core slogan of ‘work with government seamlessly.’ On one hand, the two 
phrases envisage Pongsapat holding hands with the Thai government, which means that the phrase 
repeats the idea of ‘work with government seamlessly’, but with the noun ‘government’ taken out. On 
the other hand, the phrase ‘holding hands’ reflects Pongsapat’s intention to work collaboratively with 
Bangkokians or all sectors in Bangkok to move Bangkok forward together. 
The word ‘ยทุธศาสตร์’ means ‘strategy’ and ‘ไร้รอยต่อ’ means ‘seamless’. These two words/phrases need 
further elaboration and examples for readers to understand what Pongsapat intended to communicate 
on his cover page. Notwithstanding the fact that Pongsapat aimed to design his campaign specifically 
under this slogan or that he intended to establish his relationship with the government, the message 
could have been more reader-friendly to diverse potential followers in order for them to be able to 
decode his campaign message quickly.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s original campaign slogan was ‘รักกรุงเทพฯ ร่วมสร้างกรุงเทพฯ เลอืก ม.ร.ว. สขุมุพนัธุ์  
บริพตัร’, which means ‘Love Bangkok, build Bangkok together, elect M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra’. 
This slogan was not framed in relation to his political party, but it was framed to encourage voters to 
directly vote for the candidate. The use of the word รัก (love) to start off the message highlights the 
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strong feeling of concern that a person has for Bangkok. The second part of the message shows M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s willingness to have people collaborating with him to สร้าง (build) Bangkok, giving a 
sense of engagement by including voters to be part of his proposal to ‘build Bangkok.’ M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was trying guide people to vote for him by showing the cause and consequence i.e. if 
people love Bangkok, they should elect M.R. Sukhumbhand so that they can collaborate in building 
Bangkok with him. M.R. Sukhumbhand’s slogan was giving a sense of unity, belonging and identity 
to Bangkok. Thus, if viewers read the message and they feel that they ‘love’ Bangkok, they would be 
interested in ‘building’ Bangkok with M.R. Sukhumbhand. The word ‘elect’ encourages voters to vote 
for M.R. Sukhumbhand.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s slogan has a few similarities to Samak Sundaravej’s campaign slogan in the 
2000 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign as shown below:  
 
Figure 5.1: Print medium of Samak Sundaravej in the 2000 Bangkok gubernatorial election from (Photograph 
from Surapongse Sotanasathien, 2002, p.204). 
Figure 5.1 shows the text message in the brochure of Samak Sundaravej, the winner of 2000 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election: ‘ถ้าจะใช้ผม ...กรุณาเลอืกผม หมายเลข ๗  ๒๓ กรกฎา เลอืกสมคัร เป็นผู้ว่ากทม’, which 
can be translated as ‘If you want to use me, please elect me. Number 7. 23 July, elect Samak as 
Bangkok governor.’ The slogans of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Samak are similar in that both use the 
word ‘elect’ and their name as part of their slogan. In Samak’s slogan, the word ‘elect’ gives a sense 
of direction for voters to take action in voting for the candidate as a result of the condition that 
candidate gives, which the candidate viewed himself as subordinate to the voters, who would be the 
candidate’s bosses if the candidate won the election. Also, the word ‘elect’ is related to ‘democracy’ 
in which voters are allowed to have choices in elections and vote for the candidate that they support, 
without any authoritarian command to restrict voters from choosing which candidate to vote for.  
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It is noteworthy that another of M.R. Sukhumbhand slogan was: ‘กรุงเทพฯ เดินหน้าทนัที ►►’ which can 
be translated as ‘Bangkok moves forward immediately ►►.’ This slogan used the benefit of being 
the incumbent to explain his policies in the next term. The verb ‘เดินหน้า’ (move forward), represents 
the candidate’s idea of keep on developing Bangkok and implement policy. The word ‘ทนัที’ 
(immediately) indicates there will not be any delays in implementation policy.  The ‘forward sign’ 
►► symbolises a sense of direction in the candidate’s campaign as well as conveying a sense of the 
modern, digital world. Thus, this slogan indicates a connecting point between M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
first and second terms as governor. Arguably, M.R. Sukhumbhand was an incumbent of the election 
and has the advantage to formulate such slogan, but new candidate of the election can also frame their 
slogan in a similar way if they intend to communicate the same meaning.  
When M.R. Sukhumbhand elaborated his campaign slogan on his Facebook posts during the election 
campaign, he made extensive usage of the word tham. Literally, the word tham alone means ‘do’ or 
‘make’. M.R. Sukhumbhand used the word tham in the context of his policies, in combination with 
other words to form new phrases.  M.R. Sukhumbhand attempted to link his policies to his work 
performance as a Bangkok Governor and the policies which he proposed in 2009 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election. M.R. Sukhumbhand mainly used the word tham to talk about what he had 
achieved as a Bangkok Governor in the previous term. For example, M.R. Sukhumbhand links his 
new policies with his work performance in ‘ตลอด 4 ปีท าหลายอย่าง’ which can be translated as means 
‘Throughout the past 4 years, I did many things’, ‘ท าแล้วจะท าต่อ’ which can be translated as ‘What has 
been done already, will continue to be done’ and ‘ท าได้จริง which can be translated as ‘truly able to do’.  
In the phrases ‘ตลอด 4 ปีท าหลายอย่าง’ (‘Throughout the past 4 years, I did many things’) and ‘ท าแล้ว’ 
(‘done already’), M.R. Sukhumbhand was summarising his past 4 years work performance as 
Bangkok Governor. He was creating awareness among Bangkokians and was promoting his work 
performance in order to establish the image of being an incumbent who has significantly contributed 
to Bangkok. M.R. Sukhumbhand’s frequent references to what he had done for Bangkok might be due 
to voters’ questions about what he had done in the previous four years and why he should be re-
elected. M.R. Sukhumbhand took Facebook as a platform to clearly highlight the development that he 
had contributed to different areas and sectors in Bangkok, for example, the 12.75 km BTS extension 
lines to reduce traffic congestion and increase convenience in moving around in Bangkok, the 
installation of more CCTVs in Bangkok, his contribution to the Thonburi side of Bangkok and Nong 
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Jok District, and the free breakfasts that he had provided to 340,000 schoolchildren in Bangkok as 
examples of groups of people benefiting from his work performance.  
Highlighting what the candidate had done in the previous four years shows the candidate’s attempt to 
portray himself as an action-minded governor who accomplished the goals and policies that he 
initiated four years ago. Also, continuously stressing his own work performance reflects M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s way of telling voters that he was worth electing in four years ago, and voters should 
vote for him again in the upcoming election. This point leads to another phrase, ‘จะท าต่อ’ (will 
continue doing), found to also have important meaning in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign. This 
phrase connected what he had already done to what he will carry on doing. At times, this phrase was 
replaced with ‘สานต่อ’ (follow through), both phrases indicating that what he is going to do or what he 
will continue to do is related to what he had already done in the previous four years. These have a few 
implications.  
Firstly, M.R. Sukhumbhand will persist with the projects and policies which he perceived to be useful 
and relevant in developing and improving lives in Bangkok, once he is re-elected. A change in 
governor will not guarantee that the projects will remain. Secondly, M.R. Sukhumbhand was unable 
to complete some projects or fully implement some policies, which, as stated on his Facebook page, 
was due to the limited timeframe (4 years) and the challenges to his governorship from external 
events such as the flood crisis in 2011. At this point, it could be said that the phrases ‘จะท าต่อ’ and 
‘สานต่อ’ were used to protect his image from the incomplete projects and at the same time, give voters 
the sense of follow-up and establish the direction of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s policies and campaign, 
which might make voters reluctant to change governor. Arguably, for voters who were against or did 
not favour M.R. Sukhumbhand’s policies or his approach to solving problems, the phrase ‘จะท าต่อ’ 
signifies that his campaign was conventional because he is going into the same direction as before, 
without much indication of new approaches being used. This means that voters who have doubts 
about M.R. Sukhumbhand’s work performance as Governor might become even more pessimistic 
with his current campaign, indicating that the phrase ‘จะท าต่อ’ could create different impressions 
among different voters.  
Lastly, the phrase ‘ท าได้จริง’ (truly able to do) reflects what is possible, and M.R. Sukhumbhand used 
this phrase in the context of what his experience as Bangkok Governor showed him about which types 
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of policies were achievable. As critical voters tend to perceive candidates in Thai elections as being 
unrealistic in planning and implementing their policies within a timeframe, candidates tend to just 
market their policies during the election campaign to persuade voters to vote for them. Thus, by 
stressing what is achievable, M.R. Sukhumbhand was attempting to show that his proposed policies 
are not wishful thinking but can be implemented. The phrase ‘ท าได้จริง’ establishes and confirms M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s image of having realistic policies. It was possible for him to continue developing his 
policies based on his experience as Bangkok Governor. Above all, the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign was a connecting point between M.R. Sukhumbhand’s first and second terms, and 
he attempted to portray his image as an incumbent who had experience in this position, ready continue 
for another term.  
To summarise, M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat framed their campaign slogans and propose their 
policies differently, based on their status and what they were known for at the time of the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election. As these candidates were the main competitors, they used different 
approaches to portray their image of being what Grabe and Bucy (2013) refer to as an ‘ideal 
candidate’, having the qualifications to take the position that the candidates are campaigning for. 
Pongsapat’s image of being an ideal candidate consists of a significant element of ‘statesmanship’ as 
his policy strategy was to collaborate with the Thai government seamlessly. If Pongsapat wins the 
election, there would be a change in the trend of Bangkok having a governor from the Democrat Party. 
The overall perception that voters could get from Pongsapat’s slogan is that his campaign is related to 
the government and is somehow interdependent with the government as he intends to work with the 
government seamlessly. On the other hand, M.R. Sukhumbhand was the incumbent, and the framing 
of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign slogan took advantage of this to say in his campaign that Bangkok 
would move forward if he was re-elected. As M.R. Sukhumbhand also used his name as part of his 
slogan, it related to voters in a more individualistic manner, commanding voters to democratically 
return him to power as Bangkok governor. Thus, the overall perception that voters could get from 
M.R. Sukhumbhand would be that the candidate is independent and action-minded to govern Bangkok 
for another term.  
5.2. Management of policy-related posts   
According to Anek (1996), middle-class Thais critically evaluate candidates’ policies based on the 
impact that the policy will have on the country as a whole, which is different from how rural people 
judge candidates based on the ‘parochial and personal benefits’  that they gain from the candidates 
(p.221).  This means that policy is an important selling point during an election campaign for middle-
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class Thais. Taking into consideration there were 45 days to campaign, introducing and explaining 
policies on Facebook involved management of the number of posts on Facebook in relation to the 
different phases of the election campaign to accord with Bangkokians’ voting behaviour. Due to the 
differences in the backgrounds of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat, each candidate might also 
emphasise particular policies in relation to their specialist knowledge and the voters that they are 
specifically targeting.  
This section aims to examine candidates’ management of policy-related posts on Facebook by first 
determining the overall distribution of policy and non-policy-related posts of each candidate and the 
different ways candidate adopted to introduce their policies. Then, this section moves on to review the 
emphasis of their policy statements during different phases of the election and the weight that 
candidates gave to different policies. The analysis in this section enhances our understanding of the 
management of policy-related posts in relation to the establishment or development of a relationship 
between candidates and followers, and how the management of policy-related posts could lead to a 
different level of interaction over the entire election campaign period.   
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5.2.1. Quantity of policy-related posts  
The following table presents an overview of Facebook posts by M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat, 
showing the percentage of posts which are policy-related and non-policy-related 
  M.R. Sukhumbhand  Pongsapat  
  No. of posts  Percentage  No. of posts  Percentage  
Posts which contain the 
keyword ‘นโยบาย’ 
(policy)  
114 24.5% 66 16.3% 
Posts which were 
manually coded as 
policy-related posts  
84 18.1% 69 17.1% 
Total policy-related 
posts  
198 42.6% 135 33.4% 
Non-policy-related posts  267 57.4% 269 66.6% 
  n=465 n=404 
Table 5.1: Distribution of policy and non-policy textual content on the Facebook pages of M.R. Sukhumbhand 
and Pongsapat. 
Table 5.1 shows that M.R. Sukhumbhand had 42.6%, and Pongsapat had 33.4% policy-related posts. 
The remainder were non-policy-related posts, which contained no element of a plan or strategy in 
problem-solving or developing Bangkok. The difference in the percentages of policy-related posts 
between M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat campaign on Facebook indicates the different level of 
focus that both candidates place on policy-related content. M.R. Sukhumbhand was more policy-
orientated than Pongsapat as he had more policy-related content on Facebook. A possible reason for 
this could be that M.R. Sukhumbhand was the incumbent, giving him an advantage of skills and 
knowledge to relate his campaign to his experience as Bangkok governor in the past four years and 
further develop his policies or propose new policies with more expertise and efficiency. The 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election was an appraisal for M.R. Sukhumbhand as voters got to judge if M.R. 
Sukhumbhand should be Bangkok Governor for another term.  
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Because Pongsapat was a new candidate for Bangkok gubernatorial election, Pongsapat needed to use 
his Facebook post to construct an image based on his personality, background and campaign schedule 
so that his followers would be able to get to know him better. Also, the Pheu Thai Party had never 
won any Bangkok gubernatorial election in the past, so Pongsapat and the Pheu Thai Party might 
struggle to develop policies in the interests of Bangkokians. Another possible reason for Pongsapat 
having a lower percentage of policy-related posts was due to his proposal to work with government 
seamlessly as he stated in his campaign slogan. This means that Pongsapat could depend on the 
government for policies. On one hand, it could be said that Pongsapat was not as policy-oriented as 
M.R. Sukhumbhand on Facebook. On the contrary, Pongsapat might be significantly dependent on 
another medium to communicate on his policies. 
Non-policy-related posts of both candidates constitute more than 50% of the total posts made during 
the election campaign. These posts include short messages and images which contain information on 
the place and time of campaign events, media interviews, debates with other candidates or meeting 
voters. In non-policy-related posts candidates encourage their followers to interact with candidate’s 
Facebook page. (This will be further analysed in Chapter 6 on how such posts can increase the 
spreadability of candidate’s campaign on Facebook as candidates engage followers on their Facebook 
pages and ensure continuous momentum on ‘live feeds’.) Real-time reporting of the candidates’ 
campaign with images allowed followers to experience the candidates’ offline campaigns. 
Information on candidates’ future schedules informed followers about the place and the time of 
campaign events, which gave followers the chance to meet and interact with the candidates.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s policy-related posts were associated with his work performance and the 
policies which he campaigned on in the 2009 Bangkok gubernatorial election. 24.5% of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s Facebook posts directly referred to policy, containing the keyword ‘policy’ to 
indicate his policy in the posts e.g.  ‘ผมมีนโยบายเก่ียวกับ’ (I have policy about) ‘ผมมีนโยบายที่จะเพิ่ม’ (I 
have policy to add) or ‘หนึง่ในนโยบายของผม’ (one of my policies). In another 18.1% of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s posts which were policy-related but did not content the word ‘policy’, he would use 
phases such as ‘ผมจะเดินหนา้ติด CCTV’ (I will walk go forward to install CCTVs), ‘ผมตัง้ใจที่’ (I intend to) 
and ‘ผมตัง้เป้าพฒันา’ (I aim to develop). These phrases are examples of rephrasing policy and 
attempting to mention policy in an implicit way, but at the same time still showing his objective to 
launch his policy and create awareness of what he intends to do.  
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The result of Table 5.1 shows that 33.4% of Pongsapat’s Facebook posts were policy-related, made up 
of 16.3 % of total posts using the word ‘policy’ and 17.1% of total posts manually coded as policy-
related. Pongsapat used two ways to launch and discuss his policies on Facebook during the election 
campaign and both ways might or might not use the word ‘policy.’ The first type of policy was 
launched formally in different sets with time intervals in between each set, which contained a clear 
statement and identification of Pongsapat’s proposed policy. This type of policy-related post had the 
word ‘policy’ in the title given to the set of policies that he was launching. It was found in this 
research that Pongsapat launched a total of five sets of policy during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign and each set was posted in a numbered sequence with a proper title to the posts, 
which gave the sense that the next few posts were related to what the candidate just posted.  
There was no pattern or timeframe in the launching of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s policies on Facebook, 
but the posts which M.R. Sukhumbhand considered to be ‘policy-related were organised into one 
album on Facebook. However, when examining Pongsapat’s campaign on Facebook, this research 
found patterns in relation to the time of launching policies and the use of different visual images. As 
stated earlier, Pongsapat launched five sets of policies at different times and he used different info-
graphics to identify the different sets of policies. For example, on the night of 31 January 2013, 
Pongsapat posted the first set of policies entitled ‘เปิดตวันโยบายหลกัเร่ืองที่ 1: ลดรายจ่าย เพิ่มรายได้’ 
(‘Launch of main policy number 1: reduce spending, increase income’). The content under this title 
includes what Pongsapat planned to do in order to achieve the objective of reducing spending and 
increasing income. Then, the presentation of Pongsapat’s policies on his Facebook page continued on 
the following day, 1 February 2013, with another seven posts directly related to the heading ‘Launch 
of main policy’. This set of policies was officially announced to his Facebook followers, with a clear 
outline of what the candidate attempted to achieve in his main set of policies. 
The prevalent elements of Pongsapat’s policy-related posts consisted of clear statements introducing 
policies, presented in bullet points and short paragraphs in order for the message to be reader-friendly 
on the Facebook page. The different sets of policy-related visual images were posted in sequence 
within 24 hours of the first post in the set. Dividing a set of policies into 3-8 posts allows the 
messages to be more comprehensive and might tempt followers to follow up on other policies. In 
other words, this type of posts gives a sense of ‘follow up’ on Pongsapat’s Facebook page in order to 
completely understand the whole set of policies. Consequently, after viewing Pongsapat’s info-
graphics, viewers might want to share the content with their friends on Facebook, enabling more 
people to know more about Pongsapat’s policies. Lastly, each set of policies was posted at intervals, 
varying from 7 to 13 days, which allowed the strategy management team to revise or adapt their 
145 
 
policies according to the problems that voters raised during Pongsapat’s field campaigning. Another 
possible reason to stagger the presentation of policies was to give followers sufficient amount of time 
to digest the policies. Similar to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook campaign, there were also policy-
related posts in Pongsapat’s campaign that contained the keyword ‘policy’ but these were not found in 
the posts which were launched in sets. Where the word ‘policy’ was not found in policy-related posts, 
Pongsapat used language such as ‘แนวทางการ’ (‘procedure’), ‘ผมตัง้ใจที่จะพฒันา’ (‘I intend to develop’) 
and ‘ยทุธศาสตร์การ’ ‘strategy’). Such language was another way that Pongsapat communicated about 
his policies.  
Thus there were the two major types of policy-related posts made on the Facebook pages of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat. The first type gave a direct indication that the candidate is talking 
about policy.  The second type did not contain the keyword ‘policy’ but indicated what the candidate 
intended to do if he won the election. With a significant percentage of both types found on both 
candidates’ Facebook pages with the same intention of persuading their followers about their policies, 
it could be said that both types of policy-related post were useful in campaigning on Facebook in the 
way for candidates to keep communicate about their policies and draw followers’ attention to 
candidates’ campaigns.  
5.2.2. Overview of publication of policy in each phase  
Two Gantt charts have been produced to visualise the candidates’ emphasis on different policies 
during the period of the election campaign (see following page). Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the patterns 
of individual candidate’s policy mentions in relation to election campaign phases. The number in each 
cell shows the number of posts on that day that mentioned a particular policy. One post might mention 
more than one policy. The columns at the right show the total number of posts and the total number of 
days with posts.  
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Figure 5.2: Gantt chart to visualise M.R. Sukhumbhand campaign on Facebook relating to the types of policy and emphasis on policy during the different phases of the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. 
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Figure 5.3: Gantt chart to visualise Pongsapat campaign on Facebook relating to the types of policy and emphasis on policy during the different phases of the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign. 
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Figure 5.4 (below) is derived from Figures 5.2 and 5.3, showing the frequency of policy mentions in 
each phase. 
 
Figure 5.4: Frequency of policy referred to in each phase. 
Figure 5.4 shows that Phase 1 of the election campaign contained the fewest number of policy-related 
posts for both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat, 34 posts and 21 posts respectively. There are 
several possible explanations for this result. Firstly, the first half of Phase 1 was before the official 
start of the election campaign so both candidates intended to focus on introducing themselves to 
voters and raising awareness that they are competing in the election. M.R. Sukhumbhand did not 
make any Facebook posts about resigning as Bangkok governor until two days after he resigned, with 
a post about ‘the atmosphere of opening the Election Centre’ and his nomination by the Democrat 
Party, using of images to indicate his affiliation with Democrat Party politicians. During Phase 1, M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was also letting his followers know about his campaign experience and his schedule at 
different venues. The small number of policy-related posts found on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook 
page during Phase 1 states that the candidate was utilising this phase to make a gradual a start to his 
campaign and introduce his policies. 
As a new candidate, Pongsapat spent Phase 1 of the election campaign establishing his network on 
Facebook. This was to increase the number of followers and expand his network, making sure that his 
campaign message was broadcast to a mass audience. After his first Facebook post, subsequent posts 
published in Phase 1 (on 16, 17 and 19 January 2013) encouraged his followers to interact on his 
Facebook page. As the result of clicking ‘Like’, ‘Share’ or make a comment, Facebook algorithm 
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would enable Pongsapat’s posts to appear on the followers’ friends’ status pages, as will be further 
analysed in the digital vote-canvassing network in Section 6.2. Thus, the majority of posts in this 
phase were non-policy-related, as Pongsapat focused on introducing himself to voters, with the 
secondary intention of proposing or explaining his policies.  
Another possible reason why Phase 1 had the lowest number of policy-related posts might be that 
candidates attempted to focus on field campaigning to formulate and develop policies based on voters’ 
problems that emerged after the candidates met the voters. Also, as will be discusses in Chapter 6, at 
the beginning of the election campaign, public relations personnel work to familiarise candidate’s 
SNSs page. Thus, Phase 1 might have been a ‘trial and error’ stage for candidates’ public relations 
personnel to familiarise themselves with the candidates’ campaigns, making a few posts to investigate 
how the composition of different posts might affect how followers interacted with the candidates’ 
Facebook page. Consequently, the number of policy-related posts for both candidates in Phase 1 was 
lower than other phases of the election campaign.  
For both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat, the number of policy-related posts increased 
dramatically in Phase 2 from 34 and 21 to 70 and 72 respectively. This increase can be explained by 
the fact that as voters became aware that both candidates were competing in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign and had a certain number of followers as their base supporters on 
SNSs, both candidates started to feel more confident about introducing their policies formally and 
informally on Facebook. There were certain days in Phase 2 when both candidates started to stress 
particular policies, e.g. on 5
th
 and 6
th
 February 2013, M.R. Sukhumbhand made a total of 7 Facebook 
posts related to transportation policy, while Pongsapat mentioned policies related to security issues in 
two Facebook posts per day from 28 January to 1 February 2013. This pattern of gradual increase 
found in both candidates’ campaigns implies the momentum of the election campaign on Facebook 
for both candidates.  
The most striking result emerging from the data is that Phase 3 and Phase 4, which M.R. 
Sukhumbhand made 177 and 141 policy-related posts on Facebook respectively. In Phase 3, 
Pongsapat made a comparatively moderate total of 53 policy-related posts, which increased to 91 in 
Phase 4. These results support Boonlert's (2015b) explanation that a ‘late swing of undecided votes’ 
was a key element in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. Taking into consideration 
the existence of swing voters, M.R. Sukhumbhand and his campaign team spent the first two phases 
of the election campaign to develop their policies according to the social problems they found and the 
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feedback received during the first half of the election campaign, and used the second half of the 
election campaign to assure the feasibility of all his policies.   
Pongsapat made the highest number of policy-related posts on his Facebook page in Phase 4, which 
Pongsapat launched the two final sets of policies. This shows that Pongsapat attempted to intensify his 
policy-related posts in the final stage. Another possible reason could be that Pongsapat’s campaign 
team monitored his election rivals, which might have encouraged Pongsapat to give greater emphasis 
to policy in the final phase of the election campaign. Hence, as Phase 4 contains the most policy-
related posts on Pongsapat’s Facebook page, Phase 4 was paramount for Pongsapat to concentrate on 
persuading voters about his policies.  
A closer examination of the Gantt charts, Figures 5.2 and 5.3, show that Friday is common day for 
both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat to make posts about their policies on Facebook. The Gantt 
charts show that both candidates made multiple posts on a particular policy on one day. E.g. M.R. 
Sukhumbhand made posts on every policy on Friday 8 February but with particular emphasis on 
security (7 posts), transportation (5 posts) and the environment (4 posts). On 1 February 2013, 
Pongsapat made posts on every policy with particular emphasis on security (6 posts) and the 
environment (4 posts). Moreover, the day of the week also matters in talking about policy on 
Facebook. The highest number of posts on policy for Pongsapat was Friday 1 February 2013 and 
Friday 1 March, and for M.R. Sukhumbhand were Friday 8 February 2013, Friday 15 February 2013, 
and Friday 22 February 2013.  
It is difficult to explain why candidates emphasised policies on certain days. Friday is the last working 
day of the week, which follows by Saturday and Sunday. Gaining more followers’ attention would be 
possible on a Friday and during the weekend. It is possible that if followers do not see and interact on 
candidate’s policy on followers’ news feed on Friday and if there is high level of interaction on the 
particular post occurring throughout Friday and the weekend, Facebook algorithm will prioritise the 
post shown on followers’ news feed during the weekend. This gives possibility to draw followers’ 
attention on the candidate’s posts. In contrast, if significant policy content of were posted on Monday, 
the first working day of the week, followers might have a different impression of the candidate’s 
campaign as followers might be busy at work and feel that it was the candidate’s intention to bombard 
followers with policies. This shows that the day of the week chosen to present policies is significant.  
The dissemination of campaign message on Facebook is associated to how a candidate manages 
policy-related posts during specific phases or days in an election campaign. The second half of the 
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election campaign was a significant period for emphasising policies. Nearer to the day of the election, 
followers started to be interested on candidates’ policies and become more enthusiastic about deciding 
to vote for. The candidates tried to draw their followers’ attention to their policies during the final 
stage of the election campaign as followers started to be interested about the election. The candidates 
attempted to ensure that their image in relation to policy are constantly visible on their follower’s 
Facebook timelines as voters started to think about the candidates’ campaigns. When followers 
interacting candidates’ policy-related posts there is a possibility for the posts to reach more followers 
and the possibility for more Facebook users to follow the candidates’ campaign on Facebook. As a 
result, it was necessary to repeat and rephrase each policy to gain supports from news followers as 
well as to increase the spreadability of each policy-related post published on the candidates’ Facebook 
pages. Also, Friday is the day when candidates most often presented their policy-related posts. If 
policy-related posts published on Fridays were not read by followers, there was the possibility for 
them to read and react to the policy-related posts during the weekend, when the posts might be shared 
or spread to other Facebook users.  
5.2.3. Emphasis on particular policies  
Each candidate also made a different number of posts about each policy, giving more prominence to 
some.  
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Figure 5.5: Number of times different policies were mentioned. 
It is apparent from Figure 5.5 that M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat gave different prominence to 
each policy issue. The number on top of each bar represents the number of posts dealing with that 
policy. It can be seen from Figure 5.5 that:  
1. the top three policies for M.R. Sukhumbhand are transportation (74 posts), education (74 
posts), and healthcare (60 posts);  
2. the top three policies for Pongsapat are transportation (51 posts), economy (39 posts), and 
security (37 posts);  
3. posts related to transportation was the most frequent in total;  
4. the policy issue which shows the greatest difference in frequency of posts between the 
candidates was water management i.e. 26 posts (M.R. Sukhumbhand 33 posts; Pongsapat 7 
posts)  
The following analyses the above results.  
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Healthcare and Education: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign  
Posts related to healthcare and education policies were the two most frequent in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
campaign on Facebook, which covers a range of age group. Policies on healthcare are associated to 
elderly, intended to increase Bangkokians’ life span. Having reasonably good access to healthcare 
facilities implies a good standard of living in the city. Policies on education concerns with young 
generation, increase opportunity for children to be knowledgeable and creative in the long-term. An 
education can increase the chance for Bangkok children to be employable in the future. It could be 
said that such policies contains some sort of phudi character in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s approach to 
strategic planning to ‘build’ Bangkok as expressed in his slogan.  
Security and Economy: Pongsapat’s campaign  
Posts related to security and economy policies were the two most frequent in Pongsapat’s campaign 
on Facebook. With a background as a police officer, Pongsapat had specialised knowledge and 
experience relating to drugs, crime and road accidents in Bangkok. The policies to increase safety in 
various areas of Bangkok, would also make Bangkokians feel safe in risky areas and on the road. 
Pongsapat had used his professional experience as a unique selling point in security policies to 
distinguish himself from his main competitor.  
Pongsapat’s policies relating to economic issues aimed to increase income and reduce spending for 
Bangkokians in the short term and develop the economy in Bangkok in the long term. This emphasis 
in Pongsapat’s campaign is associated with the Pheu Thai and Thai Rak Thai parties, which have both 
been well-known for proposing policies to resolve income and spending problems among Thai people, 
particularly lower-class Thais. Hence, it could be said that Pongsapat’s policies relating to security 
and the economy are related to the daily life of Bangkokians, aiming to resolve their problems in the 
short-term and having an immediate impact on Bangkokians, especially lower-class Bangkokians.  
Transportation: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s campaigns 
The two candidates had transportation as the most frequently mentioned in their campaigns on 
Facebook. The transportation policies that both candidates proposed were reducing traffic congestion 
in Bangkok, making it more convenient for people to move around in Bangkok, which both 
candidates promising to reduce travelling time and cost. During the election campaign, both 
candidates attempted to portray themselves as candidates who understood the problems of 
transportation in Bangkok with photographs on both candidates’ Facebook pages of them travelling to 
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election campaign sites via the BTS sky train or MRT underground train as well as having 
conversations with motorcycle taxis in Bangkok. This showed the candidates’ attempts to experience 
and gains access to the problems that Bangkokians face. Given that all Bangkokians, regardless of 
gender, age, occupation and location, need to move around in Bangkok, it could be said that both 
candidates attempted to ensure that their policies on transportation would enable Bangkokians to 
relate easily to their policies, so posts on transportation-related policies were found to be the most 
frequent in both campaigns.  
Water Management: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s campaigns 
Water management was the only policy showing a significant difference in the frequency of posts 
between the campaigns of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat on Facebook. A possible reason for this 
are the political attacks against M.R. Sukhumbhand during the 2011 flood crisis in Bangkok, when 
there was conflict in water management between M.R. Sukhumbhand and the Pheu Thai Party. The 
memory of the 2011 flooding in Bangkok and long-term water management are a major concern of 
Bangkokians during the rainy season. Efficient water management requires the ability to plan 
strategically, and M.R. Sukhumbhand showed the intention to handle future floods in Bangkok. It is 
hard to explain Pongsapat’s lack of emphasis on to water management policies, but it might be related 
to his slogan of ‘working with government seamlessly.’ This means that Pongsapat might collaborate 
with the government to resolve flood issues in the future, and therefore it was not essential or 
necessary for him to elaborate on his water management policy.  
The candidates’ management of policy-related posts on their Facebook pages is based on the overall 
distribution of policy-related posts over the entire election campaign, the number of policy-related 
posts during each phase of the election campaign and the frequency of posts that candidates make on 
different policies. Even though the semiotic analysis in Chapter 4 shows that the candidates’ visual 
images and signs, such as election numbers, are important in identifying the candidates’ campaigns, 
the ongoing publication of candidates’ policies during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaigns on Facebook was also important for candidates in engaging with their followers. The 
amount of attention that candidates give to policy-related posts on Facebook suggests that candidates 
also perceive policy to be a significant factor in the eyes of their followers. Based on the analysis in 
this section, it could be said that political public relations on Facebook is associated with the 
management of number and distribution of policy-related posts on Facebook that candidates have 
adopted in line with the atmosphere of the election campaign, the candidate’s background, candidate’s 
status during the election and the diversity of the candidate’s followers on Facebook.  
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Candidates increased the number of policy-related posts during the second half of the election 
campaign as voters started to be more aware of candidates’ policies nearer to the Election Day. M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s policy-related campaigns were related to their specialist knowledge, 
the interests of their political party and their status in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election as 
either the incumbent or a new candidate. Voters may have had higher expectations of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s policy formulation based on what he had achieved in the previous four years. In 
contrast, the fact that Pongsapat was new and had a different background led him to link his policy to 
his professional experience, giving voters a new alternative.  
5.3. Making sense of candidates’ campaigns on Facebook  
The candidates’ campaigns, based on their posts on Facebook, can be perceived as a unilateral point 
of view by the candidates about their campaigns. As candidates intend to influence voters based on 
the images that they construct on their Facebook pages, they seek ways to associate their campaigns 
with interrelated actors to give credibility to their campaign and to assist voters in interpreting their 
campaign. The themes associated with the analysis in this section consist of the way candidates 
associated their campaign with the political party that nominated them for the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election, the source and origin of candidate’s policies, the districts where the candidates 
directed their policies, the festivals celebrated during the election campaign, and reference to 
mainstream media during the election campaign. The analysis in this section provides an 
understanding of how the candidates made their campaigns more influential by using various ways to 
increase the feasibility of their Facebook campaigns.  
5.3.1. Political parties and other politicians 
Further to the finding from Chapter 4 on visual images in relation to politicians of their political 
parties and the identity of their political parties, this subsection further examines how both M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat relate to their political party in their campaign on Facebook. As the 
candidates’ Facebook campaigns were individual channels of communication unfiltered by any third 
party with regard to policy posts, the analysis in this subsection helps to understand the candidates’ 
approach to using the images of their political parties and their politicians in giving credibility to their 
campaign.   
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Pongsapat and the Pheu Thai Party  
A keyword search of ‘Pheu Thai Party’ and ‘government’ showed that Pongsapat used these two 
expressions in different contexts. Pongsapat explained the benefit of collaborating with the Pheu Thai 
Party or the government to implement policies, which was a more comprehensive way to elaborate his 
slogan: ‘work with government seamlessly.’ Pongsapat developed his policies with significant use of 
the phrase ‘coordinate with government’ (ประสานกบัรัฐบาล). Pongsapat repeatedly referred to the 
advantage of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration working closely with the government.  
At the beginning of Pongsapat’s campaign, the name ‘Pheu Thai Party’ was used in contexts where 
Pongsapat introduced himself as someone trusted by members of the Pheu Thai Party, who had given 
him the chance to be the representative to serve his ‘brothers and sisters’ as ‘candidate for Bangkok 
Governor, representative of the Pheu Thai Party’. When Pongsapat was about to launch his final set 
of policies on the theme ‘Revitalize Bangkok’, he mentioned that the ‘Strategy Team of the Pheu Thai 
Party would like to invite everyone to exchange their opinions on the future of Bangkok.’ Pongsapat 
intended to establish his candidate identity in relation to the Pheu Thai Party, and he was showing his 
appreciation for the politicians of the Pheu Thai Party, who had given him the opportunity to represent 
them in the election. Those who received this message would not perceive Pongsapat as an 
independent candidate, but as a candidate from the Pheu Thai Party. 
The expression ‘Pheu Thai Party’ was found in non-policy-related texts, where Pongsapat seemed to 
have the intention to inform the public of his schedule or give live updates what he was currently 
doing or about to do in the Pheu Thai Party headquarters. Pongsapat used the Pheu Thai Party 
headquarters as a hub to officially launch his different sets of policies to the media and the public. 
Pongsapat was able to remind the public that he was a candidate nominated by the Pheu Thai Party for 
the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign.  
Throughout Pongsapat’s campaign on Facebook, the names of Pheu Thai Party politicians, 
particularly that of Yingluck Shinawatra, were mentioned in the context of acknowledging their 
accompaniment of Pongsapat to different places. However, no evidence on Pongsapat’s Facebook 
page was found of Pongsapat writing that Pheu Thai Party politicians support give credit and promote 
his campaign. Pongsapat only integrate the noun ‘government’ in his policy-related posts. This could 
be viewed as an individualistic way that the candidate used to communicate with his followers. 
Pongsapat was not a politician or member of Pheu Thai Party but he was nominated as their 
representative just for the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. Therefore, Pongsapat’s campaign on 
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Facebook was related to Pheu Thai Party and the government in the form of his policy to work with 
the government seamlessly and was associated with the Pheu Thai Party throughout the election 
campaign. 
M.R. Sukhumbhand and the Democrat Party  
A search for ‘Democrat Party’ and the names of Democrat Party politicians in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
Facebook posts shows that politicians such as Abhisit Vejjajiva, Apirak Kosayodhin, Chuan Leekpai, 
Ongart Klampaiboon and Korn Chatikavanij had a significant involvement in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
campaign.  Democrat Party politicians were acknowledged on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page 
in the context of their assistance in his campaign and evaluating his work performance for the 
previous four years. In the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, M.R. Sukhumbhand 
organised and delivered a total of seven campaign speeches and Democrat Party politicians played a 
major role in the campaign speeches. When Democrat Party politicians were on stage, they were 
persuading voters to vote for M.R. Sukhumbhand based on his work performance, his policies, his 
management style as Bangkok governor and his nomination by the Democrat Party.  Examples of this 
include:  
Apirak Kosayodhin:  
In the past 4 years Sukhumbhand has worked to push for Bangkok’s recovery from various 
crises (23 February 2013).  
Chuan Leekpai:  
I would like to tell our brothers and sisters ‘however you write policy, what is important is the 
practice. Bangkok wants someone who can talk and really do things like M.R. Sukhumbhand.’ 
(15 February 2013)   
Abhisit Vejjajiva:  
Sukhumbhand does not care who is the government because M.R. Sukhumbhand says that the 
boss is not the government, the boss is every person in Bangkok (24 February 2013).  
Ongart Klampaiboon:  
#Vote16 because the policies offered are real, can really be done and Governor Sukhumbhand 
will move forward for Bangkokians (8 February 2013). 
Korn Chatikavanij: 
Small jobs, little jobs are never neglected. If it is about Bangkok, it reflects the sincerity of 
Sukhumbhand toward Bangkokians who he intends to work for throughout 4 years (1 March 
2013).  
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M.R. Sukhumbhand’s use of comments by Democrat Party politicians about his work performance, 
contribution, attitude, working style and policies as the incumbent Bangkok Governor enabled him to 
bring in views that other politicians have, and showed their endorsement of his re-election. The above 
quotes also made significant use of the word ‘tham’ (do) to portray M.R. Sukhumbhand as a Bangkok 
Governor who ‘really did what he said’ (พดูแล้วท าจริง), ‘did a lot, talked little’ (ท ามากพดูน้อย), ‘really 
can do, has already started doing’ (ท าได้จริง เร่ิมต้นท ามาแล้ว), ‘move forward and continue doing’ 
(เดินหน้าท าต่อ) and ‘determined to work’ (ตัง้ใจท างาน). These quotes provide evidence that politicians of 
Democrat Party were endorsing M.R. Sukhumbhand as Bangkok Governor for the interests of 
Bangkokians. According to them, he was an action-minded and realistic person in implementing 
policies in the previous four years. As a result, M.R. Sukhumbhand was not only constructing his own 
image based on his own opinions but he was letting his followers know how other politicians of the 
same political party viewed M.R. Sukhumbhand during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign.  
The name of Apirak, who was Bangkok governor from 2004-2009, was mentioned on M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page throughout the election campaign. Apirak was able to assess M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s policies and work performance as a former Bangkok governor. For example, on 6 
February 2013, Apirak said that M.R. Sukhumbhand’s policies aimed at ‘development’ and as long as 
Bangkokians trusted him, M.R. Sukhumbhand would implement policies for Bangkokians, and there 
would be a better environment, community libraries, support for education and a solution to the flood 
problems in Bangkok. Using quotes from Apirak was a way to give confirmation to voters of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s suitability to become Bangkok governor.   
Abhisit was the former prime minister and leader of a political party at the time of 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign. Abhisit referred to both Apirak and M.R. Sukhumbhand by giving 
concrete examples of the projects that had been successfully implemented by both governors. The 
various projects, especially the BTS extension, showed the continuity of work by Apirak and M.R. 
Sukhumbhand as governors. Despite central government rejection of projects that Apirak and M.R. 
Sukhumbhand proposed in the past, they were able to proceed with projects that they thought would 
be beneficial for Bangkokians. Abhisit attempts to portray an image of both candidates nominated by 
the Democrat Party as being sincere and focused on delivering policies in the interests of Bangkokians. 
This reflects on their ability to proceed with projects during political conflict.  
One of the very final posts made by M.R. Sukhumbhand on his Facebook page is the one below:   
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Choose the Democrats because method of the Democrats is 1. We do not abandon our brother 
and sisters, we are alongside the people, we share sadness and happiness with the people, 
because we maintain that we do well because of the people.  
Second, we do not use the authority of the state for personal benefit. The Democrat Party has 
respect for government officials and working people.  
Third, we give importance to our brothers and sisters at every level, let our brothers and sisters 
be themselves and take care of their own interests by themselves.  
Fourth, we emphasize development which is sustainable, do not use bribes, but we work on 
development which is not eye-catching but very important such as school milk and free 
breakfasts. 
Fifth, the Democrats looks after all groups of people including children, the elderly, women, 
working people, the homeless, and animal lovers. No matter which colour, we look after you 
because our origin is the people.  
(1 March 2013)  
The above post summarises the five different reasons why the Democrat Party thinks that 
Bangkokians should vote for them. What makes this post significant is the multiple use of ปชป, which 
is the abbreviation of ประชาธิปัตย์ Prachatipat or ‘Democrat’. Instead of communicating why 
Bangkokians should vote for M.R. Sukhumbhand, the message was framed and focused on the image 
and identity of the Democrat Party. Thus, this post truly substitute M.R. Sukhumbhand’s image with 
that of the Democrat Party as a whole.  
Democrat Party politicians were named on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page with the use of 
Facebook ‘tags.’ Tagging enables the posts on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page to also appear on 
those of the politicians tagged. In other words, ‘tagging’ spreads the campaign message to the 
networks of other Facebook users named by M.R. Sukhumbhand. Consequently, those following 
other politicians on Facebook, but not M.R. Sukhumbhand, would receive the messages on their new 
feeds. Through the ‘connectedness’ of the Facebook network, ‘tagging’ increases the visibility of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand. 
References on Facebook posts to other politicians of the same party also allowed the candidate to 
extend the network of support. By mentioning and quoting what other politicians of the Democrat 
Party said about him, M.R. Sukhumbhand was able to endorse his campaign with other politicians’ 
points of view, giving voters a broader view on how other politicians of Democrat party evaluate his 
work performance and policies. In other words, M.R. Sukhumbhand was able to show that what he 
did in the past four years and what he will do in the next four years have been widely assessed by 
different politicians of Democrat Party. Each quote was additional support, which could enable M.R. 
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Sukhumbhand to establish a clearer and stronger image and eventually gain more votes from 
Bangkokians who have been following Democrat Party politicians on Facebook. Thus, it could be 
said that M.R. Sukhumbhand’s use of Facebook to portray the image of Democrat Party as a whole 
was targeted at Bangkok voters who are loyal to Democrat Party. M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign on 
Facebook was not only about voting for M.R. Sukhumbhand as an incumbent, but it was also about 
voting for the Democrat Party.  
To sum up, M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat referencing the names of political parties or other 
politicians was another significant way for candidates to gain endorsements of their campaign and to 
influence Facebook followers based the credibility that other politicians lent to their campaign and 
their relationship with their political party. By doing so, this enhances the image of ‘ideal candidate.’ 
Although the image of the candidate of Bangkok gubernatorial election is focused on the candidate, 
not the political party, as not every candidate is nominated by a political party (Surapongse, 2002, 
p.43), both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used Facebook to associate their individual images, 
their campaigns in general, and their policies in particular, with those of their political parties. This 
establishes a connection between the candidates’ Facebook networks and the politicians of the same 
political party, which can increase the spreadability of the candidates’ campaign. This is also a way to 
gather support from the political party that has nominated them for the election, which can be used to 
target Bangkokians voters who are loyal to the political party instead of judging the candidate as an 
individual. For M.R. Sukhumbhand in particular, this gives followers a broader view of how different 
politicians of Democrat Party evaluate and assess his performance and policies. 
5.3.2. Policies in reference to other countries  
While M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page continuously reported other politicians’ remarks about 
his campaign and his performance, another type of policy-related posts found only in Pongsapat’s 
campaign, was the relation of his policies to other countries. Pongsapat referred to different countries 
that implemented some of the policies he proposed during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign on Facebook. A total of six Facebook posts by Pongsapat, referred to similar policies in 
other countries in support of the policies that he was proposing.  
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Figure 5.6: Capture of Pongsapat’s Facebook post, on his policy on ‘one seamless travel card’ to increase 
convenience for Bangkokians, using London as an example, posted on 16 February 2013, (พงศพัศ พงษ์เจริญ 
[Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013k).  
Figure 5.6 shows how Pongsapat explained existing problems of multiple transportation cards in 
Bangkok in relations to London Oyster Card makes, which can make it easier for followers to 
visualise the feasibility of candidate’s policy. The above post explains how the card works and how 
the policy will be implemented. Pongsapat also emphasised that the policy will bring more 
convenience for Bangkokians who use trains and buses.  
 
Figure 5.7: Capture of Pongsapat’s Facebook post, showing monorails in Kuala Lumpur (top) and Singapore 
(bottom) posted on 18 February 2013, (พงศพัศ พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013l).  
In addition to the example of the Oyster Card, Pongsapat made a post on 18 February 2013 with the 
example of monorails in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore to show voters the idea of Bangkok having a 
Translated version of post: One of my policies to develop the mass transit system is 
to coordinate with the government in order create standards for a common ticket 
system for the convenience of travelling on all routes using only one card.   
This idea is widely used in many metropolises around the world. One of the cities that 
has the best mass transit system is London, which uses a common ticket called the 
“Oyster Card”.  
The brightly-coloured Oyster Card is can be used to pay fares under the Transport for 
London system, or London’s BMTA, in all forms whether underground or overground 
electric trains, buses, boats or other types of trains, in the London transportation 
network. The card has greatly increased convenience in people’s lives. It is used in up 
to 80% of the transportation system. It can be said that the card is part of London 
people’s lives.  
The card uses a convenient top-up system. When you use it, you just have to touch it 
at the entrance and the system will automatically deduct money. When there is no 
money, you can top-up again. This is easy like our BTS and MRT stored value cards, 
but Oyster Cards can be used everywhere on the system.  
‘One seamless travel card’. One of the things that I will coordinate and push for in our 
Bangkok. 
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monorail, as shown in Figure 5.7. In this post, Pongsapat stated the distances, numbers of stations and 
ticket fares in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Pongsapat also used his Facebook page to raise 
awareness of the ongoing construction of the monorail in Ho Chi Min City, by emphasising the 
importance of having a monorail in developing infrastructure and reducing traffic congestion. Thus, it 
could be said that these posts was comparing the capital of Thailand, as a ASEAN country, with 
neighbouring countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam in the development of 
transportation.  
On 14 February 2013, Pongsapat made a post elaborating his policy on waste management, which he 
proposed during a presentation of his vision. Pongsapat mentioned that he plans to bring in new 
technology to Bangkok to turn waste into recycled products, energy, and money, and this has been 
successfully implemented in Europe and the United States of America. Three Pongsapat Facebook 
posts on 24 February 2013 were also about waste management, and two of them referred to how the 
Netherlands and Sao Paulo have been managing waste through recycling. These two posts emphasised 
the efficient conversion of waste into energy in the future, given the large amount of waste collected 
in the Netherlands and Sao Paulo. These examples led to Pongsapat’s final post, which included an 
analysis of how his policy on waste management will benefit Bangkokians. Instead of continuing to 
landfill waste in Bangkok, Pongsapat proposed that the recycling of different waste material could 
lead to energy production and the sale of recycled materials for local community revenue in the long-
term. Using successful examples of developed countries in solving a particular problem shows the 
candidate’s intention to bring in new feasible ways to approach problems in Bangkok.   
Another way to explain the implementation of Pongsapat’s policy was to reference his policies to 
other countries which he believed were realistic and achievable if implemented in Bangkok. This was 
also a way to repeat, reemphasise, rephrase and further analyse a particular problem or policy from an 
international perspective. Even though Pongsapat referred to other countries’ policies in only six posts, 
the content was significant and noteworthy in providing readers with a broader view of the impact that 
his policies would bring to Bangkok.  
5.3.3. District-based policies  
With reference to the result of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election presented in Appendix 1, M.R. 
Sukhumbhand won a total of 39 districts in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election while Pongsapat 
won 11 districts. This result indicates a strong base of support among Bangkokians for M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and the Democrat Party at the time of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. This 
section analyses candidates’ policies in relation to the frequency of references to the different districts 
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in Bangkok on the candidates’ Facebook pages. This section reviews how candidates set policy-
related posts in relation to particular districts of Bangkok to target directly those districts.  
The overall and district-based results of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election were very close, but 
a few districts in Bangkok showed significant support for either M.R. Sukhumbhand or Pongsapat. 
For example, M.R. Sukhumbhand gained more votes than Pongsapat in Khlong Toei district, a 
Bangkok working-class residential area, although Pongsapat proposed a security policy especially for 
this district.  Also, M.R. Sukhumbhand gained more voters than Pongsapat in districts such as Khlong 
San, Thon Buri and Chom Thong, whereas districts in northern Bangkok such as Don Mueang, Lak Si  
and Bang Sue were a strong hold of Pongsapat and the Pheu Thai Party.  
It is apparent from Figure 5.8 (next page) that there was a major difference in identifying of districts 
in policy-related posts. M.R. Sukhumbhand mentioned 32 districts while Pongsapat mentioned 6 in 
their policy-related posts, with five districts identified in both candidates’ campaigns. The most 
interesting result to emerge from the data is that Thon Buri was the district given most attention by 
M.R. Sukhumbhand to (10.1% of total number of policy-related posts, equivalent to 20 posts), while 
Lak Si was the only district mentioned by Pongsapat (once) but not M.R. Sukhumbhand.  
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M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Campaign 
on Facebook 
Pongsapat’s Campaign on 
Facebook 
Bang Khun Thian  
(S: 5.05%, P: 
0.74%),  
Bang Sue 
(S:0.51%, 
P:0.74%),  
Chatuchak 
(S:1.52%, 
P:2.22%), 
Khlong Toei 
(S:2.02%, 
P:2.22%), 
Phra Nakhon 
(S:0.51%, P: 
0.74%)  
 
Lak Si (0.74%)  
Bang Bon (2.02%), Bang Kapi (0.51%),  
Bang Khae (1.52%), Bang Khen (1.01%),  
Bang Na (3.03%), Bang Phlat (1.01%), 
Bangkok Noi (2.53%), Bueng Kum 
(0.51%),  
Don Mueang (1.52%), Lat Phrao (0.51%), 
Huai Khwang (2.02%), Min Buri (1.01%), 
Khlong Sam Wa (1.01%),  
Lat Krabang (0.51%), Prawet (1.52%), 
Nong Chok (1.01%), Sai Mai (0.51%), 
Phasi Charoen (4.04%), Sathon (1.01%), 
Phra Khanong (0.51%), Thon Buri (10.1%) 
Taling Chan (2.02%), Watthana (1.52%),   
  Suan Luang (0.51%), Thawi Watthana (1.01%), 
 
 
Thung Khru (0.51%),  
 
Wang Thonglang (0.51%) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Districts named in candidates’ policy-related posts on Facebook, and percentages of policy-related posts containing the name of particular districts 
165 
 
The difference in the ways candidates relate their policy to districts is that the incumbent M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was specific and detailed in his policy proposals, making a major attempt to target his 
policies to impact particular districts. The policy-related posts of the Pongsapat Facebook campaign were 
more general, targeting all groups of voters. This approach does not pay attention to any district in 
particular or any personal relationship between the candidate and voters in that district. In districts which 
were not mentioned by a candidate, followers may feel that the candidate’s campaign is unequal or unfair 
to different districts of Bangkokians. However, this difference in approaches between M.R. Sukhumbhand 
and Pongsapat could also be explained by the fact that M.R. Sukhumbhand was the incumbent and 
Pongsapat was a new candidate nominated by the government at the time of the election. Pongsapat’s 
policy proposals seemed to be structured and will be coordinated with the government seamlessly to 
implement policies. M.R. Sukhumbhand had more specialised knowledge of the different districts and 
was able to relate his policies to specific districts directly.  
Thon Buri and Lak Si are two districts identified in both candidates’ posts associated with water 
management and flood policy. M.R. Sukhumbhand proposed policy to be implemented and for the benefit 
of Thon Buri district the construction of wastewater treatment plants and a giant drainage tunnel. As Thon 
Buri was one of the districts in Bangkok severely hit by the Great Floods in 2011, this policy to be 
implemented particularly in Thon Buri could be used to prevent floods and handle heavy rains in the 
future. Pongsapat’s policy proposal for Lak Si District was also connected to flood issues. Pongsapat 
explained to voters in that particular post that waste water in Bangkok has to be re-managed by working 
with the government seamlessly through rebuilding and reconnecting drains and drainage tunnels and 
extending sewers in Bangkok. Pongsapat’s policy was more generally related to water management policy 
in coordination with the government after he had spoken to residents in Lak Si District. Identifying a 
particular district for policy implementation or relating a specific district to candidates’ policy-related 
posts, could have an impact on voters’ perceptions of the candidates. Voters who live and work in Thon 
Buri or Lak Si districts could have better interpretation of the water management policies proposed by 
M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat. They could feel that they were the direct target of the candidates. 
However, if followers are critical of candidates’ campaign, they might argue against the policy. This 
makes such policy-related posts a two-edged sword. 
Among the five districts which were specifically mentioned by both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat, 
Bang Khun Thian and Khlong Toei were the two that received most mentioned. M.R. Sukhumbhand 
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mentioned Bang Khun Thian District in the context of the hospital that he built there for the elderly and 
his plans to build further ‘ageing communities’ near the hospital. Bang Khun Thian District was 
mentioned once by Pongsapat in the context of working with the government to resolve future flooding. 
Both candidates mentioned Khlong Toei District in the context of increasing security and reducing the 
crime rate. Khlong Toei District has a vast number of Thais squatting in slum, and is considered as one of 
the poorest districts in Bangkok. The both M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s campaigns formulated 
policies to increase the safety and living conditions in Khlong Toei District.  
The results of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election in Appendix 1 correlate to a certain extent to 
attempt target on districts in the Facebook campaigns of both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat at on. 
M.R. Sukhumbhand won the majority of votes in Thon Buri District while Pongsapat won in Lak Si 
District. In nearby districts, M.R. Sukhumbhand gained the majority of votes in districts to the North of 
Thon Buri District, whereas Pongsapat won the majority of votes in Northern Bangkok around Lak Si 
District. This suggests that there could be a relationship between those areas and the candidates or of their 
political parties. M.R. Sukhumbhand gained the majority of votes of Bang Khun Thian and Khlong Toei 
districts despite Pongsapat’s attempts to use his specialist knowledge to formulate a security policy 
targeting Khlong Toei District.  
Many districts were not mentioned on candidates’ policy-related posts, but it would be said that policy-
related posts integrated targeting feature to establish and develop a relationship between the candidate and 
followers in a specific district with the aim to gain votes. It is too simplistic to claim that a candidate’s 
mention of a particular policy in relation to a district in would impact on the number of votes gained, 
because the number of followers on Facebook is not representative of the Bangkokians voters. Moreover, 
there is no information available on the number of voters in a particular district who followed the election 
campaigns on Facebook. Voters in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election used different media to gain 
access information about candidates’ policies.  
5.3.4. Festivals celebrated during the election campaign  
Observation of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages found that the daily agendas set 
by candidates based on the policies discussed and the places visited are linked to festivals that were 
celebrated in Thailand during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. The period of the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign covered Chinese New Year celebrations (10 February), 
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Valentine’s Day (14 February) and Buddhist Magha Puja Day (25 February). Both candidates used these 
festivals to introduce their policies and construct an image of candidates giving prominence to the 
festivals.  
 
Figure 5.9: Image of Pongsapat with the announcement that Pongsapat will be going to Bang Rak Central Post 
Office on 14 February, from 6:30am, (พงศพัศ พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013j).  
Figure 5.9 shows that on Valentine’s Day, Pongsapat went to Bang Rak Post Office to congratulate newly 
registered married couples. It was conspicuous that for Valentine’s Day, Pongsapat visited Bang Rak (บาง
รัก) District Office. The name of the district contains of the word rak (รัก), which means ‘love’. Many Thai 
people register their marriages at Bang Rak District in the hope of an auspicious married life.  This shows 
that Pongsapat tried to relate his campaign to the festival celebrated by newly registered voters.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign on Facebook launched a policy on women one day before Valentine’s 
Day, and used Facebook to explain how concerned he was about women in Bangkok. 
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Figure 5.10: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook post explaining his policy on women, posted on 13 February 2013, 
(ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพัตร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013k).  
Figure 5.10  shows M.R. Sukhumbhand launching a policy on women, coded under security policy and 
healthcare policy in the Figure 5.3 Gantt Chart, on the day before Valentine’s Day, when he took the 
opportunity to explain policies on women in relation to the Valentine’s Day festival. M.R. Sukhumbhand 
was thus able to associate his campaign to a festival celebrated during the election campaign, with a 
relationship with a particular group of voters.  
Both candidates visited different Chinese Temples and Chinatown in Bangkok during the Chinese New 
Year festival and visited Buddhist temples in Bangkok on Magha Puja Day. Associating the launch of 
policies with festivals, and publishing Facebook post relating to festivals or visiting places, this shows 
candidates give prominence to the festivals celebrated during the election campaign. By doing so, there is 
possibility for followers to interpret the policy or campaign better, which can also lead to more interaction 
and spreadability on a particular policy.  
5.3.5. Media management on Facebook  
From a mainstream media perspective, McNair (2011) defines ‘media management’ as the way politicians 
maintain a positive relationship with the media and recognising the importance of each other political 
communication (p.123-124). Research has found a connection between the agendas on SNSs and those on 
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mainstream media in Thailand (Isriya, 2012; Supreeya, 2009). During election campaigns, candidates 
tend to give recognition to themselves by referring to mainstream media reports about their campaigns 
(Sombat, 1993, p.107). This research did not find out how public relations personnel work to enable 
candidate’s to gain a positive coverage on the mainstream media as this research was focused towards the 
operation of candidate’s SNSs page.  
With reference to how Marcinkowski and Metag (2014) state that the ‘two-step flow of campaign 
message’ occurs by expecting journalists to use candidates’ campaign information on Web sites to further 
spread on traditional news media, this research found that candidates of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election had used their Facebook pages to provide a source of information for journalists as well as for 
their followers to know candidates’ campaign coverage on traditional media, which shows the 
relationship between the candidate and media, or what Hall et al. (1978) referred to ‘primary definers’ and 
‘secondary definers’ of news production respectively. Candidates provided information for followers to 
access and by also posting photographs of traditional media giving attention to the candidate. In addition, 
public relations personnel intend to frame campaign message on SNSs to attract mainstream media 
attention to candidate’s SNSs posts and public relations personnel also tried to give information to 
followers in advance about the television programme and any print media that have interviewed the 
candidate. The candidate’s Facebook page is a central point in disseminating campaign information and 
public relations information relating to candidate’s media appearances, where mainstream media and 
followers can access more information and different perspectives on candidates via their Facebook pages.  
The relationship between mainstream media and the candidates’ SNS pages also shows that candidates 
aim to make mainstream media report about their campaign. If mainstream media would like to gain 
information about candidate’s campaign, journalists access candidate’s SNS page and use candidate’s 
posts as the source of information for their news coverage. As mentioned by one public relations 
personnel, Personnel C, interviewed in this research, what the personnel intend to achieve when working 
for the candidate on SNSs is for the news agency to use candidate’s campaign content on SNSs as the 
agenda or talk about candidate’s posts on the mainstream media. The personnel said that when this occurs, 
it shows that the candidate’s post in reliable and worth giving attention to. Because of their appearance on 
mainstream media, their campaigns can reach wider groups of voters who rely on different media 
channels to receive information about the election campaign and candidates’ policies. This is also a way 
to increase the credibility of the candidates’ campaigns for followers to interact with.  
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Candidates also provided website links for interviews conducted by specific media outlets as well as other 
forms of positive coverage. In his campaign, M.R. Sukhumbhand posted that he was interviewed by a day 
Bulletin magazine, Channel 11, TNN, Modern 9, The Nation, Channel 5, Daily News and Thairath, while 
Pongsapat reported that he was interviewed by a day Bulletin magazine, Thai PBS, China Central 
Television (CCTV) and Channel 9. This information indicates that both candidates attempted to link their 
Facebook pages to other channel of communication and show that they are continuously recognised by 
other media outlets. This integration of Facebook with mainstream media may motivate SNS users to 
seek information on the campaigns from mainstream media. Followers can access the interview 
recordings where they can get to know more about candidates’ campaign from media interviews. Also, 
when mainstream media give attention to candidate’s campaign, candidates benefit when they take part in 
media interviews or appear in news coverage. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page (18 January 2013), Pongsapat’s Facebook page (23 January 
2013) (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013n; ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพันธ์ุ บริพัตร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013l).  
On M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages, a relationship with the mainstream media 
was evidenced by candidates using their Facebook pages to inform their followers about their interviews 
with mainstream media. Among both M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s posts on Facebook would be 
information about different media outlets interviewing and recording the candidates. Figure 5.11 shows 
images posted on the candidates’ Facebook pages, showing the amount of attention that both candidates 
gained from different media outlets during their campaign in general. Such visual images can also be 
related to what Grabe and Bucy (2013) refer to ‘populist campaigner’ under the theme of ‘mass appeal’. 
Instead of showing a large number of crowds supporting candidates, the image of candidates surrounded 
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by cameras and microphones also demonstrate the candidates’ popularity and some kind of ‘celebrity 
image.’  
As candidates and public relations personnel are in control of information to disseminate on candidate’s 
Facebook page, there is a question of how valid are candidate’s claims of the feasibility of the policy or 
how voters can ensure candidate has the potential to govern Bangkok. The activity of media management 
in political public relations on Facebook is related to information management on candidate’s Facebook 
page in way to refer to the candidate’s campaign on mainstream media throughout the election campaign. 
As the election campaign was very competitive, candidate’s tried to influence followers’ voting decision 
by referring to the mainstream media. This is a way for candidates to raise awareness on their Facebook 
pages of their appearances on other media outlets, and the attention and credibility that candidates receive 
from other media outlets during the election campaign. As a result, the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign on candidates’ Facebook pages did not occur individually, but candidates have related 
their campaign on Facebook with their campaign information printed on their billboards and brochures 
(analysed in Chapter 4) with mainstream media. 
 
To summarise, both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat tried to guide and mediate voters to view their 
campaigns from different perspectives and also to help followers to make sense of their campaigns on 
Facebook. Both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat tried various ways to increase the trustworthiness of 
their campaign, with attempts to frequently develop their relationship with their political party and other 
politicians as well as the mainstream media. Both candidates also relate to the festivals celebrated during 
the election campaign, which could draw more attention from followers engage with their campaign on 
Facebook. As for M.R. Sukhumbhand in particular, he targeted voters with links to specific districts, 
showing how his policies would benefit particular districts, while for Pongsapat made references to other 
countries to show a pragmatic approach to formulating policies.  
Conclusion  
This chapter sets out to determine the candidates’ framing of campaign slogans, the pattern of policy-
related posts disseminated on candidates’ Facebook pages and the various ways candidates adopted to 
help followers make sense of their campaign on Facebook. The campaign message is another significant 
element of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, where candidates communicated their 
policies and clarified their standpoints. The content communicated on Facebook during the 2013 Bangkok 
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gubernatorial election campaign was managed to establish campaign momentum and highlight different 
aspects of the candidate’s campaign. Based on the analysis, this chapter argues that information 
management of political public relations on Facebook during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign included the management of policy-related posts and the way in which candidates 
communicated their campaign to enable voters to easily understand and interpret them.  
 
The mediation of campaigns on Facebook consisted of the linkage between candidate’s individual image 
and political party image. Although candidates in Bangkok gubernatorial elections can be independent of 
any political party, M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat relied on their political parties in developing their 
images. Both candidates framed their campaign slogans differently and attempted to make their 
campaigns more influential by relating their campaign to the political parties that nominated them for the 
election. Nevertheless, both candidates’ campaigns show the intention to challenge Bangkokians’ 
pessimism about politics by constructing their images to be what Grabe and Bucy (2013) refer to ‘ideal 
candidates.’ As the incumbent in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, M.R. Sukhumbhand 
approached his campaign by highlighting his ability to implement policies immediately once he gets re-
elected. Although M.R. Sukhumbhand’s slogan portrays his individualistic approach to governing 
Bangkok, he still relied on other politicians of the Democrat Party to give him credit for his past 
performance and policy formulation. M.R. Sukhumbhand framed his campaign by portraying himself as 
the candidate and using the Democrat Party’s image to strengthen his campaign. On the other hand, 
Pongsapat attempted to give one solution to problems in Bangkok in the form of ‘working with the 
government seamlessly’ and show the trustworthiness of his policies by referring to other countries that 
have benefited from the same policies.  
Based on the results of content analysis, it was found that policy-related posts on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages were managed by taking into consideration of swing voters’ voting 
behaviour, new followers connected to candidates’ campaign throughout the election campaign and the 
atmosphere of the election and candidates’ professionalism in implementing specific policies that they are 
familiar with. The ongoing publication of policy-related posts throughout the election campaign 
attempted to elaborate on candidates’ policies, hoping to increase followers’ engagement, interaction and 
the spreadability of the candidates’ campaigns on Facebook. Candidates’ Facebook pages was therefore 
based not only on the policy-related posts that candidates discussed, but also associated with the time that 
candidates discussed their agendas or the times that candidate viewed as appropriate for followers to 
make the most sense of the posts. In addition, candidate’s Facebook page stored campaign information, 
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which followers and mainstream media can access to candidate’s campaign information at any time 
during the election campaign.   
The management of the publication posts on candidates’ Facebook pages also requires an understanding 
of the operation of candidates’ campaigns on SNSs, leading to Chapter 6 to explore the management of 
the candidates’ relationships with their public relations personnel and followers. The analysis in next 
chapter will demonstrate that political public relations on SNSs is also associated with the networks of 
messages disseminated on SNSs, which importantly requires not only management of campaign content 
but also the management of relationship among campaigns staff and followers connected to candidates’ 
SNSs pages. 
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Chapter 6 : Spreadability of Digital Vote-canvassing Networks 
 
Introduction  
The relationship among individuals who are connected to candidates’ SNS pages is another significant 
element of an election campaign and political communication. The backdoor operation of campaign staff 
and public relations personnel co-operating to send out messages on SNSs during an election campaign is 
vital to manage human resources to manage candidates’ SNS pages. The interactive feature of SNSs 
provides an opportunity for followers to interact about candidate’s campaign, and has the potential to 
spread candidates’ campaigns on SNSs from one user to another.  
This chapter aims to answer the research question: ‘What was the relationship among the individuals who 
were part of the candidates’ networks on social networking sites during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign?’ By reviewing the roles and responsibilities of public relations personnel working for 
candidate’s campaign on SNS, this chapter determines the relationship between candidates and public 
relations personnel during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. Based on candidates’ and 
political public relations personnel’s viewpoints on interaction, this chapter determines the relationship 
between candidate, public relation personnel, followers and other SNS users that were established and 
built during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. Using media features identified by Baym 
(2010) (interaction, reach, temporal structure and mobility), this chapter examines the networks 
disseminating campaign messages in relation to the concepts of spreadable media, two-step flow and 
traditional vote-canvassing networks in Thai political culture, which will be used as the framework to 
analyse how interacting on SNSs could create and expand ‘digital vote-canvassing networks’.  
This chapter is organised in the following way. Firstly, this chapter examines the role of public relations 
personnel in communicating on behalf of candidates on SNSs and the relationship between the candidates 
and their public relations personnel before and during the election campaign. This is to understand the 
internal communication and backdoor operation on candidates’ SNS pages during the election campaign. 
The second half of this chapter examines how campaigning on SNSs is a development of traditional vote-
canvassing in Thai political culture by discussing particularly on how the interaction and algorithms of 
Facebook can enhance candidates’ campaigns based on the way Facebook users are connected to each 
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other. The analysis in this chapter explains the management of human resources and the relationship 
among people who are involved and connected to candidates’ SNSs to use SNSs to their full potential.  
6.1. Public relations personnel  
Using the definition of ‘personalisation’ of Sweetser (2011) and Trammell and William (2004), this 
section determines the relationship between candidates and public relations personnel and how this 
relationship is a development from the traditional role of public relations practitioners in Thailand. The 
analysis of the development of the relationship between candidates and public relations personnel takes 
also into consideration of Sombat (1993) analysis of how candidates in Thai elections changes the 
emphasis of their election campaign content as the election campaign proceeds and the findings of 
Boonlert (2015b) on swing voters in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. This section is divided into 
three subsections: the first will identify the basic roles and responsibilities of public relations personnel 
during the election campaign; the second analyses how public relations personnel personalise candidates’ 
SNS pages; and the last section discusses changes in the relationship between public relations personnel 
and candidates before and during the election campaign. The information in this section was obtained 
from public relations personnel working for party-based candidates and fringe candidate using SNSs.  
6.1.1. Basic tasks and responsibilities  
This subsection reviews the basic tasks and responsibilities of public relations personnel in order to 
analyse the relationship between the candidates and public relations personnel during the election 
campaign. Firstly, personnel have to spend time in attempting to gain background knowledge about the 
candidates’ campaigns and also to establish the relationship between the two parties before the election 
campaign actually started. The following are quotes by public relations personnel who worked for 
candidates of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, highlighting what they did before and 
during the election campaign to establish and maintain their relationship with the candidate:  
I had to be with him for weeks before really working. I could not do it. I followed him everywhere, 
took taxis with him. Wherever he went, I was always there.  
     (Staff Member B)  
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I will do a daily report on the previous day and today do three posts and will circle what he needs 
to follow. However, he is slow at answering. But before this I talked to him and was with him for 
about one to two weeks. I will know that he is a person with this kind of thoughts. 
   (Staff Member B) 
Actually, when we started doing this, we were not ‘in’, we did not know which direction to come 
from, that we should collect questions and everything to send to the candidate for him to read what 
people were saying. There were questions like this questions and what kind of approach do the 
candidate’s answers take. The candidate would answer that if they ask about this issue, we respond 
in this way. Since we came in to do this job, we send questions almost every day, until things 
calmed down, and we could adapt and answer ourselves. 
     (Staff Member C) 
We did not think up things ourselves. Those are things that the candidate had already thought. 
Because of the fact that we follow him in field. We have a team member watching what the 
candidate says, what he does. This is what we use to put something together. It is not something 
that we think up on our own. 
       (Staff Member D) 
The interviews with Staff Member B, C and D, show that background knowledge of the candidate and the 
image that the candidate wants to establish were not something that the public relations personnel could 
understand in a short period of time. The personnel spent time and effort prior to the election campaign or 
in the early stages of the campaign in order to learn background information on the candidate such as 
family, education, previous experience and performance. Personnel had to understand the candidate’s 
policies, his point of view and the way the candidate attempted to solve problems faced by Bangkokians 
because this will be questioned on the candidate’s SNS page. Most importantly, what personnel post on 
behalf of candidate has to reflect the type of image that the candidate would like to establish during the 
election campaign. Therefore, before undertaking their job on the candidate’s SNS page, the personnel 
had to gain a background understanding of the candidate.  
The internal communication of operating candidate’s SNSs page involves candidate being able to rely on 
campaign staff to work together to make posts on the candidate’s SNS page. The roles and the number of 
public relations personnel vary according to the size of the campaign team. For a candidate with one or 
two personnel working on the SNS page, their role was mainly to help the candidate to post messages and 
photographs on the SNS page, e.g. basic information on what the candidate did and where the candidate 
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went during the day.
20
 For a candidate with a team of social networking campaign staff, each member of 
the campaign staff was allocated a different task such as strategic planning on SNSs, recording videos and 
taking photographs of the candidate on the campaign trail, note-taking, transcribing or summarising what 
the candidate said in public speeches, at election campaign forums, in interviews with the mainstream 
media or in any interaction the candidate and the voters. Then, with the use of the Line message system or 
voice messages, a member of the campaign staff would be responsible for sending to the head of the staff 
on-site information, or any key points by the candidate in the conversation. Because the head tends not to 
be on-site with the candidate, the content would be sent to the chief of the SNS public relations team for 
editing before messages or photographs were posted on the candidate’s SNSs page.21  
Another important role of personnel was to ensure the timeliness and accuracy of communication on the 
candidate’s SNS page, as personnel ensured that the candidate’s Facebook status was updated within 5-20 
minutes or ‘as fast as possible’, as stated by one party-based staff member, in order for followers to gain 
the sense of a live feed on Facebook. Real-time communication, or the use of the check-in feature on 
Facebook, was able to attract more voters to meet the candidate in a particular place. However, real-time 
communication has to be accurate, and another role of personnel was to ensure the accuracy of the 
candidate’s posts on SNSs to minimise misunderstanding. Public relations personnel had to be cautious 
while structuring and framing messages, as seen in the quotation below:  
When we are doing the strategy that we will post, we need to think that sometimes we post 
something and then the good thing about is? – The message that we post makes the least 
miscommunication. – It’s not a matter of posting anything – posting about a rival. It becomes two-
edged sword. Post something that makes people understand in a negative way; this is something 
that needs care. Posts have to be accurate, posts have to be tight and when it’s posted it must not 
be criticized.  When it’s posted it must not be an old issue that we have been criticised about. All 
this has to be thought of. If we post something, will it attack others? The attack is good at first. 
They will think like this, those who do it for them.  
     (Staff Member B)  
In the above quote, Staff Member B stressed her concern to avoid miscommunication based on the 
content that she posts. As miscommunication and misunderstanding could have negative impact on 
candidate image, the staff were very conscious when framing the candidate’s campaign messages. Staff 
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Member B had to consider prudently the effect of the content that she is going to post on behalf of the 
candidate in order to minimise critical comments or challenges to the candidate’s image during the 
election campaign.  
Politician B mentioned that his political party has a team to monitor the profiles of Facebook users who 
are followers of his political party, politicians in the party and competitors in the election. They do 
‘extensive’ research on followers’ profiles as is seen in the following quotation:  
We have both internal and external social media staff and professional staff to come and help us. 
We do extensive research to see the profile of our candidate and our competitor. So we monitor 
every day. We monitor 24 hours, and have a daily meeting to wrap up what has been happening in 
the last 24 hours. Moreover, we are very flexible to change, to do more or to do differently in this 
social media war. 
(Politician B) 
Staff play a role in collecting candidate’s followers’ profiles on SNSs and how they make use of 
followers’ profiles to strategise the candidate’s campaign. This point is further supported by M.R. 
Sukhumbhand, who mentioned in a social media forum that there were more men than women following 
him and the majority of his followers were aged below 24 years old, while Suharit Siamwala, an 
independent candidate in the election, mentioned that he also had more men than women following him, 
but the majority were aged between 24-30 years old.
22
 This means that the candidates and their staff know 
the gender and age group of the people following them on SNSs. It could be said that personnel could 
gather followers’ demographic information on SNSs so that candidates know their target group or the 
profile of people who are receiving messages from their SNS pages. By doing so, they can frame the 
message in a reader-friendly way for a specific group of followers.  
Staff were involved in dealing with answering questions, including critical questions, that followers 
posted on candidates’ SNS pages. By frequently conferring with the candidate on the ways to deal with 
followers’ criticism, this ensures that personnel would deal with the critical comments according to how 
the candidate would tackle the criticism. In other words, this ensures that the thinking of the candidates 
and their staff is the same in dealing with the same problem as staff are acting on behalf of the candidates. 
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When staff are more independent in handling candidates’ SNS pages, they would deal with criticism by 
themselves and would also immediately send a report to update the candidate that questions on SNSs 
have been answered in a particular way or discuss with the candidate if the candidate is fine with the 
answers.
23
  
For candidates’ Facebook pages with a high level of interaction and a number of comments, a staff 
member would focus on reading and accepting questions and comments posted by followers. They would 
also filter them in a report passed to the candidate.
24
 Due to the different types of comments posted by 
followers, staff tended to structure answers based on the candidates’ policies, biography, and ways of 
thinking.
25
 These were used to frame answers to questions, which ensures that personnel would deal with 
questions based on the candidate’s campaign or personality. Even though interactive feature on SNSs 
allow followers to be more involved in candidates’ campaigns, critical comments were a challenge to the 
candidates’ image, and personnel had to be committed to work through such challenges to maintain a 
positive image of the candidate throughout the election campaign. This commitment includes the 
discussions that personnel had with candidates on how to handle critical content.
26
 (Chapter 7 will analyse 
further how critical comments and questions posted by stirrers are deal with). 
The basic task and responsibilities of public relations personnel in managing candidates’ SNS pages have  
contributed to public relations personnel ‘personalising’ communication on candidates’ SNS pages, which 
is what Sweetser (2011) and  Trammell and William (2004) refer to. Personalising candidates’ SNS pages 
is about personnel posting content on candidate’s SNSs page and giving a sense to followers that the 
content was written by the candidate, which subsection 6.1.2 analyses. 
6.1.2. Personalisation of candidates’ SNS pages  
This research further examines if there are any features or evidence of public relations personnel 
personalising the posts of M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat. With the use of candidate’s first name as 
the keyword search to examine how candidates’ names were used on candidates’ Facebook posts , it was 
found that there were posts which candidates signed off using their names. There were also posts which 
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were signed off with ‘ทีมงาน’, which means ‘Team’ or ‘Staff’. This type of post contains the candidates’ 
names as part of the post because the campaign staff were reporting about the candidate. The rest of the 
posts were anonymous. The results of this content analysis are presented in Table 6.1 (below):  
 
Type/name of candidate 
and result 
M.R. Sukhumbhand Pongsapat  
No. of posts  Percentage  No. of posts  Percentage  
Type 1: Anonymous 450 96.8% 321 79.5% 
Type 2: Candidate’s name 
used to sign off the post 
1 0.2% 70 17.3% 
Type 3: ‘Team’ or ‘ทีมงาน·’ 
used to sign off the post 
14 3.0% 13 3.2% 
Total number of posts  n=465 n=404 
Table 6.1: Ways in which candidate’s Facebook posts ended. 
Based on the results shown in Table 6.1, candidates’ Facebook posts which are categorised as Type 1 or 
‘anonymous’, constituted the highest percentage of posts, with 96.8% and 79.5% of anonymous posts 
M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat respectively. In this type of post the candidates’ names or their 
candidate’s campaign team was not used to sign off the posts, but the posts were written in a way to give 
a sense to the reader that the candidate wrote the posts, with the use of first person language ‘ผม’ or ‘I’ to 
refer a male. In Type 2, candidates’ names were used to sign off; this constituted only 0.2% of M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s posts and 17.3 % of Pongsapat’s posts. In Type 3, about 3% of each candidate’s total 
posts were signed off by their campaign staff.  
The overall finding of the different ways that posts were signed off on both candidates’ Facebook pages 
suggests that candidates intended to show a high level of responsibility on Facebook by being fully 
involved in communicating to his followers, with minimal involvement of personnel in writing and 
posting messages to them. However, if the reality was that personnel were writing candidates’ posts, then 
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it could be said that the candidates’ Facebook pages have shown a high level of consistency in 
personalisation, making followers feel confident that candidate wrote the messages themselves.  
In fact, based on interview data, it seems that public relations personnel posted content on behalf of the 
candidate but the result of the content analysis in Table 6.1 shows that only 3% of each of candidate’s 
overall posts were signed off by their teams, leaving the rest of the posts showing, explicitly or implicitly, 
that campaign messages were coming directly from the candidate. Anonymous posts do not mean that 
campaign staff did not write or were not involved in composing or gathering information for the post. 
This may confuse readers who notice this feature of candidates’ posts. There is a gap in knowing if the 
post was written by the candidate or their personnel, as followers cannot easily differentiate.  
From followers’ point of view, they might follow a candidate on SNSs with the expectation of receiving 
campaign messages ‘directly’ from the candidate, without third party interference. However, it is also 
understandable that candidates cannot compose every post by themselves. What should matter is how this 
is acknowledged on candidates’ SNS pages. This information is necessary if followers want to know if 
the post was coming directly from the candidate. If the candidate wrote the post and signed off the post 
using his name, it shows the candidate’s sincerity and willingness to communicate with their followers 
although their personnel might develop the posts.  Also, there might be posts which personnel wrote over 
candidate’s signature, which becomes problematic for followers to identify.  
The overall roles and responsibilities of public relations personnel indicate the relationship between 
public relations personnel and candidate before and during the election campaign. The findings in the 
previous and this subsection suggest changes in the relationship, the level of interaction between 
candidate and public relations personnel and the degree of autonomy that public relations personnel had 
over the candidate’s SNS pages, which is treated in the next subsection.  
6.1.3. Changes in relationship between candidates and their public relations 
personnel  
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 show the changes in the relationship between the candidates and their public 
relation personnel before and during the election campaign with reference to the changes of emphasis of 
election campaign content (Sombat, 1993) and swing voters of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign (Boonlert, 2015b).  
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Elements/Phase 
of election 
campaign  
Before 
election 
campaign 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Interaction between 
candidate and public 
relations personnel  
High High Low Low Medium 
Autonomy of public 
relations personnel 
over candidates’ SNS 
pages  
Low Low High High High 
Table 6.2: Changes in the level of interaction between the candidates and public relations personnel during the 
election campaign and of autonomy that public relation personnel has over candidates’ SNS pages. 
 
Figure 6.1: Changes of relationship between candidate and public relations personnel during the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election campaign. 
Based on the analysis done so far in this chapter, Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 show the changes in the 
relationship between the candidates and their public relation personnel in different phases before and 
during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. Before the election campaign, the relationship 
between candidates and their public relations personnel was the most intense as the personnel had to 
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familiarise themselves with the candidates’ biographies, personalities, management styles, policies and 
opinions on different issues. The personnel had to invest a significant amount of time and effort to gain a 
deep understanding of the candidates’ campaigns for them to be able to do strategic planning for the 
election campaign on the candidates’ SNS pages. The personnel had limited control of candidate’s SNSs 
page.  
During Phase 1 of the election campaign, the intensity of interaction between candidates and their 
personnel remained high as the personnel had to discuss frequently with the candidate about managing 
campaign content on candidate’s SNSs page and how they should reply to followers’ comments and 
questions. During Phase 1, the personnel had to understand and familiarise themselves with the candidates’ 
ways of speaking in public and their opinions to personalise the candidates’ SNS pages. The 
communication between the two parties might occur a few times a day, depending on the amount of 
content that they intend to post on SNSs and the feedback that they receive from followers. Therefore, the 
interaction level between candidates and their personnel during Phase 1 would be very frequent and 
intense because the personnel tried to acquire skills in posting messages on SNSs on behalf of the 
candidates, while the autonomy that personnel had over the candidates’ SNS pages remained low as both 
candidates and personnel were still dependent on each other during Phase 1.  
In Phase 2 and Phase 3, the frequency and intensity of interaction between the candidates and their 
personnel would be lower than in Phase 1. As the election campaign proceeded, the autonomy of 
personnel over the candidates’ SNS pages started to increase gradually, the personnel were given a 
reasonable degree of autonomy and independence to manage the candidates’ SNS pages. There were still 
regular or daily contacts between the candidates and their personnel. The regular meetings between the 
candidate and personnel remained important in Phases 2 and Phase 3 because the candidates still needed 
to know what was happening on their SNS pages and at the same time their personnel also needed to 
know what the candidates did and said in field campaigning, debates, speeches, and interviews.
27
 Both 
candidates and their personnel maintained a positive relationship with each other, not allowing any gap of 
communication to exist as there were times in which news reporters and voters would ask the candidate 
for clarification about the candidates’ posts on SNSs. Their personnel had to keep an eye on mainstream 
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media news coverage related to the candidates or if the candidates’ rivals mentioned the candidates in any 
way.
28
 Therefore, the level of interaction between the candidates and their personnel during Phases 2 and 
3 was lower than Phase 1, with a high level of leeway for personnel to be more independent in their jobs 
and responsibility. 
Taking into consideration of the difference between results of opinion polls and actual result of the 2015 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign (Boonlert, 2015b), Phase 4, the conclusion of the candidates’ 
election campaigns on SNSs, allowed the issues that had been observed and gathered during the election 
campaign to be formulated into the final message sent out to followers on SNSs. Thus the interaction 
between the candidates and their public relations personnel was closer again in Phase 4, gaining more 
involvement from the candidates to participate in their SNS pages. The analysis in this subsection 
suggests that during the different phases of the election campaign, there were changes in the level of 
autonomy that public relations personnel had over the candidates’ SNS pages. As the election campaign 
preceded, public relations personnel were able to confidently regulate the candidates’ SNS pages, 
personalise and post message on behalf of the candidate.  
Turning now to the use of public relations personnel for political communication on SNSs, a public 
relations staff member
29
 who has managed a Thai politician’s SNS accounts mentioned that after he had 
been responsible for the Thai politician’s SNS page for quite a long period, he knows what the politician 
wants him to do on the SNS pages and at times, he would still consult with the politician on certain things. 
He describes his responsibilities as someone who has to manage ‘a database for press releases’ by taking 
photographs of the politician and transcribing what the politician said in conversations and parliament in 
order for the politician’s followers to have access to raw data from politician’s SNS page based on what 
the politician is doing on the daily basis. At the same time, the politician also monitors his SNS page by 
posting certain messages and pictures to see the effect that the content might have on his followers. 
Simultaneously, the staff member also ensured that the politician was aware of the actions taken by the 
public relations personnel on the politician’s SNS page. Hence, the finding on the roles and relationship 
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of public relations personnel with their political figures in the context of the election campaign and 
political communication on SNSs in general consist of the same approach. 
To conclude, the roles of public relations personnel found in this section indicate the development of Thai 
public relations. Updating Daradirek and Rosechongporn (2004) findings on the duties of Thai public 
relations personnel of press release writing, media relations, organisational publications production, 
public relations planning and special events, the roles of political public relations on SNSs at the micro 
level consist of efficient internal communication to manage campaign message from political figures to 
public relations personnel, who had the knowledge and ability to think on behalf of the candidates based 
on the content posted the candidates’ SNS pages through the establishment of a relationship between the 
candidate and their personnel. The messages flow from the public relations personnel to the candidates’ 
followers. Public relations personnel acted as the link between candidates and their followers on SNS. 
Public relations personnel working for candidates might be in-house staff employed by the political party, 
who might or might not be personally related to the candidates. The primary role of public relations 
personnel was to personalise the candidates’ SNS pages, respond to and manage comments and 
communicate in real-time during the election campaign. The autonomy that public relations personnel had 
over the candidates’ SNS pages increased over time. However, it should be noted here that the high level 
of personalisation of candidates’ posts by public relations personnel could lead to a problem in assigning 
responsibility for candidates’ SNS pages. The changes in the relationship between candidates and their 
personnel raise the question of who is actually in charge of candidates’ SNS pages. (Chapter 7 will 
discuss further this issue).  
The establishment of a relationship between candidates and their personnel was essential for personnel to 
personalise the candidates’ SNS pages. Section 6.2 moves on to contextualise the flow of messages on 
SNSs in relation to the communication theory of two-step flow and vote-canvassing networks in Thai 
political culture.  
6.2. Digital vote-canvassing networks  
With reference to Van Dijk's (2006) definition of ‘interaction’, Van Dijck's (2013) concept of 
‘connectedness’ and Baym's (2010) analysis of relationships between Facebook friends, this section uses 
a prototype to discuss how the flow of campaign information on Facebook and the relationship between 
individuals who are part of the candidates’ campaign on Facebook can establish and expand their digital 
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vote-canvassing networks. This section starts off by analysing how the role and relationship of public 
relations personnel and candidates establish a digital vote-canvassing network, which is a development 
from traditional vote-canvassing systems. Building upon the establishment of the digital vote-canvassing 
networks on SNSs, this section then examines how candidates perceived interaction to be beneficial for 
their campaigns. Finally, this section envisages the expansion of digital vote-canvassing networks by 
looking into the implications of followers interacting with and spreading candidates’ campaigns on SNSs.  
6.2.1. Establishment of digital vote-canvassing networks: Core digital vote-canvassers 
on Facebook   
 
Figure 6.2: Flow of information on SNSs between candidates who use public relations personnel to transmit 
campaign messages to followers (Author’s compilation). 
Figure 6.2 is a prototype of the transmission of election campaign message flows from candidates to 
followers on SNSs, which consist of:  
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1. Candidate.  
2. Candidate’s campaign headquarters: On Stream A2; the people who disseminate campaign 
information from the candidate to other channels of communication.  
3. SNS public relations personnel: Campaign staff who post messages on behalf of the candidate 
on SNSs.  
4. SNS media: SNSs as media platforms where campaign messages between candidates and 
followers are transmitted and exchanged.    
5. Voters/followers: Voters in the election or followers of candidates who are SNS users.   
6. Specialists: Note-takers, video camera operators and photographers who keep a record of 
candidates’ movements. These specialists send their work to public relations personnel to select 
content to be posted on candidates’ SNS pages.   
As shown in Figure 6.2, personnel use Facebook to make the connection between candidates and 
followers. This section argues that the prominent role of candidates’ personnel and their relationship with 
the candidates have developed on the framework of traditional vote-canvassers in Thai election 
campaigns, turning personnel into ‘digital vote-canvassers,’ who operate ‘digital vote-canvassing 
networks’. The noun ‘network’ and ‘system’ are similar in showing the way people are connected through 
communication. This research will use the term ‘network’ in the establishment and development of digital 
vote-canvassing to demonstrate that this is formulated on social networking sites, where users have been 
able to articulate their opinions through interacting.    
As discussed in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.2, there are parallels between the roles of digital vote-
canvassers and traditional vote-canvassers in Thai election campaigns. Anek (1996) and Anyarat (2010) 
characterise the latter as those who regularly visit local villages or communities to have personal ties with 
voters. However, both digital vote-canvassers and traditional vote-canvassers play an intermediary role in 
linking candidates and voters during the election campaign. This research found that it was impossible for 
candidates in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election to take full responsibility for communications on 
their SNS pages. Public relations personnel were a type of in-house vote-canvassers during the election 
campaign on SNSs. They acted on behalf of the candidates in various roles. With the intention of 
influencing voting decisions, both digital and traditional vote-canvassers have specialised demographic 
knowledge on their electorates and target groups with whom they are communicating. Public relations 
personnel or digital vote-canvassers play a significant role in managing and personalising candidates’ 
SNS pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign.  
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There are differences in the temporal structure of communication among traditional vote-canvassers and 
digital vote-canvassers. Communication in traditional vote-canvassing networks was mainly through face-
to-face meetings and telephone calls, but communication with digital vote-canvassers, campaign staff or 
specialists was mainly made by e-mail and instant message applications such as Line and WhatsApp, 
which were practical only with internet connections. Depending on internet connection and how people 
are notified about the message transmitted, the temporal structure on the digital vote-canvassing networks 
is an asynchronous communication as there might be delay between the time the sender sends the 
message and the receiver gets or reads the messages (Baym, 2010). Arguably, communication in digital 
vote-canvassing networks is real time in terms of updating the message on computer screen and the ability 
to extend its reach to more SNSs users. Communication between digital vote-canvassers and followers 
was made through different SNSs such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Google Plus, which also 
require an internet connection, making the speed of communication in digital vote-canvassing network 
faster than in traditional ones. On the screen, communication between the candidates and their followers 
might seem ‘short’ and ‘direct’ but there was a hierarchy of teams acting behind the screen to publish 
posts on SNSs. One possible explanation for this is the digitalisation of communication on digital vote-
canvassing networks, allowing rapid communication on candidates SNS campaigns though several staff 
campaign were in different locations during the election campaign.  
The different form of communication used in traditional and digital vote-canvassing networks defined the 
sub-duties of campaign staff connected to digital vote-canvassers. With reference to the finding in 
Chapter 5 on agenda-setting in relation to the phase of the election campaign, digital vote-canvassers 
acted on behalf of candidates to personalise communication on candidates’ SNS pages by structuring 
individual posts to suit the timeframe of the different phases of the election campaign as well as to target 
followers. As a result, digital vote-canvassers coordinated and built online networks using their 
specialised knowledge of followers or voter segmentation and decided on the strategies to use on SNSs. 
Communication strategies on SNSs have been used to influence voting decisions through the basic idea of 
microtargeting (Bimber, 2014; Edgerly et al., 2013; Stokes-Brown, 2012). Given that followers can 
follow more than one candidate’s SNS page and the existence of swing voters in the 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial election (Boonlert, 2015b), it was important for digital vote-canvassers to make SNSs 
personalised channels of campaign communication to reach voters’ needs, engage with them and persuade 
them to vote for the candidate. In other words, digital vote-canvassers had to ensure that candidate’s 
campaign was relevant to voters, and they had to be able to sustain their attention throughout the election 
campaign.  
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Links between candidates and different campaign staff led to collaboration among campaign staff in the 
digital vote-canvasing networks. The head of the public relations team had regular contact with the 
candidate during the election campaign, and the head would provide the candidate with a daily report 
based on what has been posted and follower’s interaction on the candidates’ SNS page. The outer layer of 
the digital vote-canvassing network (Stream A1 of Figure 6.2.) consisted of different specialists, namely 
note-takers, video cameramen, and photographers recording what happened during the candidate’s field 
campaign, while editors in another location edited photographs and video, with their finished products 
sent through the internet to the head of public relations team. The head of public relations team was able 
to compose a message and publish it on the candidate’s SNS page based on the strategic communication 
plan initially defined for the election campaign.  
This research found that digital vote-canvassers monitored other candidates’ Facebook pages by noting 
whether other candidates mentioned anything about their candidate in a positive or critical way. This was 
done so as to be aware of the candidate’s competitors attempts to acknowledge or attack them during the 
election campaign. Traditional vote-canvassers obstruct other candidates’ campaign movement in villages 
and rig election results (Phichai Rattanadilok Na Phuket, 1998, pp.167-168 cited in Anyarat, 2010, p.72), 
which makes the work on digital vote-canvassers a development from the traditional vote-canvassing 
network.  
Another interesting finding about M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign on Facebook was about M.R. 
Sukhumbhand acknowledging politicians and campaign staff of Democrat Party who disperses 
themselves to different places in Bangkok during the second half of the election campaign period, without 
the attendance of M.R. Sukhumbhand. There might be coordination about such movement in M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s campaign. However, no evidence was found of individual politicians or campaign staff 
of the Pheu Thai Party dispersing to canvass votes for Pongsapat. It could be argued that the politicians 
and campaign staff of the Democrat Party were also ‘vote-canvassers’ in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign 
Although Anek (1996) identifies vote-canvassers in rural areas as village headman, landlords, 
shopkeepers, and school teachers who are personal supporters of the candidate, the involvement of 
politicians and campaign staff of Democrat the Party in M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign during the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign reflected the difference in the type of people who are vote-
canvassers, who also played an integral role in assisting M.R. Sukhumbhand to access many groups of 
Bangkokians. By using politicians such as Abhisit or Apirak in particular to campaign, voters were able 
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to recognise them as the leader of the Democrat Party and former Bangkok Governor respectively, so the 
credit they give to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign could be more influential.  
M.R. Sukhumbhand’s digital vote-canvassing network used politicians and campaign staff of the party to 
expand the campaign network and the coverage of activities by ‘vote-canvassers’ on the candidate’s 
Facebook page could increase the possibility of followers interacting with the content. Even though M.R. 
Sukhumbhand was absent, voters were still able to receive direct information about M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
campaign from Democrat Party politicians and campaign staff, who acted as his representatives during 
the election campaign. By acknowledging this activity on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page, the 
accumulation of support in the offline campaign was portrayed, which is another way to give confidence 
to the voting bloc that M.R. Sukhumbhand had. Also, this vote-canvassing network enabled M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and the Democrat Party to establish further the image of members of the Democrat Party 
collaborating with each other to win the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, which strengthened M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s image in relation to the Democrat Party.  
In short, the backdoor operation of election campaigns on SNSs indicates that political public relations on 
SNSs during the election campaign developed from traditional vote-canvassing networks based on the 
roles of vote-canvassers and their relationship with candidates, which established digital vote-canvassing 
networks through a different temporal structure of communication, enabling more rapid and centralised 
management of human resources and communication on SNSs during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign. Personnel become core digital vote-canvassers, playing a significant role in 
communicating with candidates and their followers, with the use of different campaign staff specialists 
collaborating to send out campaign messages on candidates’ SNS pages. M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign 
in particular decentralised his offline network to ensure that his campaign reached as many voters as 
possible within the limited time available to campaign, but this network was still acknowledged on his 
Facebook page. These findings point out that the notion of the traditional vote-canvassing network 
remains important in developing election campaigns through the use of technology.  
6.2.2. Interaction on SNSs to gain campaign feedback  
The interaction feature of SNSs seems to be a beneficial communication feature for followers to express 
their opinions on different agendas and for candidates to receive feedback about their campaigns on SNSs. 
Allowing followers to interact is a way to establish and build a relationship between candidates and 
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followers. This subsection uses the results of content analysis and interview quotes in relation to the 
encouragement of interaction initiated by candidates and core digital vote-canvassers to examine how 
candidates and personnel perceived interaction on SNSs to be beneficial for the election campaign. The 
analysis in the rest of this section depends on two facts. Firstly, not every follower interacts on Facebook 
about the candidate, but there was a certain level of interaction on candidates’ Facebook posts. Secondly, 
in exploring the comments that followers’ left on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s profile and first 
cover page on Facebook, it was found that some followers are voters in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election, while other followers showed their support for the candidates’ campaign but also acknowledged 
that they are not eligible to vote in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. This indicates that there isn’t 
a set of defined criteria for followers to establish and expand the digital vote-canvassing network on 
Facebook and therefore not all followers are voters of the election.  
Interaction on candidates’ Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was 
initiated in two ways. The first type is that regardless of the content of posts, every Facebook post had a 
certain level of interaction via clicking ‘Like’, ‘Share’ or commenting. The second way is when 
candidates directly encourage followers to interact on particular posts on particular topics as candidates 
seek followers’ opinions on an issue. In other words, candidates posted to initiate interaction on Facebook, 
encouraging followers to click ‘Like’, ‘Share’ or commenting on campaign content.  
In the second type, content analysis showed that 1.01% of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s Facebook posts (5 out of 
465) contained content asking followers to provide feedback on the post, while 4.95% of Pongsapat’s 
Facebook posts (20 out of 404) contained the same feature. For example, on 9 February 2013, M.R. 
Sukhumbhand posted a short message asking followers to click like for ‘Number 16’, which is his 
election number, and on 16 January 2013, Pongsapat began his campaign on Facebook saying that he 
would like to get to know his followers’ friends and therefore he asked followers to ‘share’ his Facebook 
page .  
Candidates and their staff were able to make use of the interactive features on SNSs to receive feedback 
or concerns that followers had on different issues. As SNSs allow candidates followers’ to click ‘Like,’ or 
‘Share’ or comment on candidates’ posts or photographs, interviewees mentioned that they were able to 
measure the performance of their campaign through these interactive features on SNSs. An independent 
candidate stated:  
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The good thing about social media is that we know to interact with them and what thoughts they 
have. There are people who are satisfied and some are not. It’s a media that we can measure rather 
quickly. Otherwise, we have to wait for research to see if it’s right, e.g. television, or various apps, 
or another medium, we need to wait to check when the research results come back. But social 
media reacts immediately, day-by-day. We can know immediately. We know what others say. It 
comes our target group, what they think, the language that they use, the feelings that they express. 
It is not like other media where there is no feedback which is direct and quick like this. 
 (Candidate C) 
The above quote indicates that the followers’ use of language in comments on candidates’ SNS pages 
could give a quicker determination of followers’ viewpoints on candidates’ campaigns. Candidates were 
able to receive a timely response from voters. The interaction features on SNSs allow candidates to 
identify followers’ opinions. An independent candidate commented that he was able to keep an eye on 
voters’ opinions to modify his campaign. He believed that the comments he read on YouTube enabled 
him to know what his followers were thinking.
30
 In comparison with mainstream media or research, 
another independent candidate stated that candidates would have to wait for a long time to know what 
followers were thinking about their campaigns.
31
 By the use of SNSs in the election campaign, candidates 
were able to gain a faster response from followers during the election campaign. 
Another public relations staff member working for an independent candidate went on to express her 
concern about the lack of public opinion in Thailand and she viewed SNSs as an appropriate space for 
people to voice their views on different issues. Therefore, she attempted to set an appropriate 
communication strategy on the candidate’s SNS page for followers to feel comfortable in interacting with 
the candidate, as seen in the quoted below.  
Public opinion, Thailand has never had this issue emerge before, right? Every issue — every issue. 
if it’s a governor, five governor candidates sit together and say what they each want to do – Thai 
people listen  no matter what the issue is about – not just about politics – Thailand lacks 
expression of opinion– lacks discussion – it only listens – If I choose you—what do you have – 
but you cannot talk to the Governor – nothing – Numbers 1,2,3 – My aim of Facebook is 1. Let 
people know the candidate 2. I want to get public opinions from Bangkokian, what they think 
about these issues. Our aim directly is what is the strategy doing, have people come and talk about 
those issues with us. Thai people do not understand – if you graduate from journalism you will 
understand that Thai people are good at one-way communication—I tell you and you listen, listen 
– When I come to do Facebook – the paradigm has changed already – Facebook has to be two-way 
and it must really be two-way – not – two-way in the sense – two-way and it does no good benefit. 
                                                             
30
 Interview with Candidate A.  
31
 Interview with Candidate B.  
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So the thing that I currently have and other governor candidates do not have is – I do a campaign – 
one campaign is linking Instagram and Facebook together easily –… … this is our goal – I do not 
know about other governor candidates – they want Facebook 1. Want to be famous 2. Want their 
aim in communication is one-way communication – talk, talk, talk. 
 (Staff Member B)  
Staff Member B went on to explain that the value of using SNSs in the election campaign is to make the 
best use of two-way communication to gain the most benefit for the candidate and the followers. During 
the interview, she provided an example of a post that she made on behalf of the candidate, discussing why 
many taxi drivers in Bangkok do not agree to take customers, as quoted below:  
If we look from the taxi driver’s side, where will he get security? He doesn’t know if the person 
who calls him is a the if or what he is – then we keep waving – will he take us?—I ask if this is the 
problem of Bangkok people – this is the problem that is close to people that I brought it up to talk 
about and share – Today I posted this issue, people are, like, surprised – it’s striking, lots of 
talking going on – I didn’t think that the candidate would talk about micro level problems – but if 
you ask what we talk to the mass about, we need a lot of products to sell, right? It began with the 
campaign – I posted on the first day, as an ad – as a banner saying – I’m a sincere person, a direct 
person, I want to hear the opinions of Bangkokians directly. Follow [candidate number] the 
problems close to Bangkokians and it’s IG. I wrote that [candidate number] day and [candidate 
number] vision on issues close to Bangkokians. I want to invite people on the fan page to join in 
giving their opinions together. Every opinion enables me to know what view you have about those 
problems. And you can follow on IG. I have posted and people share – the latest – three days 
already – this is the picture of someone sitting in a taxi and the opinion of the candidate – his 
opinion – the candidate said a lot of people talk on the Internet and people around him said that 
taxis only stop to pick up passengers when they don’t want them – but they never go when we call 
them – before they claimed they were returning their cars – but now they just won’t go without 
giving a reason why they won’t go. This issue needs co-operation from the garage owners, the taxi 
drivers, and the police. I will have a hot line take reports, and deduct points from the drivers and 
the garage owner have lose points as well for not looking after their employees. I will return 
licenses to taxi drivers, increase security for both sides, bring in GPS technology to use, so that 
when the driver is lost or the passenger is lost, we can track them for the safety of both sides. 
What do you think? This is what we want. 
 (Staff Member B)  
The above quotation shows candidate’s concern about fundamental transportation problems in Bangkok 
by interacting with the candidate’s followers on SNSs. Unlike having a large number of followers 
clicking ‘Like’ on candidates’ posts and photographs, Staff Member B stressed the value of interaction 
between the candidate and his followers, by asking followers to post their opinions on different problems 
in Bangkok and critically analysing the problems from various perspectives. Being interactive and 
receiving public opinions seemed to be important for candidates because candidates were able to know 
the voter segmentation through interaction. Candidates showed that they gave prominence to their 
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followers’ comments and their SNS pages were open for discussion and allowed followers to participate 
in the dialogue. As a result, candidates knew what their followers were thinking. By encouraging 
followers to interact on the candidates’ Facebook pages, candidates were able to ensure that the social 
networking platform was used to its full potential during the election campaign. Thus, interactive posts 
can be used to portray the candidate’s image as having the potential to be the Bangkok governor, willing 
to listen to Bangkokians’ problems and thoughts. On the other contrary, there are doubts about whether 
candidates valued the social issues or comments that followers posted on the candidates’ SNSs pages, 
which means that candidates might be using SNSs to construct an image of being concerned with the 
problems that followers face, without actually paying attention to the content of interaction.  
Two public relations personnel agreed in the interview that the number of candidates’ followers on SNSs 
does not mean much. Staff Member A said that ‘followers might not be voters’ and gave the example of 
many product brands that have many followers on SNSs but do not have a high level of sales. Applying 
this to the election campaign, this means that people might be following candidates from a distance but 
might not be influenced by the candidate’s SNS posts. Staff Member B said that having a large number of 
followers does not show that the candidate is ‘hit or hot’. What is more important is the interaction that 
occurs between the candidate and the voters on Facebook. This point shows that the actual interaction on 
candidates’ SNS pages matters more than the number of followers that a candidate has. Arguably, if a 
candidate has a small number of followers on his SNS page, it would mean that not many followers 
would receive his campaign message, and low level of interaction would occur on the candidate’s SNS 
page. It could be said that both the number of followers and the level of interaction matter for election 
campaigns on SNSs. 
To summarise, interaction on SNSs during the election campaign was a way to establish a relationship 
between candidates and their followers with the use of SNSs as the platform of communication to allow 
followers to be express their opinions on the agendas posted by candidates. This relationship is associated 
with the concept of political public relations in the way that personnel manage agendas on SNSs to enable 
two-way communication to occur between the candidates and their followers, which was passed public 
relations personnel who played a role in managing and filtering comments for candidates to followers’ 
views on different issues. Consequently, the interaction allowed more SNSs users to receive and interact 
with the candidate’s campaign content, expanding the digital vote-canvassing network, and the next 
subsection demonstrates how this could be done.  
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6.2.3. Expansion of digital vote-canvassing networks: Making Facebook friends 
become part of digital vote-canvassing networks 
Elaborating from the establishment of digital vote-canvassing networks, this subsection demonstrates how 
candidates’ followers and followers’ friends can be part of the digital vote-canvassing networks through 
interaction on SNSs, particularly Facebook. As stated by Dubrofsky (2011) about the functions of SNSs 
such as Facebook, ‘the more people comment on a piece of data, the stronger the likelihood that this bit of 
data will appear as ‘Top News’ on a friend’s newsfeed’, which increases the likelihood that the data will 
spread and for other users to interact (p.122). This circulation of content is what Jenkins et al. (2013) refer 
to the ‘spreadable’ feature of SNSs. As a result of followers interacting on candidates’ Facebook posts, 
the interchangeability of Facebook (Kent, 2010) would lead to the expansion of candidate’s networks on 
Facebook, which is a reflection of the two-step flow communication proposed by Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955b), enabling campaign content posted on candidates’ Facebook page to reach other Facebook users, 
and expanding digital vote-canvassing networks. This subsection explains how the interaction could 
expand digital vote-canvassing networks.  
It was found on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages that every post provoked 
interaction through all features, i.e. sharing the post, clicking ‘Like’ on the post and leaving a comment.  
The level of interaction varied from post to post. Taking the candidates’ first posts about the election 
campaign as examples, M.R. Sukhumbhand received 3,192 Likes, 95 Shares and 191 Comments on his 
first Facebook post, while Pongsapat received 5,394 Likes, 1,495 Shares and 912 Comments (data 
accessed on 15 August 2015). These figures indicate the number of followers who further disseminate 
candidate’s campaign on Facebook intentionally and unintentionally.  
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Figure 6.3: Voters as vote-canvassers through interaction on social networking sites (Author’s compilation). 
With reference to Van Dijck's (2013) concept of ‘connectedness’ (pp.46-7), interaction on Facebook 
would allow Voter A on Figure 6.3 to spread the digital vote-canvassing network. In Figure 6.3, Voter A 
and Voter B are followers of the candidate on Facebook, and received campaign information directly 
from candidates on Facebook. After Voter A received a post from the candidate and if he decided to 
interact on the post, whether through sharing, clicking on the ‘Like’ icon or making a comment, friends of 
Voter A would be able to see the candidate’s campaign content and the type of interaction by Voter A. In 
other words, the candidate’s campaign content and the type of interaction would appear on news feeds of 
Voter A’s friends, who are Voters C, D, E, F, G, and H. Assuming that Voters D and F continue to share 
the post with their Facebook friends, Voters I, J, K, L, M and N would also receive the campaign message. 
The interactive features of sharing Facebook posts, therefore, increase the visibility of candidate’s posts to 
followers’ friends, which expands the flow of information from a follower or a non-follower in the 
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candidate’s Facebook page.  If this continues, the campaign information will spread to more Facebook 
users who are non-followers of the candidate. Conversely, Voter B, who is a passive follower of the 
candidate, did not interact on the post, which means that Voter B’s friends would not receive the 
campaign message on this network. 
The different ways of interaction indicate different intentions of followers spreading a candidate’s 
campaign message on Facebook. For example, if Voter A shares the post, the content would spread to 
Voter A’s friends’ news feed and will also be shown on Voter A’s Facebook timeline. If Voter A makes a 
comment on the post, Voter A is ‘unintentionally’ spreading the post to his friends on the network. 
Depending on the Facebook algorithm to prioritise news feeds, Voter A’s friend might be notified on the 
news feed that Voter A has made a comment on the candidate’s post, which Voter A might not know 
about. However, if many followers leave comments on the same post at the same time, the comments that 
Voter A made might be hidden but would be visible to viewers who search to filter all the comments 
posted on the individual post. Consequently, Voter A was ‘unintentionally’ increasing the candidate’s 
visibility on Facebook as Voter A might not know that making a comment on the post would be 
acknowledged on Voter A’s friends’ news feeds according to the Facebook algorithm. This effect also 
applies when Voter A clicks ‘Like’ on a post. At this point, however, what is known is the number of 
interactions at the initial stage, which is the number of active followers who interact on the candidate’s 
post. Voter A would not know if Facebook friends of Voter D and Voter F continued to interact on the 
post at the outer layer of the network, but we can assume that a few will continue to do so.  
The multiple layers of interaction by different Facebook users connected directly and indirectly to 
candidates’ Facebook pages expand the digital vote-canvassing networks. This expansion constitutes the 
notion in Jenkins et al. (2013) of spreadable media content on SNSs from one user to another, and Kent's 
(2010) proposal of interchanging networks via interaction, making campaign messages reach more users, 
which further reflects the notion of two-step flow in circulating campaign information through interaction 
(Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). With further reference to how Marcinkowski and Metag (2014) state that 
‘two-step flow of campaign message’ in the state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany in 2010, 
occurs by candidates expecting journalists to use candidates’ campaign information on Web sites to 
further spread on traditional news media,  this research found that idea of two-step flow on Facebook 
were significantly associating with followers interacting and spreading candidate’s campaign content. 
Followers of a candidate’s Facebook page are the online opinion leaders while friends of such followers 
on Facebook are a less active group of voters who do not seek to gain campaign information directly from 
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candidate’s SNS page. In addition, based on the exploration of the comments that followers’ left on M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s profile and first cover page on Facebook, followers started to interact on 
both candidates’ profile pictures right after the photographs were posted on Facebook and the interaction 
went on until the end of the election campaign. This further indicates that as a result of interaction, the 
spreadability of candidate’s campaign on Facebook is not restricted to time.  
Online opinion leaders might also conduct interpersonal communication offline with friends and family 
who are not friends of opinion leaders on Facebook. Thus, candidates’ followers who interact with 
candidates’ campaign content on Facebook might spread the content to their online or offline friends in a 
two-step flow manner. If the content continues to spread, the multiple-step flow of campaign messages 
will reach other voters who are indirectly connected to the digital vote-canvassing networks. Therefore, 
when candidates encouraged followers to interact directly about the candidates’ campaign on Facebook, 
they were implicitly asking followers to expand their digital vote-canvassing networks. From this point, it 
could be said that the candidate perceived followers as digital vote-canvassers while followers who 
interacted on candidates’ Facebook pages indirectly became part of the candidates’ digital vote-
canvassing networks, which they might be willing or unwilling to do. The spreading of campaign 
information on Facebook becomes more complex in the outer layers of the digital vote-canvassing 
networks as there is no information about where campaign messages are heading and where the flow of 
information ends.  
The multiple-flow of communication on digital vote-canvassing networks is individualistic, enabling 
candidates and voters or voters’ friends to establish a more direct and personal relationship. In campaigns 
that did not contain any encouragement to followers to interact, a certain level of interaction on 
candidates’ Facebook could be beneficial in spreading campaign content on SNSs. Followers who left 
critical comments on candidates’ SNSs pages were challenging the candidates’ image, and SNSs allow 
such content to be further spread to other users. In addition to the way followers are connected to 
candidates on the digital vote-canvassing network,  the relationship between candidates and followers on 
Facebook was also associated to the phi nong relationship that Sanit (1994) analyses. On M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages, staff use ‘phi nong’ to refer to offline voters that 
candidates met as well as to address their followers on  Facebook. This shows both candidates and their 
staff intend to establish a close relationship with voters and give a sense of connection between the 
candidates and voters. As a result, this relationship shows a positive image of the candidates as they are 
able to establish a positive rapport and ‘closeness’ with voters.  
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Dimitrova and Bystrom (2013) noted that there are possibilities for citizens to influence political 
outcomes if they can compose and post political messages on the internet. Based on how SNSs users are 
related to each other i.e. ‘strangers, admirers, confidants, co-workers, family and a host of other 
relationship types’ (Baym, 2010, p.145), such ‘connectedness’ (Van Dijck, 2013, pp.46-7) leads to the 
possibility that Facebook users were interested in how their Facebook friends interacted. With reference 
to Granovetter's (1973) definition of ‘strong tie’ and ‘weak tie’, if SNS users’ relationships are weak ties, 
they might be less interested in knowing that their friends were interacting. However, if the relationships 
are strong ties, the relationships could expand the digital vote-canvassing networks.  
The relationship between the outer layer of digital vote-canvassers and candidates was not a long-term 
relationship because such relationship was focused mainly during the election campaign, which was 42 
days (from the official start of election campaign, 21 January, till the day before the election campaign, 2 
March 2013). This means that candidates and their public relations personnel had to devote their time and 
attention to delivering their campaign messages on SNSs to different groups of followers in a short period. 
Thus, it must be stressed here again that public relations personnel played a crucial role in structuring the 
posts and continuously encouraging followers to interact on the posts, which built the relationship 
between candidates and followers as well as other SNSs connected to followers.  
Above all, there was no evidence found about how campaigns on SNSs can guarantee votes from 
followers. Staff Member F commented that:  
It is not something like oh because of social media that’s why we won. Well partly, if social media 
meant that much in the campaign, we would have won last time because we actually got more 
support in social media last time. But social media numbers in Thailand are not that great yet. I am 
saying ‘yet’ because it is not happening yet. Mainly because elections happen every couple of 
years, it will affect more. But the last time for sure, the reason why we won is because of social 
media but not the social media by us. It is because of opinion leaders in the social media who 
express their ideas on what people are already thinking. 
(Staff Member F) 
Staff Member F attempted to explain that there is still insufficient evidence to show that the use of SNSs 
cause election results. This means that the number of supporters that candidates gained on SNSs could not 
be used to indicate or predict the number of votes that the candidate will get in the election. Staff Member 
F justified this by saying ‘social media numbers in Thailand are not that great yet’, which implies that the 
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digital divide in Thailand had limited the ability to use SNSs to predict election results. Hence, the use of 
SNSs for the election campaign and political communication cannot involve the whole Thai population.  
As noted in Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.2, Callahan and McCargo (1996) note the literal meaning of hua 
khanaen is ‘head vote’, while hua khanaen act in practice as canvassers, vote gatherers and vote banks. 
The distribution of money and gifts to rural voters could be used to predict or indicate the number of 
votes that candidates would get under the patron-client relationship. With reference to Hutton's (1999) 
claim that public relations is ‘managing strategic relationships’, the management of relationships between 
candidates and followers on SNSs during the election campaign is ‘strategic’ as the primary goal of 
candidates is to win the election by utilising SNSs to spread their campaign messages to reach voters.  
However, other than knowing the reaction that candidates receive to their campaign message on SNSs, 
there has been no way to determine the relationship between campaigning on SNSs and the number of 
votes that candidates would get. The transformation of campaigning on digital technology allows more 
diverse groups of SNSs users to connect to candidate’s SNSs network. Followers of candidates’ SNS 
pages might be voters or non-voters and followers can also follow more than one candidate to access 
direct communication channels with the candidate. This suggests that SNSs have moved vote-canvassing 
systems into the direction where SNS users of various backgrounds are connected to candidates’ SNS 
networks without having any electoral tie with the candidate. Consequently, campaign strategy on SNSs 
becomes more challenging as SNS users connect to candidates’ networks for various reasons. There was 
no way for candidates or their staff to guarantee that campaigning on SNSs could affect voting, and this 
finding supports previous researchers who had commented on this (Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014; 
Nalinee and Brown, 2006; Strandberg, 2013).  
To summarise, Van Dijk's (2006) definition of ‘interactivity’ as ‘a sequence of action and reaction’ and 
the four dimensions of interaction space, time, behavioural and mental (p.8-9) that Van Dijk outlines have 
led to the establishment and expansion of digital vote-canvassing networks through different Facebook 
users who are connected to candidates’ Facebook networks in one way or another, through continuous 
interaction on candidates’ Facebook pages. The interaction of followers on candidates’ Facebook pages 
was another fundamental part of the election campaign on Facebook as it increased the spreadability of 
campaign content and maximised candidate presence on Facebook during the election campaign for other 
Facebook users to take into consideration. Followers who interacted on campaign content that they 
received directly from the candidates’ Facebook pages can be considered as the outer layer of digital vote-
canvassing networks. Therefore, the interaction features of Facebook are especially beneficial for new 
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candidates like Pongsapat or candidates with a small number of followers. Efficient management of 
interaction on Facebook can expand digital vote-canvassing networks through the way people are related 
to each other, which might or might not influence voting decisions but increases candidates’ visibility, 
allowing campaign messages to reach more Facebook users. 
Conclusion  
To answer the question on What was the relationship among the individuals who were part of the 
candidates’ networks on social networking sites during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign?, public relations personnel acted as core vote-canvassers to co-ordinate campaign message on 
SNSs, to communicate with followers as well as to encourage followers to spread the candidates’ 
campaign on SNSs. Candidates allowed public relations personnel to have independence and autonomy to 
enhance their image on SNSs during the election campaign, and the establishment of such roles and 
relationships are similar to those of core vote-canvassers in Thai political culture. The core digital vote-
canvassers performed the same function as the traditional ones with the intention of bringing voters to 
make a decision. However, there was no evidence found in this research on how this could be guaranteed 
or measured from campaigning on SNSs.  
Candidates and public relations personnel attempted to have a good rapport with followers, to initiate and 
build an individualistic and direct relationship to enhance the election campaign on Facebook and to use 
Facebook to their full potential. Even though followers have diverse connections with their friends on 
Facebook, some followers interact and spread candidates’ campaigns on Facebook to enhance their 
relationships with candidates during the election campaign. Through Facebook algorithms, expanding the 
digital vote-canvassing network on Facebook can increase the number of people exposed to the content 
regardless the type of interaction.  
The findings in this chapter are developed from the traditional vote-canvassing networks in Thai political 
culture (Anek, 1997; Anyarat, 2010), spreadable media (Jenkins et al., 2013) and the two-step flow (Katz 
and Lazarsfeld, 1955), under the features of interaction, reach, temporal structure and mobility that Baym 
(2010) identifies and interchangeability of networks that Kent (2010) outlines. Thus, this chapter argues 
that political public relations on SNSs during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign were 
associated with the expansion of networks through the management of human resources and relationships 
in order to organise and spread campaign content on SNSs and increase exposure to as many SNSs users 
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as possible in a short period. This management of human resource constitutes the establishment and 
development of relationships among individuals who are connected to the election campaign networks.  
The comprehensive operation of election campaigns and political communication on SNSs is a mixture of 
what Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) refer to as the second and third age of political communication. The 
mediation of political communication is no longer only dominated by political parties, but public relations 
personnel who demonstrated their value and skills in managing as well as personalising the dissemination 
and interaction of messages that candidates aimed to communicate to their followers. Although mediation 
on SNSs cannot ensure that followers support candidates through voting, the decentralisation of 
communicating and spreading messages on SNSs provides an opportunity for the messages to be 
circulated to more SNS users, enabling more SNS users to recognise the image of candidates. As Blumler 
and Kavanagh (1999) point out, the third age of political communication on the internet is also associated 
with the challenges and complexities raised in the networks, leading to next chapter to discuss about 
concerns of the election campaigns on SNSs and the question of responsibility when dealing with what 
might not be allowed on SNSs during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. 
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Chapter 7 : Challenges of Political Public Relations on Social Networking 
Sites 
 
Introduction  
In general, political communication and election campaigning on SNSs is arguably contributing to the 
emergence of deliberative forms of discussion on the internet in Thailand, which is important for the 
development of democracy. Thai citizens who have access to SNSs interact on political figures’ SNS 
pages to express their opinions and take part in debates in ways they could not before.  However, there 
have been issues associated with political figures’ images and the management of interaction that limits 
this development. This chapter is concerned with the management of interaction, and focuses on its 
limiting role rather than the deliberative aspect of SNSs. Having public relations personnel is one 
approach that Thai political figures take to operate their SNS pages. Another approach to political 
communication is for political figures to have full control of their SNS pages. Based on SNS features of 
interaction, reach, temporal structure, storage and mobility that Baym (2010) outlines, this chapter 
attempts to answer the research question on ‘How did the features of social networking sites challenge 
political public relations during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign and political 
communication in Thailand?’ Building upon the content related to management on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s 
and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages as well as the establishment and development of digital vote-canvassing 
networks on SNSs, this chapter examines political public relations on SNSs by looking at how features of 
SNSs complicate the regulation and moderation of political communications and 2013 Bangkok 
gubernatorial  election campaign. The analysis in this chapter takes into consideration SNS pages 
mediated by public relations personnel for candidates compared to SNS pages managed by the political 
figures themselves.  
The first section analyses Thai politicians’ experience of using SNSs to communicate with followers 
directly to disseminate messages and build a long-term relationship with followers. This section 
demonstrates another way to approach political public relations on SNSs based on the way Thai 
politicians manage their channels of communication for political purposes. The second section discusses 
how interaction on SNSs becomes a two-edged sword for political figures’ image and how political 
figures deal with followers who are critical of them. Finally, this chapter discusses the challenge and risk 
to election campaigns on SNSs in Thailand by further analysing the scope of responsibility of public 
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relations personnel toward the external factors which threaten political public relations on SNSs in 
Thailand.  
7.1. Political communication on SNSs  
The use of public relations personnel is a choice in political communication on SNSs. Some Thai 
politicians decide to take full control in the composition and publication of content that they communicate 
on their SNS pages, enabling SNS users to receive messages directly from them, without the intervention 
of mainstream media or public relations personnel in any aspect. This section examines Thai politicians’ 
motivation for and experience of using SNSs to communicate directly with their followers by first 
reviewing politicians’ perception of how they use SNSs to communicate with followers. This section then 
moves on to analyse the relationship between politicians and their followers developed in this way. 
Analysis in this section indicates how political communication SNSs can have an impact on deliberative 
democracy in general.  
7.1.1. Direct communication between politicians and followers   
Politicians A and B interviewed for this research stated their experience of the benefits that they gained 
from using SNSs to communicate directly with their followers and the press. Politician A managed his 
SNS accounts without employing any public relations personnel to assist him, while Politician B shared 
his experience of being significantly involved in the strategic planning of the political communication on 
SNSs of his political party, other politicians of the same party, and of himself.  
With the advance of Facebook, we can communicate with our followers, our members on a minute 
to minute basis, at least on a daily basis, and we can monitor, whether these messages are being 
received. It is also a medium whereby members can also respond, comment and advise us. We can 
update our activities with photographs. It is amazingly free and Mr. Zuckerberg guarantees that it 
will be free forever. 
(Politician A) 
I do also use it as a way to communicate with the press.  Whereas typically one would use to 
organise press conferences and not be able to control what is reported, nor even control the 
accuracy of what is reported. Now on sensitive issues in particular, Facebook is a very good 
medium because I can control exactly what is communicated. And be sure that the message is 
reported in a complete manner. So this is very helpful. 
   (Politician A) 
205 
 
Politician A had experienced communication faults in the past in political communication through 
mainstream media, where the politician did not have any channel of communication to make corrections 
to or give further explanations of what has been reported by mainstream media. The emergence of SNSs 
is, therefore, a development in political communication in Thailand, which eliminates the significance of 
the role of mainstream media in McNair's (2011) political communication model. As noted by Sathiian 
(2008), citizens, in general, do not have personal meetings with political organisations, politicians, or the 
prime minister, and the media act as the mediator of messages from political organisations to citizens This 
means without the media, both parties are not informed about any significant political issues that occur on 
each side. But with SNSs, Thai politicians have used SNSs to have direct communication with citizens 
and facilitate the political communication between politicians and citizens. On one hand, it could be said 
that the mainstream media is not as significant as it used to be in acting as a middle person to transmit 
political messages to the public as politicians have their SNS pages to communicate with the public. But 
on the other hand, the mainstream media in Thailand still remain a primary source of political information 
for many citizens (Nalinee and Brown, 2006; Pimonpan and Pirongrong, 2013). 
By being able to use SNSs to communicate directly with their followers, politicians have been able to 
decide and have control over the content that is reported, especially on sensitive issues as the politician 
can fully ensure that what he intends to communicate is structured and framed according to his interests.  
I think what I might help to use my social media, to help to inspire people to help, inspire people 
to do good things, inspire people to think of social, inspire people to be successful in whatever you 
like. For example, when I create the [name] Facebook page. Normally we don’t have the tools, we 
don’t have the budget, we don’t have money, but that’s my way of working that I think social 
media is a new way that you can communicate to people effectively… … Secondly, sometimes I 
would like to promote some ideas. For example I would like to promote the [adjective] economy 
concept during the [politician name] Administration… … So I start using my social media to help 
find information or do activities for try to raise awareness, try to share my thoughts or at least to 
inspire people that follow me that creativity is very important, imagination is very important. 
Think outside the box is the way of living. That’s the source of ideas that I think will inspire 
people. 
(Politician B) 
Politician B can frame his message to reflect his opinions and interests according to his purpose in 
political communication, which, in Politician B’s case, is the idea that he would like to inspire people and 
promote certain ideas from his point of view. Politician B was also able to encourage his followers to get 
involved in volunteer projects. With a channel of communication on SNSs, a lack of budget and resources 
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was not a barrier to political communication any more. As a politician using SNSs, he has been able to 
motivate and show his support for different ideas. 
Based on Politician B’s experience of using SNSs for political communication, it could be said that the 
politician has the autonomy to define what issues to communicate with his followers, the time of 
communication and the approach to handling communication on SNSs. As the politician is in control of 
his SNS page, he can send a message or post a photograph at any time, allowing him to become the 
gatekeeper authorising the publication of messages in political communication on his SNS page. Thus, 
with SNSs, Thai politicians can facilitate political communication with their followers through the 
mobility and temporal structure of SNSs. The low barrier to communication on SNSs has led politicians 
and citizens to have access to SNSs as it does not involve any cost of entry. When politicians choose to 
control and manage their own SNS pages, political public relations on SNS becomes a self-managed 
channel of communication for politicians to disseminate political and non-political messages. Political 
communication on SNSs is a direct, without the intervention of mainstream media and public relations 
personnel to set agendas and frame messages.  
Political communication on SNSs is an additional, rather than an alternative, channel of communication 
between politicians and followers in Thailand. It is still problematic to say if communicating on SNSs can 
substitute for political communication on mainstream media or the five roles that McNair (2011, pp.18-20) 
outlines for the media in the democratic process (inform citizen, educate citizens, provide space for public 
political discourses, give publicity to government and political parties and provide a space for the 
‘advocacy of political viewpoints’). In the development of political communication on SNSs, there are 
possibilities for these objectives to be accomplished if there is a centralised SNS page as an online 
platform of communication for politicians and followers to communicate with one another. Politicians can 
frame their message and facilitate political communication on SNSs to accord with these objectives. But 
as long as the digital divide exists in Thailand, there would still be certain groups of Thais who do not 
have access to online political discussion.  
With further reference to Pitch's (2002) analysis that deliberative democracy via internet message boards 
in Thailand has not resolved ‘the politics of personality’, SNSs have also provided a channel of 
communication for politicians to express their political opinions and show their personality, which can 
widen political divisions in Thailand. This means that receiving messages from a particular Thai 
politician’s page can be just a point of view coming from a particular politician. But, if active followers 
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follow more than one politician on SNSs i.e. the government party and the opposition party, political 
information and views sent from both networks might enable followers to gain different perspectives and 
allow followers to make their own judgements on the political issues. After all, consumption of political 
information on SNSs is also dependent on who followers choose to connect with on SNSs and what 
information they choose to consume or interact with. 
7.1.2. Long-term and direct relationships   
The direct communication between politicians and followers on SNSs has also developed the long-term 
relationship between politicians and followers.  
I spend a total of about one hour per day in the car or whatever on social network. I see it is an 
important tool. After all – in fact in any given day, I am actually communicating more on social 
network than I am – in anything else that I am doing. Even tonight, I am going a TV show. It is 
debatable that more few people will see it compare to read my Facebook page. So it is an 
important part of what I have to do. And I don’t feel that it is appropriate for me to delegate 
communication with general public to somebody else. It’s what politicians have to do by 
themselves – not least because it forces you to think about what you say and I also---the last sack 
of one hour is reading people’s comment and feedback and that tells me a lot about what people 
are thinking and it helps me to keep my figure on the path.  
(Politician A) 
If people feel that my account is managed by myself, at least they believed. When they follow me, 
they know that they are talking to ‘this politician.’ But if another guy, always use 80-90% Team to 
help, the level of credibility is – it is like the advertisement.  
(Politician B) 
Politicians who choose to control and manage their SNSs accounts saw the importance of developing a 
relationship with their followers by dedicating a reasonable amount of time and attention daily for 
political communication on SNSs. Politicians A and B perceived that having public relations personnel 
communicating on behalf of politicians on politicians’ SNS pages gives a different impression to 
followers compared with SNS pages that are self- managed by the politicians.  
Politician A commented that that it is not appropriate for him to delegate communication with the general 
public to somebody else while Politician B said that if messages are posted by his team most of the time, 
political communication on SNSs would be similar to ‘advertisement.’ Therefore, communicating directly 
with their followers and having full control over their SNS pages shows their genuineness, willingness 
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and intention to communicate with their followers, which is a way to increase the credibility of political 
communication on SNSs. The politicians stressed the importance dedicating a reasonable amount of time 
and attention to communication with their followers, which shows that the politicians did not have SNS 
accounts just because other politicians have one, but they took political communication on SNSs seriously 
with the main intention of approaching followers directly.  
It could be said that politicians’ investment of time on SNSs is a way to accumulate support and cultivate 
followers through the relationship that they build.  
The relationship is closer. I am able to explain my thoughts more clearly to more people. And also, 
I am able to actually help more people because my followers would ask for help through Facebook, 
usually through the inbox. I get 10—20 inbox messages every day. I read them all. There is hard 
work. Most of them are either ones that give specific advice or ask for specific help as a MP and 
from all over the country. So I would try to process them all. Instead of having a specific 
traditional MP clinic in the UK, every Monday or whatever, the MP would be in office, I have an 
open clinic through Facebook effectively.  
(Politician A) 
Knowing that you will not be accessed by the majority of followers, some are purely personal, 
simply because I decided earlier that I want to use Facebook as a way to basically talk with my 
followers. And when you talk with your followers, you don’t just talk about politics. They follow 
you because they are interested in you. They want to know a little bit more about you. So I tell 
them sometimes what I am thinking, what I am doing. Recently, I told them that I got a particular 
disease that I am trying to find a cure for. A lot of response to those kind of messages as well. And 
I find that by making them feel that they know you better, they can touch you. When it is that you 
have a message that you want to deliver, there is a much greater chance for the message to being 
accepted and trusted. As if it was something that was spoken by a friend, they know and they 
going to know well rather than by just another politician.  
(Politician A) 
The above quotations from Politicians A indicate that they have been able to use SNSs as a channel to 
communicate about non-political issues that they are interested in. Politician A gave the illness that he 
had as an example. He used this topic to gain a response from his followers. This made his followers 
know the ‘politician’ as more than just a politician, and somehow the relationship is similar to a ‘friend’ 
relationship. Moreover, the politician uses Facebook as a platform of communication for him to be able to 
advise people who send private Facebook messages to his inbox. In this way, the politician was able to 
provide direct support to and assist people who needed help on an individual basis. The composition and 
dissemination of political communication is not significantly dominated by political parties, but the 
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agenda and frames of messages are based on what politicians think is substantive to them and to their 
followers. Without public relations personnel intervention in political communication on SNSs, mediation 
of politics on SNSs can also occur when politicians handle communication on their SNS pages by 
themselves, through trial and error, to test the impact that particular messages have on followers. Political 
communication on SNSs becomes less mechanical and more flexible, enabling SNSs users to have more 
choice to receive political information and get involved in political communication 
With regards to Hutton's (1999) definition of public relations as ‘managing strategic relationships’, it 
could be said that the relationships established and developed between politicians and their followers are 
a manageable and strategic kind of relationship that occurs at a more individual level of political 
communication. ‘Managing strategic relationships’ between politicians and followers becomes ‘political’ 
when the communication is purposeful. With further reference to Strömbäck and Kiousis's (2011) 
definition of political public relations, it could be said that communication between politician and 
followers might not be what Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) refer to ‘purposeful communication’ in the 
short term as some content posted by politicians are not directly politically-related content. But in the 
long-term, the relationship developed between politicians and followers could result in whether 
politicians gain political support from the followers. As Castells (2012) concludes that digital media 
established deep communication ties and organisational capacity in protesters before the actual 
mobilisation of protest in the Arab Spring (p.105), deliberative democracy on SNSs can cultivate and 
accumulate followers to support a politician in elections and social movements in the Thai context. With 
regular updates about politicians and the responses followers leave through interaction on SNSs, 
followers know more about the politician than the politician’s policies and political views – and vice 
versa.  
For educated middle-class Thais who are critical in evaluating candidates’ policies and elect ‘honest and 
capable persons to serve as lawmakers and political executives’ (Anek, 1996, p.221), direct 
communication on SNSs between politicians and their followers would assist them in receiving 
information and interacting on politician’s policies on a regular basis. SNS users can also follow more 
than one politician on SNSs to gain each politician’s perspective on the same political issue, enabling 
SNSs users to have more information in evaluating politicians. Suchit (2009) comments that the 2007 
constitution in Thailand alone does not resolve the problem of ‘conflicting political forces’ (p.93). It 
could be said that political communication on SNSs allows Thai politicians to express their opinions or if 
they have any disagreement with any political issues as Thai politicians have SNSs as their own channel 
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of political communication. It seems beyond the bounds of possibility for political communication on 
SNSs to resolve political conflicts.  What SNSs have done to develop the relationship between political 
figures and citizens and as will be further analysed in section 7.2. SNSs have opened a space for followers 
to challenge political figures’ image.  
To sum up, another approach to information management in political public relations on SNSs is direct 
communication between a politician and his followers on SNSs, which shortens the political 
communication network as it eliminates mainstream media from the transmission of political messages 
from politicians to followers. SNSs in Thailand have enabled political communication to become more 
informal as there is no restriction on the time and content of communication. SNSs enable Thai politicians 
to decide on what they want to communicate with citizens and also to ensure the accuracy of the message. 
Politicians compose their messages sent through their SNS accounts, by which they have chosen to 
communicate both politically-related and non-politically related content, believing that non-politically 
related content is also what followers are interested to know more about. Consequently, these networks of 
direct communication have enabled the relationship between politicians and citizens to become closer. 
7.2. Interaction and challenges to image management  
Based on the exploration of the comments that followers’ left on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s 
profile and first cover page on Facebook, it was found that there was no interaction between personnel 
and followers, which means that candidates were just initiating the interaction among the followers by 
posting the content. It was just followers who left comments on candidates’ Facebook pages and other 
followers would comment or click ‘like’ on the comments that were left by followers. The comments that 
followers leave on political figures’ SNSs page express various opinions, including both supportive and 
critical views that followers have on particular political figures. The literature shows that the general 
notion of stirrer exists in other democratic contexts where stirrers attempt to set up SNS accounts to 
continuously show disapproval of political figures on political figure’s SNS page (Bailard, 2012; 
Chinnasamy and Griffiths, 2013; Gueorguieva, 2007; Harfoush, 2009; Leong, 2014; Rosyidah, 2015). 
Looking specifically in the Thai context, stirrers on SNSs seem to have been a significant distraction on 
political figures’ SNS pages.  Even though the consensus in the literature is that campaign content is very 
unlikely to influence voting decisions (Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014; Nalinee and Brown, 2006; 
Strandberg, 2013), the moderation feature (Kent, 2010) and social cues feature of SNSs (Baym, 2010) 
raise the question of whether followers who are critical of Thai political figures would be retained in the 
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digital vote-canvassing network or if critical comments posted by followers are kept on Thai political 
figures’ SNS pages. With the use of the features of moderation and social cues on SNSs as the basis for 
analysis, this section examines the challenges of interaction in relation to political figures’ images on their 
SNS pages in Thailand. This section first identifies the characteristics of followers who challenge political 
figures’ image by posting critical content then examines the methods and reasons of political figures and 
public relations personnel in moderating critical content.  
7.2.1. Characterising Thai stirrer interaction on SNSs  
As Chapter 6 found that followers commenting on political figures’ SNSs posts can expand digital vote-
canvassing network during the election campaign, and candidates of the election have shown attempts to 
encourage followers to interact in various ways, there have been doubts about the advantage of digital 
vote-canvassing networks arising from the way Thai stirrers interact on SNSs. This subsection uses 
interview quotations from politicians, candidates and personnel to exemplify the character of followers 
whom interviewees viewed as problematic to their SNS pages.   
Typically, they are from individuals who do not post their own photographs on their profile nor 
have any friends, as if somebody’s accounts are created specifically for the purpose of harassing 
you.. … I can tell because these comments are written about 3 in the morning (3am) and they 
come in blocks. So all of the sudden, there are five aggressively negative comments, written by 
people who don’t have a proper name or picture, in a roll… … When I look at their profile, I know 
that they are a crazy [a Thai politician’s name], supporters who never listen to me or they might be 
normal people who might be over a reason. If the only pages they follow, other than mine is I love 
[a Thai politician’s name], I just don’t bother with that.  
(Politician A) 
Right now since the politics is very bad. People discredit you, don’t like you or challenge you. So 
there might have a group of people against me or against my party. Try to come to my page and 
try to screw up in my page, post bad stuff on my page or try to discredit me on my page… …They 
use it because they like to attack, they like to criticise. Because to me, you need to open who you 
are if you like to communicate. And that could be one way to help, to protect the right of the 
people. Because if not you might have like ten accounts, and you just use different names and 
bribe people doing crime on social media. 
(Politician B) 
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You know if it is just a negative comment, we will leave it there. But if people start cursing or 
start drawing fights, sometimes it is not just negative comments, but it is comments to fight or 
upset people on the page, you can look at their account and it is a fake account.  
(Staff Member F) 
Based on the above interviews, it could be said that reading followers’ comments allowed politicians and 
their personnel to sense followers’ intentions in interacting with politicians’ SNS pages. There were both 
supportive and critical followers. The negative comments that critical followers post can be constructive, 
but there were followers who showed disapproval of the political figures and showed the intention to 
harass them through the comments they left, which can deteriorate into arguments between the followers. 
As stated by Baym (2010), people have doubts when communicating with digital media due to the lack of 
visual and auditory social cues to visualise who they are communicating with. As a result, a fundamental 
problem of anonymity is that people are not sure if they should believe who they are communicating with 
on digital media (ibid., p.32). This research found that as for ‘anonymous’ followers interacting with 
political figures’ SNS pages, there were social cues of the interaction which can indicate their intention of 
interaction. Followers who set up SNS accounts to destroy political figures’ images can be identified by 
the comments that they leave, the time when they leave the comments and the name and profile pictures. 
As mentioned by Politician A, one group of followers were supporters of his rival or were demonstrators 
attempting to bring down the government under the political party that the politician belonged to. These 
followers did not show the intention of using SNSs for communication, but set up their accounts to attack 
and spam the political figures’ SNS pages by posting consecutive comments during off-peak hours. They 
used aggressive language to actively harass political figures on SNSs and ‘screw up’ their SNS pages.  
Followers hiding their identity to challenge political figures’ images on SNS pages can be referred to 
‘keyboard warriors’. ‘Keyboard warriors’ seem to feel more comfortable expressing themselves or 
posting critical political views on political figures’ SNS pages when they do not reveal their name and 
appearance. In addition to how the use of SNSs for political communication corroborates with Pitch (2002) 
analysis on deliberative democracy in section 7.1., it was found so far in this section that there is also a 
lack of trust among the discussants in political discussion on the internet in Thailand. As for SNSs, this 
research found that there are also some Thai internet users who are still not sincere in political discussion 
on SNSs, and such group of people can be characterised through 1. the username of the commentator; 2. 
the time of the comment; 3. the content of the comment. Whether the political views of ‘keyboard 
warriors’ have substance depends on the individual’s perception of the content. Whether followers’ 
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comments can affect political figures image during the election depends on the interpretation of the 
person reading the comments.  
In an examination of the comments left on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s profile pictures and 
first cover pages on Facebook, there was no strong evidence found of followers attempting to harass the 
two candidates’ campaigns. Critical comments that are still shown are negative views on candidates’ 
photographs, general opinions of dislike of the candidates or their political parties, and predictions of the 
candidates losing the election. As this research was conducted after the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election was over, there is a high possibility that ‘inappropriate’ comments have been removed and 
stirrers who post the ‘inappropriate’ comments have been blocked from candidates’ SNS pages. The 
comments which still appear on political figures’ SNS pages are what the political figures consider to be 
acceptable, which moves on to subsection 7.2.2 to examine the moderating of comments on political 
figures’ SNS pages.  
7.2.2. Moderating comments  
Following a political figure on SNSs reflects the followers’ interest in receiving political messages 
directly from their SNS pages. However, because some followers have set up SNS accounts to attack 
political figures’ images, not every follower on the digital vote-canvassing network follows political 
figures’ SNS pages with positive intentions. This means that the interaction and spreadability of content 
on SNSs does not guarantee the enhancement of political figures’ images due to stirrers interacting on 
candidates’ SNS pages. This raises the question of whether stirrers’ comments on political figures’ SNS 
pages should be moderated. Interviewees commented that unconstructive criticism of political figures 
posted on the political figures’ SNSs page will be moderated. 
We delete comments or just block people who come in to say ‘I hate you’, stupid comments or 
hate speech, we will delete that. Some negative comments, we will still live it in. So if you go in, 
you will still see lots of negative comments and people will fight it out. We just let them fight it 
out. But if it is something like ‘Hey you know what I hate you bla bla bla. I want to kill you and 
leave your wife.’ So stuff like that we do erase but we do keep negative regular comments… … 
This is not a web blog, this is a fan page, if you are not a fan, you should not join in the first place, 
so you have just leave it to let them have freedom of speech in other page. 
(Staff Member F)  
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I just block, delete, block, delete. If it is abusive, I report it. And they disappear. And those don’t 
mean anything to me at all. There are people who negatively comment in an intelligent way, and 
not an abusive way. And if I sense that they can be turned with proper explanation and proper 
information, I will take trouble writing, usually either on the wall or often in the inbox. I often 
click into their page, look at their profile. And in Thailand, it is very easy.  
(Politician A) 
Rather than attack you personally wherever you go, they just form the team in social media to 
come and attack you. So I think that is fair to block them. But if people have different opinion, I 
just simple, openly criticise let them criticise. That’s fine. I don’t care… … People could make 
negative comments because you have different opinion. That’s fine, I don’t block them. I never 
block them. But if I understand that you get paid to come and attack me, there is no reason why I 
have to open for you… … I would say negative does not mean negative in that negative way. It is 
like crime, it is like harassment, which I don’t think we have to promote. I think that is very bad 
and I think people are learning to use it in the wrong way. People learning to use social media in 
the wrong way, which I don’t think we need to support them. I don’t think we should support 
people that misbehave. If people in the class, misbehave in the class, shout in front of people and 
get paid to do that, it’s even worse. It is crime.  
      (Politician B) 
Another public relations personnel mentioned she also deletes comments which are against the monarch. 
Above interviewees explain their criteria in judging which comments or followers should be moderated, 
which these criteria are determined by the intention reflected in the comments. The judgment of whether a 
comment should be deleted or retained on SNSs might vary from one political figure to another but the 
regulation is done under the Section 14 and Section 15 of the Computer Crime Act B.C 2550 (2007), 
stated in subsection 2.3.3. Staff Member F stressed that a political figure’s SNS page is a ‘fan page’ and 
followers have positive intentions in connecting to the political figures’ networks. Politician A said that 
negative comments that are ‘intelligent’ will not be removed. However, individual comments which are 
considered as aggressive or hate speech are removed, and the followers are blocked. This content should 
not be encouraged on SNSs as it is abuse of political figures, and they viewed it as their right to defend 
themselves by removing the comments and blocking the senders. This shows that political figures or 
public relations personnel acknowledged that they read the comments and perceive them to be 
unconstructive. Such followers should not be part of political figures’ SNS networks. Thus, if political 
public relations in election campaign includes what Baines (2011) refers to ‘damaging the credibility of 
the opponents’ policy platform and leadership aspirations’ (p.116), then it could be said that stirrers who 
are followers of Thai political figures have used the interaction space on SNSs challenge Thai political 
figures.  
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On SNS pages managed by public relations personnel, it was briefly stated in Section 6.1 that they also 
played a role in managing critical comments on the political figures’ SNS pages. Whether to delete 
comments or not, public relations personnel would make a judgment based on how sincere the content is. 
Staff Member C said that if a comment reflects a strong intention to discredit the political figure or if the 
comment or question contains bad language, they would also delete it straight away because of the lack of 
manner and respect. This is because insincere critical comments could lead to other followers arguing 
with each other on SNSs, which is an unconstructive way of interaction on political figures’ SNS pages.  
Staff Member B went on to state that there were times when she wanted to scold followers, but she cannot 
do so. Staff Member C admitted that the staff has to be mindful with the communication on political 
figure’s SNS page in order to reduce the risk of people attacking each other. Also, the staff member saw 
no value in initiating issues which will make people argue on SNSs. Hence, the strategy was defined in 
terms of how they should communicate on behalf of the political figures on SNSs. However, difficulties 
arise when in judging who should be liable if public relations personnel posted ‘inappropriate’ content. 
Also, based on the fact that public relations personnel were acting on behalf of political figures on 
political figures’ SNSs page, it could be said that this is a form of using a fake identity on SNSs because 
the personnel are not the real political figure, even though the use of the fake identity is more intentional.  
If SNSs are perceived to be a space of deliberative democracy, it could be said that deliberative 
democracy in Thailand is developing on SNSs as political communication occurs within the scope of 
Computer Crime Act B.E. 2550 (2007) law to prevent damages on SNSs users, third party and national 
security. The regulation of political discussion occurs at individual level as political figures and their 
personnel regulate content and moderate followers according to cues such as the username, the time of 
posting and the ‘inappropriateness’ of the comment content. The lack of visual and audio identity of SNS 
users can make their the comments perceived to be less reliable (Baym, 2010). The removed political 
opinion tends to be unconstructive content associated with political polarisation in Thailand and the 
division between Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt demonstrators. As a result, political public relations on 
SNSs during the election campaign and political communication in general, is a new and individualistic 
information management process, where individual political figures also make their own judgments to 
determine and moderate unconstructive comments and followers who attempt to challenge their image.  
With reference to Aksarapaak (2013), this research also found that SNSs have broadened the democratic 
space of online political communication in Thailand, enabling citizens to publish diverse political 
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opinions. This also includes citizens abusing and challenging  the images of political figures on SNSs, 
which is similar to how SNSs are used for political communication in other context (Bailard, 2012; 
Chinnasamy and Griffiths, 2013; Gueorguieva, 2007; Harfoush, 2009; Leong, 2014; Rosyidah, 2015). 
However, the findings in this research on critical comments posted on political figures’ SNS pages are a 
development from previous research as there have been attempts to halt this free-flow of opinion as 
political figures and public relations personnel in Thailand moderate comments and followers They 
perceive it to be their right to remove ‘inappropriate’ content and disrespectful followers from their SNSs 
networks. Also, moderation of comments is required by law. Consequently, this might enable political 
communication on SNSs to be perceived as less democratic and not necessarily furthering deliberative 
aspects of political debate. Political figures and their public relations personnel attempt to expand digital 
vote-canvassing networks under the external forces of interaction on SNSs that tends to weaken their 
image on SNSs. The low barriers to initiating political communication on SNSs in Thailand have led to 
citizens having the opportunity to interact with political content, where different SNSs users are 
connected on political figures’ SNS pages with different intentions i.e. some are interested in interacting 
with the political figure, while others intend to directly attack political figures. The diversity of user-
generated content suggests that there is a wide spectrum of political opinion on SNSs. Political figures’ 
ownership of their SNS pages has allowed them to filter their followers and their comments.  
7.3. Storage of interaction challenging the regulation of election campaigns on 
SNSs  
When discussing the experience of candidates and public relations personnel in using SNSs for election 
campaigns, interviewees raised a few major concerns with regards to regulating election campaign 
content on SNSs. There were doubts in judging whether voluntary contributions of Thai celebrities to 
candidates’ SNS pages should be viewed as endorsements of candidates’ images. Difficulties arose in 
deciding if active followers who crowdsource on candidates’ SNSs during the election campaign should 
be considered as campaign staff of candidates. Furthermore, it seems to be a challenge to stop followers 
interacting with election campaign content when the campaign has come to an end to comply with 
election campaign rules. These issues are associated with the interaction and storage features that Baym 
(2010) proposes. The storage of campaign content on SNSs as well as the level of interaction by followers 
on SNSs have made regulating election campaigns on SNSs complex. The changes in the relationship 
between candidates and public relations personnel during the election campaign seem to also challenge 
candidates using SNSs under general election campaign rules. This section examines the concerns related 
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to political public relations issues that candidates and personnel experienced when using SNSs during the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign.  
7.3.1. Celebrity endorsements  
As stated in Chapter 2, the notion of ‘celebrity politicians’ has been apparent in United States and United 
Kingdom politics, where celebrities have become politicians or politicians have associated their image 
with celebrities to strengthen their image (Barron, 2015; Street, 2004, 2012). However, this research 
found that the notion of ‘celebrity politicians’ is very restricted in election campaigns in Thailand, 
particularly on SNSs, as Staff Member A expressed his concerns below.   
There is one regulation saying that it is forbidden to use celebrities, especially in the entertainment 
industry to help get votes. It seems that we meet many in the entertainment industry, writing that is 
writing their own comments saying that if they vote they will vote for Number (X) because of this 
and because of that. They write on their own personal Twitter and Facebook accounts. Will the 
Election Commission interpret that we are behind them or we suggested that they write? We will 
be giving a speech in Suan Lum and we are inviting people to come and listen to the policies. 
Everyone is willing to come. The question is, if a celebrity happens to take a photo and posts on 
Instagram and that star who posts a photo on Instagram has about 20,000 followers, will the 
Election Commission interpret that we are using celebrities to campaign for us. We do not take the 
photo that they posted, but they come and take a picture of our candidate, they come to listen to us, 
listen to our policies, then they post it themselves saying that they come to this event. 
 (Staff Member A)  
Celebrities in the entertainment industry are voters in the election. One of the concerns raised by Staff 
Member A was that if a celebrity gets involved in a candidate’s campaign by attending a public campaign 
speech or by sharing content on SNSs in relation to the candidate’s campaign, will the Election 
Commission consider such action to be the candidate employing the celebrity as part of the candidate’s 
campaign? With reference to the opinion of Street (2001 cited in Barron, 2015), politicians who use 
celebrities in the entertainment industry to support their image were ‘borrowing’ the popularity of 
relationship, trust, and admiration to associate it with their image. Hence, celebrities interacting on SNSs 
about a candidate’s campaign could be viewed as taking advantage of the celebrities’ image for the 
benefit of the specific candidate. Celebrity involvement could allow a candidate’s campaign to reach 
more SNS users, which is another way to expand the digital vote-canvassing network, with an attempt to 
influence voters’ voting decision.  
218 
 
As interaction on SNSs is stored and the social cues of the celebrities’ identity are revealed on SNSs, the 
storage of interaction on SNSs can be used as a tool to track celebrity involvement in candidate’s 
campaign and the way in which celebrities endorsed a candidate’s image on SNSs. Arguably, there is 
nothing wrong if celebrities get involved in candidate’s campaign based on free will, but difficulties arise 
in knowing whether the celebrity was paid. Celebrity participation in an individual candidate’s campaign 
can also be perceived as beneficial to that candidate’s image only while other candidates struggle to gain 
such advantage. 
Nevertheless, the key problem with this rule is still the fact that there is no clear explanation and 
judgement on public figures such as celebrities in the entertainment industry to use their own SNS pages 
cannot get involved in a candidate’s campaign in Thailand even though there is a clear statement stated by 
the Election Commission on which types of public figure are not allowed to be involved in campaigns. 
Also, with reference to the roles of and relationships between candidates and their personnel, this raises 
the question of who should be responsible for celebrity interaction in candidates’ campaigns on SNSs.  
7.3.2. Crowdsourcing  
Chapter 6 showed how candidates gave prominence to encouraging followers to interact with their SNS 
pages. Another major concern seemed to be with followers getting involved in crowdsourcing or 
designing visual images in relation to the candidate’s campaign, where the images were then posted on 
SNS pages for further interaction to occur, raising the question if such followers should be considered as 
the campaign staff of the candidate.  
We will let our supporters make billboard/sign by themselves and take a photo. Some people make 
a sign as (product) and write Number (X), and they send a photo for us to see. The issue is will the 
regulator say that counts them as campaigners because they are the people who made the sign. We 
said they are normal supporters. They have a regulation that there can be no more than 500 
campaigners per candidate. There are many of our supporters doing this. It’s like the question 
whether sometimes we have to ask our supporters to stop. We do not know how the regulator will 
interpret that everyone is a supporter voter by free will – don’t know.  
    (Staff Member A)  
The Election Commission announced on 26 December 2012 that the limit on the number of campaign 
staff assisting one candidate is 500. Candidates have to report the names and total number of people 
helping the candidate in the election campaign and provide a copy of their Identification Card to the 
219 
 
Election Commission for the Bangkok gubernatorial election, at least five days in advance 
32. Staff 
Member A was anxious about followers designing visual images for candidates and posting them on 
SNSs. As one of a candidate’s campaign strategies on SNSs was to encourage supporters to raise 
awareness of the candidate’s number by designing or capturing things which contain the candidate’s 
number, supporters have been playing an active role in showing their support and creativity in this, which 
raises the question of whether these followers are considered as campaign staff working for the candidate 
during the election campaign. In further investigation of M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook 
pages, what was interesting about these two candidates’ Facebook pages was that M.R. Sukhumbhand 
posted images that were designed with his supporters, as shown in Figure 7.1 (below). M.R. 
Sukhumbhand also acknowledged his followers’ names by tagging them on Facebook while there was no 
evidence of this on Pongsapat’s Facebook page.  
 
  
Figure 7.1: Examples of visual images created by M.R. Sukhumbhand’s followers. M.R. Sukhumbhand’s posted 
these two images on 14 February (left image) and 28 February 2013 (right image) (ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพนัธุ ์ บริพตัร [M.R. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 2013l, 2013o). 
                                                             
32
 cited from “เปิดสนามเลือกตั้งผูว้า่ราชการกรุงเทพมหานคร (วนัอาทิตยท์ี ่3 มีนาคม 2556)… [Open the field of the Bangkok gubernatorial election 
(Sunday 3rd March 2013)…],” n.d.). 
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As shown in Figure 7.1, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s supporters participated in his campaign on Facebook by 
designing images related to M.R. Sukhumbhand’s campaign, and these pictures were posted on M.R. 
Sukhumbhand’s Facebook page by his staff. From the perspective of the candidate at the centre of the 
election campaign on SNSs, if candidates initiated and continuously encouraged followers to design 
images relating to candidate’s campaign, it could be said candidates implicitly perceived followers as 
digital vote-canvassers, as argued in Chapter 6. When candidates post the visual images designed by 
followers on their SNS pages, the visual images could increase the spreadability of candidate’s campaign 
on SNSs. This information was posted and remained stored as evidence to show that the candidate 
initiated the participation. In this case, it could be said that the candidate had to take the responsibility for 
considering followers to be part of their digital vote-canvassing network.   
Arguably, like the discussion on celebrity participation, it could be said that there is nothing wrong if 
followers are designing and posting visual images related to candidate’s campaign and if they were doing 
this voluntarily, meaning that the candidate did not initiate or show any support for such acts. These are 
active followers who are consuming campaign content on SNSs and at the same time are creating content 
in relation to the candidate’s campaign. This way of showing support is similar to writing a message to 
express an opinion about the candidate’s campaign and posting it on the candidate’s or a follower’s SNS 
page. Regardless of whether the candidate asked followers to do thus, they would still do it if they are 
willing to show their support in this way. However, Chapter 5 argued that visual images are more 
spreadable than textual content, so visual images are more conspicuous in election campaigns on SNSs. 
When visual images are published on SNSs, they are stored and can be used as evidence when Election 
Commission examines crowdsourcing issues.   
7.3.3. Terminating election campaigns on SNSs  
Another regulatory issue of SNS campaigns in the 2013 Bangkok Governor campaign concerned making 
the election campaign on SNSs come to an ‘end.’ Staff Member A raised this concern, which was 
supported by the Facebook posts made by both M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat found in content 
analysis as shown below:  
There is a regulation issue. There are regulations: we can do this; we cannot do that. Even the 
regulator is still confused. Suppose that we have to stop campaigning 24 hours before the election, 
and suppose on our fan page one person shares something, is he wrong? We have to ask the 
Election Commission if this is wrong. This is an obstacle because the regulators are not doing this, 
we have to be the ones to announce to our voters and supporters that they cannot do this. For us, 
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we will close all our pages 24 hours before the election, all activities, and we will disable 
everything. But here we are afraid of the things that people share, or what they write to each other 
and this is something that we are careful of. This is a personal issue, and they are at risk. But the 
Election Commission has to make an announcement. This is an obstacle. Should the Election 
Commission make an announcement? Because there will be a lot this year and everyone is using 
forward mail, now there is beginning to be forward mail coming to me. Many groups and parties 
forward mail on that night or 24 hours before the election. Is that right or is that wrong and who is 
at risk? 
    (Staff Member A)  
 
 
Figure 7.2: Announcements made by the public relations personnel of M.R. Sukhumbhand (left) and Pongsapat 
(right) to officially end the election campaign on SNSs on the evening of the day before the election, posted on 2 
March 2013 (พงศพศั พงษ์เจริญ [Pongsapat Pongcharoen], 2013m; ม.ร.ว.สุขุมพนัธุ์ บริพตัร [M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra], 
2013m).  
 On the evening of 2 March 2013, the final day of the election campaign, both M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and 
Pongsapat’s public relations personnel made announcements on the candidates’ Facebook pages that they 
were terminating the election campaign, as shown in Figure 7.2.  M.R. Sukhumbhand mentioned that he 
would stop publicising any information until 12 midnight on 3 March 2013.  M.R. Sukhumbhand asked 
readers not to ‘Like/Comment/Share’ in order to follow the rules of the election. Pongsapat in particular 
referred to the rule as stated by the Election Commission, that every candidate must end their campaign 
by 18:00 on the day before the election. Also, Pongsapat said the candidate, political party and campaign 
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team will not be liable if anyone breaches this rule. Therefore, in order to avoid this problem, they are 
making an official announcement as proof that they informed the public.  
The official announcement made on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and Pongsapat’s Facebook pages to end their 
election campaign on SNSs and the way in which Staff Member A quoted above stated his concern on 
this issue shows that ending the election campaign at the stated time is enormously serious. There was an 
official date to start the election campaign (21 January 2013), and there was also an official date and time 
to stop it (2 March 2013, 18:00). There are a few key problems with ending election campaigns on SNSs. 
Firstly, followers might think that there is nothing wrong with interacting continuously online because 
interaction or discussion about candidates’ campaign on SNSs after the official end of the election 
campaign can be viewed similarly to face-to-face conversations. However, problems arise when 
interaction and discussion on SNSs is stored as evidence of the interaction, the content, participants and 
time. Secondly, from followers’ point of view, terminating the election campaign could be considered a 
sudden act. Followers have been continuously receiving, interacting and spreading campaign messages 
from candidates’ SNS pages. Hence, they might feel it odd that the campaigns to come to an end after a 
last-minute announcement. This raises the question of whether SNSs should be an exception to the 
official end to the election campaign as SNSs are highly decentralised platforms of communication where 
a large number of voters and followers are connected.  
Finally, it seems clear that only the Election Commission, candidates and their public relations personal 
or campaign staff were aware of this rule. The Election Commission enforces this rule while candidates 
and their public relations personnel were responsible for candidates’ activities during the election 
campaign. Posting a message to end election campaign activities on M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and 
Pongsapat’s Facebook pages implies that some followers might not be aware of this rule. There is also the 
question of how many voters would see this rule, taking into consideration that Facebook news feeds are 
constantly replaced by new news feeds on SNSs user’s timeline (Dubrofsky, 2011). It is also debatable to 
what extent followers would understand or obey such rule. Also, it is unknown who would be liable if 
interaction on SNSs occurred after the official end of the election campaign.  
 
Pirongrong (2001) argues that regulating internet content in Thailand is not a ‘stand-alone value’ in the 
context of children using the internet inappropriately e.g. chatting with stranger,  and different sectors are 
involved and responsible for monitoring children using the internet. From here it could be said that 
regulating campaign content on SNSs is also not a ‘stand-alone value.’ It should be made clear who is 
223 
 
liable for unexpected violations of the rules stated by the Election Commission. Political parties, 
candidates and their staff were trying show responsibility while using SNSs to disseminate and receive 
messages during the election campaign. However, even if candidates followed the stated rules as 
announced by the Election Commission, there might be other acts performed by voters or competitors that 
are related to the candidate’s campaign, which can put a candidate’s campaign at risk. Chapter 6 noted 
that the role of public relations personnel and their relationship with candidates and digital vote-
canvassing networks seems to be problematic, taking into consideration of the various complexities of 
election campaigns on SNSs found in this section. Public relations personnel appear to be at risk in 
ensuring that the operation of candidates’ SNS pages does not breach any election campaign rule. If 
political figures managed their own SNS pages, they would be fully responsible for the operation of their 
SNS pages.  
 
Based on the three issues examined in this section (celebrity participation, crowdsourcing and interaction 
occurring after the official end election campaign), it could be said that regulating election campaigns on 
SNSs was something new in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election. The interaction functions of SNSs 
challenge with the unclear rules and the objective of terminating the election campaigns on SNSs. 
Regulating election campaigns seems incompatible with how SNSs function as SNSs users interact and 
spread campaign content on their own volition. In other words, election campaign rule was not 
specifically defined for candidates to campaign on SNSs. As candidates’ SNS networks expanded during 
the election campaign, the candidate was not in control of how and when each follower would interact on 
SNSs in relation to the campaign content posted by the candidate. Thus, the Election Commission might 
need to develop explicit rules for campaigning on SNSs. The storage feature of SNSs was a major 
concern as it can be used to track interaction based on who interacted, how they interacted and the time 
that they interacted, and this information can be used to show SNSs users breaching election campaign 
rules.  
Conclusion  
The main objective of this chapter was to discuss the challenges of political public relations on SNSs in 
Thai political communication and during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. It was 
found that having SNSs as another channel of political communication and election campaign, there are 
issues concerning the potential contribution to the emergence of deliberative democracy on SNSs in 
Thailand. In reviewing Thai politicians’ experience of using SNSs to communicate directly with followers, 
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the decentralisation of political communication on SNSs can deepen the political polarisation in Thailand 
as political figures have their own channel of communication to build direct and close relationship with 
followers to manipulate their followers. At the same, interaction on political figures’ SNSs page is a way 
to develop deliberative democracy. Some followers challenge political figures’ image by setting up SNSs 
accounts to write unconstructive criticism on politician figures’ SNSs page, which political figures and 
public relations personnel work to moderate comments and stirrers in order to maintain political figures’ 
images and minimise arguments among followers. In terms of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election in 
particular, difficulties arises when attempting to conform the candidate’s social networking usage in 
relation to the rule of the election campaign. Problems associated with interaction on SNSs during 
election campaign were related to celebrity participation on SNSs, crowdsourcing and interaction 
occurring after the official end of the election campaign.  
On the question of how SNSs challenge political public relations during political communication and the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, this chapter argues that the features of SNSs have 
challenged political figures’ image management, the dissemination of messages and internal operation on 
SNSs. Even though the decentralisation of communication on SNSs was a channel to establish and build 
relationship between the Thai political figures and followers, communication on SNSs for political 
purpose lays under the contestation of interaction and storage of content on SNSs, which political figures 
and public relations personnel constantly managed the SNSs page for political figures’ interest. As 
interaction on SNSs is not restricted to time, interaction on SNSs can extend message to reach other SNSs 
users at anytime and anywhere.  
The political mediation on SNSs in the third age of political communication in Thailand is still a new and 
developing channel of communication and management. Based on relationship between candidate and 
public relations personnel and followers, it is contentious to judge who is liable for issues associating with 
political public relations on SNSs. Although public relations personnel know how the emergence of SNSs 
in Thailand can be beneficial to election campaigns, the skills of public relations personnel cannot fully 
tackle the external factors affecting candidates’ image and the dissemination of campaign messages 
during the election campaign within a set framework. What public relations personnel did was to 
safeguard the candidate’s campaign by publicly acknowledging that they are aware of the election 
campaign rules, but they will not be responsible for what happens beyond their control.  
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Chapter 8 :  Conclusion 
This research set out to explore the operation of political public relations work on SNSs in Thailand, with 
a particular focus on Facebook as the platform of communication and the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election campaign as the context of study. This research used multimodal analysis to examine candidates’ 
management of policy-related posts and their selection of visual images uploaded onto their Facebook 
profile picture and cover pages. This is to determine the patterns of communication between the 
candidates and their followers during the election campaign. Also, interviews with Thai politicians, 
candidates and public relations personnel of the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign were also 
conducted, seeking to further examine the management of the relationship between candidate, public 
relations personnel and followers, and to discuss the challenges of using SNSs for political 
communication and election campaign.  
With reference to Baym's (2010) seven concepts of analysing media (interactivity, temporal structure, 
social cues, stored, replicated, reach and mobility), this research found that political public relations on 
Facebook during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign consisted of the broad elements and 
activities of political public relations defined by McNair (2011) and Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011). The 
activities of information management, image management, media management and internal 
communication that McNair (2011) proposes, and the relationship management through purposeful 
communication and action that Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) offer, remained significant in exploring 
political public relations on Facebook during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. When 
applying the political public relations activities to Facebook, McNair’s analysis on four activities is not 
sufficient in understanding the way candidates and public relations personnel manage the visual images 
and campaign information on candidates’ Facebook pages, but it is important to refer to relationship 
management that Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) offer. The relationship between candidate, public 
relations personnel, candidates’ followers and followers’ friends on Facebook is significant in interacting 
and spreading candidate’s campaign and dealing with challenges that emerge in the digital vote-
canvassing networks. Also, with regards to Rhum's (1996) definition of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’,  
election campaigns on SNSs a modern way of campaigning that has developing in relation with 
traditional ways of campaigning in Thai political culture. Below is a summary of the findings of this 
research. 
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In terms of image management in political public relations on Facebook, M.R. Sukhumbhand’s and 
Pongsapat’s campaign on Facebook encompassed textual framing and visual framing, whereby both 
candidates balanced their individualistic image with their political party’s image. Although in the 
Bangkok gubernatorial election, the image was focused on the candidate (Surapongse, 2002), M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat significantly associated their campaigns on Facebook with their political 
parties. M.R. Sukhumbhand portrayed an individual approach to implementing policy and acknowledged 
how politicians of the Democrat Party give credit to and supported his policy while Pongsapat 
communicated the policy approach of working with the government seamlessly. Nevertheless, with the 
use of Grabe and Bucy's (2013) framework to analyse both candidates’ visual images on Facebook, both 
candidates’ Facebook profile pictures were similar in portraying their individual images as ordinary 
people using Facebook to campaign and approach potential followers. There was no sign of candidates’ 
Facebook profile pictures to symbolise their social status, education or career background. The visual 
image of both candidates’ Facebook cover pages portrayed the broader aspects of the candidates’ image 
and public recognition, which contain a mixture of statesmanship, ordinariness, popularity and the 
compassionate frame. Being party-based candidates, both had also framed their statesmanship image by 
using politicians of the same political party to endorse their campaign. Also, this research found that when 
adopting Grabe and Bucy's (2013) framework to analyse the candidates’ Facebook cover pages, it was 
important to code signs related to a specific platform of communication, the type of election and culture. 
The management and integration of the different signs associated with the candidates’ individualistic 
images and party-based images can increase the credibility and spreadability of the candidates’ campaigns 
on Facebook, which enabled the candidates to relate and stretch their campaigns to voters who vote based 
on individual images and party-based images.  
‘Information management’ was another element of political public relations on Facebook during the 2013 
Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign and was associated with the management of candidates’ policy-
related agendas on Facebook as a way for candidates to develop a relationship with their followers by 
communicating their campaigns under the challenge of data movement of Facebook posts. M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used different tactics to engage and facilitate followers’ interpretation of 
their policy on Facebook through the election campaign, attempting to make followers optimistic about 
their policy, as well as to encourage followers to interact and spread their campaign to other Facebook 
users. With reference to Baym (2010), this research found that the mobility and the temporal structure of 
Facebook allowed real-time synchronisation between candidates’ offline campaigns with their Facebook 
pages, where M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used Facebook as a platform to centralise their election 
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campaigns. Textual content and visual images posted on both candidates’ Facebook pages were a 
combination of their reports about offline campaigning and messages that candidates were 
communicating specifically to their followers. Also, as part of information management, M.R. 
Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat used their Facebook pages to centralise the activity of ‘media management’ 
in political public relations. Mainstream media can access candidate’s campaign information directly 
from candidates’ Facebook pages and followers also can get candidates’ activities associated with 
mainstream media directly from candidates’ Facebook pages. This reflects recognition of candidates by 
the mainstream media and to facilitate followers gaining a broader perspective of candidate’s campaign 
by accessing another medium platform.  
During the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election, followers connected to candidates’ Facebook pages 
consisted of swing voters, voters who were supportive of candidates’ campaign, non-voters who were 
interested in candidates’ campaigns, and Facebook users who intend to challenge candidates’ images 
during the election campaign. Taking into consideration of the diversity of followers on Facebook, the 
composition and publication of candidates’ posts were rephrased and developed throughout the election 
campaign. With reference to Boonlert's (2015b) finding on the voting behaviour of swing voters in the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, this research found that candidates became more policy-
orientated during the second half of the election campaign to correspond with voting behaviour of swing 
voters and the peak of the election campaign. A significant feature of information management on 
candidates’ Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign was, therefore, 
determining the most important phase and day of the election campaign to introduce and emphasise 
candidates’ policy-related agendas on Facebook in order to manipulate voters’ voting behaviour.  
The establishment and development of digital vote-canvassing networks encompasses the relationship 
between candidates and public relations personnel in the backdoor operation and internal communication 
of candidates’ Facebook pages, and the relationship between candidate, public relations personnel, 
followers and followers’ friends on Facebook. These digital networks operated with the same objective as 
traditional vote-canvassing networks in Thai political culture, where the fundamental objective is to 
secure votes through the development of a relationship between candidates, but in the digital form the 
relationship is established with followers of candidates on SNSs. Also, even though the relationship was 
online, candidates still tried to establish an equal, individualistic, close and direct relationship with their 
followers on their Facebook pages, with the integration of the phi nong relationship, based on the way 
candidates communicated with their followers or interacted with offline voters, reflecting the candidates’ 
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approachable and fraternal personalities. The ongoing posting of Facebook posts in the candidates’ 
campaigns allowed followers to be more attached to them. Through the quality of ‘connectedness’ and 
Facebook algorithms (Van Dijck, 2013), followers’ interaction with candidates’ campaigns could also 
expand and spread the digital vote-canvassing networks, enabling more Facebook users to be exposed to 
candidates’ campaigns. New relationship is established between candidates and new followers as new 
followers connect to candidate’s Facebook page, which means that candidate’s image management and 
information management on Facebook has to take into consideration on new followers who might not 
have much information about candidates’ campaign since the beginning of the election campaign. 
However, regardless of the strength or weakness of the relationship between candidates and SNSs users 
during the election campaign, there was nothing to guarantee that SNSs users would vote for the 
candidate on the day of the election.  
While some have indicated the deliberative potential of SNSs, this thesis has found some limitations, 
which includes the way the open exchange of ideas is restricted or controlled. The operation of the 
candidates’ SNS pages also encompasses the way candidates and their public relations personnel dealt 
with external factors challenging the candidates’ campaign. The use of SNSs for political purposes has 
been challenged by the interaction and storage features of SNSs. Political communication and election 
campaigns on SNSs have been more anonymous as followers have hidden their identity. Due to the low 
barrier of entry to access SNSs, it has been easier for people who have access to SNSs to challenge 
political figures’ images. The way followers comment about political figures can be misleading and 
regulation on inappropriate content was therefore necessary. Also, one cannot determine whether the 
election campaign rules allows crowdsourcing on SNSs and whether voluntary celebrity interaction on 
SNSs was appropriate during election campaigns. It was challenging to terminate interaction and the 
interchangeability of digital vote-canvassing networks. Thus, regardless of the trust that candidates gave 
to their public relations personnel, the professionalism and expertise of public relations personnel are still 
at risk of being liable for any unexpected issues that occur on candidates’ SNSs pages. However, if 
candidates fully manage their own SNS pages, it is likely that they would be in control and take full 
responsibility for any decisions associated with their SNSs page. The regular political communication 
performed by Thai politicians’ SNSs develops a relationship and accrues support from followers in the 
long-term, for the political purpose of gaining votes in the election. 
This research has provided comprehensive information about political public relations using SNSs in the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, based on internal operations, management of campaign 
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information, candidate image, the spreadability of content on SNSs through the relationships developed 
between the candidate, public relations personnel and followers and the risks and challenges of using 
SNSs for election campaigns. The political public relations activities offered by McNair (2011) did not 
occur independently, but each activity co-existed during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign on Facebook in order for candidates to develop relationship with their followers. SNSs as Thai 
political figure’s own channel of communication are still fundamental for Thai political figures to 
maximise positive coverage about themselves in the mainstream media to communicate with Thai voters 
who do not follow them on Facebook, but at the same time, election campaigning and political 
communication on SNSs is also ‘free media’ in the way that users do not have to pay to register for an 
SNS account, but they would need to have the tools, skills and time to use digital technology. Election 
campaigning on SNSs requires the employment of public relations personnel who can give advice and 
also manage candidates’ SNS pages during the election campaign. When applying McNair’s definition of 
political public relations and activity of political public relations to SNSs, the relevance of political public 
relations on SNSs is still based on the management and operation of a political figure’s or political party’s 
SNS account, as a free medium, to communicate with followers in a way to construct a positive image of 
the politician or party.  
Digital vote-canvassing networks on Facebook are developed through the relationships among Facebook 
users. The analysis of digital vote-canvassing networks in this research is based on Strömbäck and 
Kiousis's (2011) definition of political public relations as ‘the management process by which an 
organisation or individual actor for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, 
seeks to influence and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its 
key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals’ (p.8). When M.R. Sukhumbhand and 
Pongsapat communicated on their Facebook pages during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
campaign, the campaign content, regardless of whether it was policy or non-policy-related content, was 
composed beyond the idea of advertising. The way they introduced their background and expressed their 
suitability as Bangkok governor allowed followers to know more about the candidates than the messages 
that voters got from candidates’ campaign billboards and brochures. The management of campaign 
content through the ongoing publication of their policies and the continuous updates of their campaign 
schedules enabled followers to feel that they were part of the candidate’s campaign based on the way they 
are engaged with the news feeds of the candidate’s campaigns on Facebook and the way they further 
interact or spread candidates’ campaign.  
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When election campaigning becomes less formal, communication between candidates and followers is 
similar to what Politician A expressed ‘as if it was something spoken by a friend.’ Such relationship 
between candidates and followers on Facebook is different from patron-client relations in Thai political 
culture in rural areas and it is also different from conventional image of political culture. Candidates 
campaigning on Facebook do not necessary meet the financial needs of followers, who might or might not 
be voters in the election. But the relationship between the candidate and followers was managed in a 
strategic way to keep each other up to date with policies and opinions within a short period of time during 
the election campaign. Furthermore, the relationship between politicians and followers for political 
communication on SNSs in general was also managed in a strategic way as followers know more about 
politicians than the politician’s policies and political opinion.  The relationships between candidates and 
followers on Facebook go beyond the Thai political culture of phi nong or sibling relationships mentioned 
by Sanit (1994). Candidates not only address followers as phi nong but the ‘close’ relationship between 
the two parties getting to know about each other on a regular basis during the election campaign.  This 
relationship is developed for the purpose of election campaigning. After the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial 
election, Pongsapat posted a message to thank everyone who voted for him and his Facebook page was 
inactive from then, whereas M.R. Sukhumbhand still communicated with his followers from time to time 
on Facebook, but not as often as during the election campaign. As a result of the relationship between 
candidates and followers, the campaign networks on Facebook were able to develop into larger networks 
if followers interacted or spread the candidates’ campaigns.  
Research contributions  
This study had made a few noteworthy informational and methodological contributions to the research 
field of political public relations on SNSs in Thailand.  
Firstly, this research serves as a base for future studies on campaign information content on SNSs during 
election campaigns. The results of multimodal analysis have revealed the management process and the 
integration of different types of content to establish momentum in election campaigns on SNSs, to 
develop a relationship with followers and to facilitate followers’ understanding of their campaign. The 
framing analysis of visual images developed a flexible framework for semiotic analysis of visual images 
uploaded onto candidates’ Facebook pages. Researchers should take into consideration different platforms 
of communication, elections, and cultures and the occurrence of overlapping frames in one visual image.  
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Secondly, this research enhances our understanding of the operation of Thai political figures’ SNS pages, 
associated with the roles and management relationship among individuals connected to political figures’ 
SNS pages that established and developed digital vote-canvassing networks. This knowledge is 
significant in maximising the spreadability of campaign messages through interaction among SNSs users. 
Thirdly, findings in this research add to a growing body of literature on problems in regulating 
communication on SNSs for political public relations purposes in Thailand in response to the spreadable 
and interactive features of SNSs. This research raises awareness of the challenges that election campaign 
on SNSs can create with the risk of candidates being disqualified due to the lack of specific election 
campaign rules to deal with SNSs as an additional channel of election campaign communication. 
Finally, the combination of research methods i.e. multimodal analysis and elite interviews, has also added 
to the growing literature on how exploratory research about political public relations on SNSs should be 
conducted, providing relevance in validating the above research findings. The quantitative results 
generated and presented have provided this research with an overall picture of data collected, while 
qualitative data further demonstrated the complexities based on issues and concerns raised by the 
interviewees. The interviewees interviewed in this research provided useful knowledge on their expertise, 
experiences and challenges of using SNSs for election campaigns and political communication in 
Thailand. The use of interviews in this study was an appropriate choice to explore into political public 
relations on SNSs in Thailand. The study of both political communication in Thailand in general and the 
2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign in particular, verified and integrated data collected and 
produced in-depth analysis of the issues examined.  
Limitation of this thesis and suggestions for future research  
There were a few limitations in this research. Firstly, the sample of multimodal analysis was focused on 
the two main party-based candidates in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election i.e. M.R. Sukhumbhand 
from the Democrat Party and Pongsapat from the Pheu Thai Party. During the election campaign, other 
independent candidates also made use of Facebook, and future research can examine independent 
candidates to gain a wider perspective of how they operate and manage their SNSs page to compete for 
power. Secondly, the data from the multimodal analysis of the two candidates’ Facebook pages were not 
collected during the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign. This was due to the lack of 
knowledge in finding software or a research methodology that could download and capture the candidates’ 
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Facebook posts. Only six months after the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign, the researcher 
was introduced to Nvivo 10 by a Ph.D. friend. Nvivo 10 offers the NCapture tool to download 
interactions on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube as a dataset. By the time researcher used Nvivo 10 to 
download the two candidates’ Facebook pages, some content had been moderated or filtered, restricting 
the full access to candidates’ Facebook pages, especially critical comments or questions which candidates 
might have deleted from their Facebook pages. Finally, the researcher only managed to interview one 
party-based public relations staff member in addition to other public relations personnel of independent 
candidates who were interviewed in this research.  
This research did not examine whether election campaign or political communication on SNSs have direct 
impact on voting decision. Candidates use other media to campaign in additional to SNSs and followers 
receive campaign information on SNSs as well as other media. Thus, the study on the impact of 
communicating on SNSs on voting decision is rather unjustifiable. As stated by other scholars, political 
information on television remains to be the main source of political communication in Thailand (Nalinee 
and Brown, 2006; Pimonpan and Pirongrong, 2013). Also, this research did not go into detail to discuss 
about deliberative democracy and also did not go into detail to examine the outer layers of the digital 
vote-canvassing networks to find out the relationship between different SNSs users and the probability of 
SNSs users spreading campaign content further along the digital vote-canvassing network. Thus future 
research can use deliberative democracy as a concept to explore the interaction tools on SNSs and the 
strong and weak relationships among followers, particularly Twitter users. Nvivo 11 can produce social 
grams to represent Twitter users’ relationship, which can facilitate research in this field to gain a better 
understanding of the expansion of digital vote-canvassing networks during election campaigns in 
Thailand. Interviews can also be conducted with followers to examine their views and motivation to use 
SNSs for Bangkok Gubernatorial election. Widening the scope of studying digital vote-canvassing 
networks could enhance our understanding of the plausibility of campaign messages reaching SNSs users 
who are not directly connected to political figures’ SNS pages. 
The concept of ‘political public relations’ remains significant in studying the use of SNSs in election 
campaigns. However, future research can consider integrating the concept of ‘political public relations’ 
with the concept of ‘political marketing’ in studying the operation of SNSs in election campaigns in 
Thailand. Political public relations activities on SNSs allow candidates to manage their human resources 
and campaign content on SNSs in order to utilise SNSs to their full potential. On the other hand, the 
model of political marketing proposed by Newman (1994) examines the exchange process between the 
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political leadership of the candidate and the votes of the citizens based on the research and polls done by 
the candidate and political party to formulate policy according to candidate’s market/voter segmentation. 
Newman’s model of political marketing integrates four components into a single political marketing 
framework, made up of 1. candidate focus; 2. the marketing campaign; 3. environmental focus 4. the 
political campaign. Newman used this framework to explain how the presidential candidates were 
marketing themselves in the 1992 Presidential election in the United States. In the Thai context,   
Nanthana (2006) used Newman’s political marketing framework to analyse the Thai Rak Thai campaigns 
in the 2001 and 2005 general elections in Thailand, and Kalan (2005) suggests ‘rebranding’ the Democrat 
Party through the use of political marketing. The use of political marketing would enable future research 
on SNSs to examine how candidates and their policy teams determine the types and patterns of publishing 
policies on candidates’ SNS pages and how the features of interaction and polls conducted by campaign 
staff are used to develop candidates’ policies. The integration of political public relations and political 
marketing in studying SNSs would allow future research to examine both the development of the 
relationships in digital vote-canvassing networks and the strategic formulation of policy that candidates 
intend to market in order to establish an electoral tie with SNS users.  
This thesis argues that the political public relations work carried out via Facebook during the 2013 
election campaign consisted of a new and complex process of managing the coordination and 
dissemination of campaign content and visual images on Facebook, and managing human resources and 
relationships. With the primary objective of using Facebook as another platform for communication to 
reach and influence voters, the election campaign content posted on candidates’ Facebook pages has to be 
as spreadable as possible to increase the interchangeability of the digital vote-canvassing networks and 
strengthen the probability of voters voting for the candidate. The construction of candidates’ images and 
the publication of campaign content required careful management and integration of different signs in 
Thai archetypes and global images to portray party-based candidates from an individualistic perspective 
as well as from the political party perspective.  
From the perspectives of political figures and public relations personnel, election campaign and political 
communication on SNS have an impact on the relationship between political figures and followers on 
SNSs based on the information and visual images that are posted on political figures SNSs page and 
based on followers interacting on the content. The establishment and development of relationship between 
the two parties leads to the possibility for political figures to gain votes or support on what political 
figures do. The development of relationships among people connected to the digital vote-canvassing 
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networks was integrated through the coordination and dissemination of campaign content on Facebook to 
enhance the electoral ties between candidates and voters, and for candidates and public relations 
personnel to confront the difficulties of using Facebook for the election campaign.   
Election campaign and political communication on SNSs is still emerging in Thailand and has the 
potential to attract and motivate more political figures to use SNSs as additional channels of 
communication in the future. This research is significant in guiding political figures and public relations 
personnel to use SNSs mindfully and appropriately to maximise the benefits of SNSs in disseminating 
messages, constructing images through the development of digital vote-canvassing networks, and to be 
aware of the issues and concerns about the functions of SNSs that could possibility put them at risk. 
Management of content on SNSs is not sufficient to operate SNSs. But the management of relationship 
between candidate, public relations personnel, followers and followers’ friends is also fundamental to 
digital vote-canvassing network. 
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Appendix 1: Results of 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election campaign 
(percentage of votes gained by M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat)  
 
 
 
  
Mom Rajawongse 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra  
Police General Doctor 
Pongsapat Pongcharoen 
คะแนนรวมทกุเขต (Total votes 
from every district)  
1,256,349 46.26% 1,077,899 39.69% 
คลองเตย (Khlong Toei) 22,060 49.08% 16,516 36.75% 
คลองสาน (Klong San) 21,089 55.62% 11,088 29.25% 
คลองสามวา (Klong Sam Wa) 35,051 43.40% 35,758 44.28% 
คนันายาว (Khan Na Yao) 18,042 42.09% 19,137 44.64% 
จตุจกัร (Chatuchak)  38,766 47.74% 31,227 38.46% 
จอมทอง (Chom Thong)  33,968 45.70% 29,458 39.63% 
ดอนเมือง (Don Mueang) 28,092 35.46% 40,073 50.58% 
ดินแดง (Din Daeng)  29,484 46.46% 25,297 39.86% 
ดุสิต (Dusit)  17,386 37.64% 21,818 47.23% 
ตล่ิงชนั (Taling Chan)  23,504 42.98% 22,704 41.52% 
ทวีวฒันา (Thawi Watthana)  20,559 49.53% 15,009 36.16% 
ทุ่งครุ (Thung Khru)  27,081 47.87% 21,416 37.86% 
ธนบุรี (Thon Buri)  28,279 49.23% 20,235 35.22% 
บางเขน (Bang Khen)  37,591 40.06% 43,024 45.84% 
บางแค (Bang Kae) 44,419 46.35% 37,430 39.06% 
บางกอกใหญ่ (Bangkok Yai)  17,393 47.70% 13,046 35.78% 
บางกอกนอ้ย (Bangkok Noi)  26,695 47.57% 20,510 36.55% 
บางกะปิ (Bang Kapi) 35,581 49.96% 26,330 36.97% 
บางขุนเทียน (Bang Khun Thian) 33,989 44.10% 32,378 42.01% 
บางคอแหลม (Bang Kho Laem)  25,107 56.79% 12,977 29.35% 
บางซ่ือ (Bang Sae)  26,781 42.71% 27,070 43.17% 
บางนา (Bang Na)  21,764 48.63% 16,651 37.21% 
บางบอน (Bang Bon)  22,934 46.03% 19,731 39.60% 
บางพลดั (Bang Phlat)  22,877 44.95% 20,244 39.78% 
บางรัก (Bang Rak)  13,632 62.70% 4,824 22.19% 
บึงกุม่ (Bueng Kum)  33,679 45.76% 29,737 40.41% 
ปทุมวนั (Pathum Wan)  13,242 55.26% 7,265 30.32% 
ประเวศ (Prawet)  34,919 47.93% 28,514 39.14% 
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Mom Rajawongse 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra  
Police General Doctor 
Pongsapat Pongcharoen 
ป้อมปราบศตัรูพ่าย (Pom Prap 
Sattru Phai)  
14,837 60.92% 5,890 24.19% 
พญาไท (Phaya Thai)  17,254 47.41% 13,559 37.25% 
พระโขนง (Phra Khanong)  23,346 50.86% 16,173 35.24% 
พระนคร (Pra Nakhon)  15,074 53.69% 8,854 31.54% 
ภาษีเจริญ (Phasi Charoen)  28,009 43.08% 27,327 42.04% 
มีนบุรี (Min Buri)  28,744 44.75% 27,327 42.54% 
ยานนาวา (Yan Nawa)  21,359 56.16% 11,148 29.31% 
ราชเทวี (Ratchathewi)  14,841 48.34% 11,216 36.53% 
ราษฏร์บูรณะ (Rat Burana)  17,625 43.07% 17,305 42.28% 
ลาดกระบงั (Lat Krabang)  25,450 34.14% 39,007 52.32% 
ลาดพร้าว (Lat Phrao) 29,690 47.18% 24,717 39.28% 
วงัทองหลาง (Wang Thonglang)  26,437 48.52% 20,645 37.89% 
วฒันา (Watthana)  19,877 61.70% 8,179 25.39% 
สวนหลวง (Suan Luang)  29,803 54.21% 17,758 32.30% 
สะพานสูง (Saphan Sung)  23,928 52.92% 15,599 34.50% 
สัมพนัธวงศ ์(Samphanthawong) 9,346 65.11% 2,752 19.17% 
สาทร (Sathon)  24,600 60.08% 10,488 25.61% 
สายไหม (Sai Mai)  30,424 34.62% 45,767 52.08% 
หนองแขม (Nong Khaem)  29,232 40.34% 33,129 45.71% 
หนองจอก (Nong Chok)  29,912 42.14% 32,168 45.32% 
หลกัส่ี (Lak Si)  23,981 42.70% 24,518 43.65% 
หว้ยขวาง (Huai Khwang)  18,616 48.15% 14,906 38.55% 
 
Source: Thai PBS (2013) เลือกตัง้ผู้ ว่าฯมหานคร 2556 ผลเลือกตัง้ [BKK Election 2013: Election Result][online]. Available at: 
http://event.thaipbs.or.th/BKKElection/result.php?t=4#menu  [Accessed on 29 February 2016]. 
(Transliterate of districts name cited from WIKIPEDIA: The Free Encyclopedia (2015) List of districts of Bangkok [online]. 
Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_districts_of_Bangkok [Accessed on 29 February 2016]. 
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Appendix 2: Image of ‘Vote No’ Campaign in Thailand 2011 General 
Election  
 
Source: FACTorial: If voting could change anything it would be illegal. No choice in Thailand. (2011). Retrieved March 27, 
2016, from https://facthai.wordpress.com/2011/06/21/factorial-if-voting-could-change-anything-it-would-be-illegal-no-choice-in-
thailand/  
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Appendix 3: Grabe and Bucy’s coding scheme for candidate’s visual 
image  
The Ideal Candidate The ideal candidate frame was measured as visual manifestations of 
statesmanship and compassion, suing the following categories:  
Statesmanship  
 Appearances with elected officials or influential – people with power, status, and/or money – on 
the national or local level. Examples include prominent members of the business community, 
former presidents, and other well-known politicians but excludes military dignitaries.  
 Visual linkages to patriotic symbols, including monuments, memorials, statues, the American flag, 
painting and photos of patriots military machinery, and living “heroes” such as Colin Powell or 
Norman Schwarzkopf.  
 Visual linkages to symbols of progress and prosperity, such as Wall Street banks, NASA flight 
centres, or high technology manufacturing plants.  
 Portrayal of an entourage, including security attachments, aides, reporters, motorcades, a 
campaign caravan, or police vehicles.  
 Campaign paraphernalia such as posters, banners, buttons, signs, and other political adornments 
or clothing.  
 Political hoopla, including raining confetti, streamers, balloon and related props.  
 Formal attire, namely a dress suit in its full range from tuxedo and black tie to a conventional 
business suit  
Compassion  
 Visual linkages to children, especially interactions with young children and the holding, kissing 
or touching of babies.  
 Visual linkages to family symbols, either through direct appearances with family members or 
indirectly via photographic references.  
 Visual linkages to admiring women, including expression of awe, wonder, excitement, and 
approval through cheering and waving.  
 Visual linkages to religious symbolism, including places of worship, religious figures, or symbols 
such as crosses, candles, or religious scriptures.  
Three behavioral display categories were used to measure compassion, as follows:  
 Affinity gestures without physical contact, including waving, thumbs up, fanning the crow, 
George W. Bush’s three-finger “W” sign, a “V” for victory or peace, informal salutes, winks to 
the audience or camera, and tipping or waving a hat.  
 Individual interactions with supporters not involving physical contacts, in other words, engaging 
and giving individual attention to people but not embracing them.  
 Individual interactions with adult supporters involving physical contact, including hugging, 
embracing, shaking hands, and kissing.  
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The Populist Campaigner.  The candidate’s visual association with the plight of common people was 
coded in terms of mass appeal and ordinariness. In all, nine categories were used.  
Mass Appeal  
 Visual linkages with celebrities including movie stars, athletes, television personalities, and other 
well-known cultural figures.  
 Visual linkages with large audiences, including images of supporters tightly packed into an event 
space, the candidate appearing amidst a sea of admiring faces, or portrayals of mass attendance of 
rallies.  
 Visual linkages to approving audiences, expressed by applauding, waving, cheering, whistling, 
laughing, nodding approvingly, or toting/displaying campaign paraphernalia.  
 Portrayals of interactions with crowds, including rope-line greetings, handshakes, grips, or 
touches without individualized attention or paused engagement with anyone in particular.  
Ordinariness  
 Portrayals of candidates in informal attire, including a shirt and tie without a jacket, or the 
candidate’s shirtsleeves rolled up.  
 Portrayals of candidates in casual dress, including khaki pants, slacks, jeans with long or short-
sleeve shirt or sport coat, sweater, or wind-breaker.  
 Portrayals of candidates in athletic clothing, including shorts, jogging gear, skiwear, golf slacks 
and shirt, a wetsuit, or other athletic attire.  
 Visual linkages with ordinary people, such as visits to working-class communities or 
manufacturing plants.  
 Portrayals of physical exertion, including athletic activities or physical work: chopping wood, 
serving meals at a homeless shelter, hunting, and so on. Expensive sports such as yachting, golf, 
and windsurfing were excluded because they suggest more elitist pastimes.  
The Sure Loser   This frame was measured with the following categories:  
 Visual linkages to small audiences where few people are scattered around at campaign events, 
spaces are sparsely filled, and empty chairs are shown.  
 Visual linkages to disapproving audiences, including instances of obvious jeering, booing, 
disapproving gestures such as thumbs down, posters with disapproving comments, protesting, 
frowning, or nodding off.  
 Visual depictions of weakness, including illness, clumsiness (tripping, falling, stumbling), or 
displaying lack of coordination.  
 Portrayals of defiant nonverbal gestures, including finger pointing or shaking, raising a fist in 
defiance, pounding on a podium, or similar displays.  
 Visual depictions of inappropriate displays, including facial expressions and gestures that are 
incongruent with the associated news context  
(Grabe and Bucy, 2013, pp.223-225) 
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Appendix 4: Song lyric of Nakleng Keyboard [เน้ือเพลง นักเลงคย์ีบอร์ด]  
นกัเลงคียบ์อร์ด ต่อหนา้ไม่กลา้บอก 
In front of you I cannot say the truth  
  
แต่ถา้มีคียบ์อร์ด จะกลา้พิมพอ์อกไป 
But if I have my KEYBOARD I can type what is true  
 
นกัเลงคนหน่ึง ผูซ้ึ้งเป็นกบัเขา ซะเม่ือไร 
A gangster like me, how could I make you fall my sweety  
 
พูดความรู้สึก พูดความในใจ ตอ้งใชแ้ป้นพิมพ ์
To tell how I feel I’m using a keyboard a keyboard gangster  
 
 
จะพูดค  าว่ารักคุณ ตอ้งต่อดว้ยหนา้ยิม้ 
I’m gonna tell you what I love you, follow with my smiley face. 
 
จะพูดค  าว่าคิดถึงคุณ ตอ้งใชป้ลายน้ิวจ้ิม 
I’m gonna say that I miss you, typing is my fate  
 
 
คุยไดไ้หม ท าอะไรอยูค่รับ เม่ือเยน็รับประทานอะไรท่ีไหน 
Can we talk? What will you do? Haven’t you eat dinner? Just like I do 
 
หนงัเร่ืองนั้นสนุกนะ เพ่ิงดูจบไป 
The movie that you watched, is it fun too? 
 
เขา้นอนแลว้ ฝันดีนะ พรุ่งน้ีละคะ ตอ้งรีบตอ้งต่ืนแค่ไหน 
You gonna to sleep? So goodnight and when you wake up, you will be alright 
 
พิมพเ์กง่จริง เรียกว่าน้ิวมือมนัตรงกบัหวัใจ 
I’m good at typing cuz my finger tell what’s in my mind  
 
นกัเลงคียบ์อร์ด ต่อหนา้ไม่กลา้บอก 
In front of you, I can’t say the truth   
 
พอไม่มีคียบ์อร์ด น ้าตาแทบไหล 
Without my tool, I cry like I do  
 
แค่เพียงไดเ้ห็นหนา้คุณ ท่ีเป้ือนรอยยิม้ 
Just I see your face that’s full of smile  
 
แค่นั้นผมกเ็สียสมดุล เหมือนโดนเขม็ท่ิม 
 I’m losing my balance like I’m gonna die  
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เจอกนัอีกแลว้ บงัเอิญจริงๆ นะ 
Oh we meet again, is it destiny? 
 
พูดไม่เป็น เหมือนเป็นเช่นคนละคนกบัท่ีพิมพเ์อาไว ้
Unable to say anything, just like the other me. 
 
ผมตอ้งไปแลว้ ไปกอ่นนะ 
I got to go, I need to go. 
 
โกหกท าไมวะ จริงๆ ไม่ตอ้งไปไหน 
Why am I lying, I just don’t wanna show.  
 
เธอไปแลว้ ไดแ้ต่โกรธแคน้ตวัเองในหวัใจ 
And then you go, I can just be angry with myself.  
 
นกัเลงคียบ์อร์ด (นกัเลงคียบ์อร์ด) 
In front of you (in front of you) 
 
ต่อหนา้ไม่กลา้บอก (ต่อหนา้ไม่กลา้บอก) 
I cannot say the truth (I cannot say the truth) 
 
แต่ถา้มีคียบ์อร์ด จะกลา้พิมพอ์อกไป 
Without my tool I can’t type what is true  
 
ตอ้งมีวนัหน่ึง (ตอ้งมีวนัหน่ึง) ชีวิตจริงไปถึงเส้นชัย 
There’ll be one day, I’ll be reaching the goal someday  
 
พูดความรู้สึก พูดความในใจ ไม่ตอ้งใชแ้ป้นพิมพ ์
To tell how I feel everything in my mind, can you wait for me?  
 
ไม่ตอ้งใชน้ิ้วจ้ิม คุณรอกอ่นไดไ้หม 
Can you wait for me? Can you wait for me? 
 
Source:  
Thai lyrics: Siam M Zone.com (2014) เน้ือเพลง นกัเลงคียบ์อร์ด - แสตมป์ อภิวชัร์ เอื้อถาวรสุข [online]. Available at http://sz4m.com/t10050 
[Accessed 12 August 2015] 
English translation of lyrics transcribed from NowBreakfast (2013) นกัเลงคีย์บอร์ด แสตมป์ อภิวฒัน์ ( English cover) กอบัว น้าหนวด [Nekleng 
keyboard Stamp Apiwat (English cover) Kobua Nanuat][video online]Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flLFkHtFOLg [Access 12 August 2015] 
242 
 
Appendix 5: Coding scheme for pilot study 
Type of post  
1 Policy-related  
2 Non-policy related 
3 Others 
   
Type of policy  
1 Recycling  
2 Deforestation 
3 Pollution  
4 Nature disaster management  
5 Welfare 
6 Unemployment 
7 Poverty  
8 Privatisation 
9 Globalisation 
10 Inflation  
11 Infrastructure 
12 Housing  
13 Education  
14 Food 
15 Drinking water 
16 Healthcare 
17 Religion 
18 Others 
   
Content of post  
1 Introducing policy  
2 Relating problems in Bangkok to Bangkokians  
3 Predicting time needed to implement policy and solve problem  
4 Content relating to candidate's background and work experience 
5 Introducing candidate's style of leadership  
6 Providing public relation information relating to election campaign  
7 Persuading voters to vote for the candidate  
8 Forwarded links from other social networking sites  
9 Forwarded links from other mainstream media  
10 Persuading voters to vote in election  
11 Relating to political issue, political party or being independent  
12 Encourage interaction on candidate's page  
13 Showing concern for the future of Bangkok 
14 Giving hope on the future of Bangkok  
15 Others 
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Appendix 6: Coding scheme for actual study 
Keyword used to search policy-related textual content: M.R. Sukhumbhand election campaign 
brochure  
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Pongsapat election campaign brochure 
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Policy keywords extracted from M.R. Sukhumbhand and Pongsapat brouchure  
Security  
 
      Water 
Management  
 
Transportation/Infrastr
ucture 
Thai  
English 
translation  
 
Thai  
English 
translation  
 
Thai  
English 
translation  
CCTV CCTV 
 
อุโมงค์
ยกัษ ์ Giant tunnel 
 
Monorail Monorail 
ติดตั้งไฟ Install light 
 
จดัการน ้า Manage water 
 
Light Rail  Light Rail 
สว่าง Bright 
 
ท่วม Swamp 
 
BTS BTS (Skytrain)  
ดบัเพลิง 
Fire 
extinguish 
 
เอ่อ To rise (water)  
 
แทก็ซ่ี 
(Taxi)  Taxi 
อาคารสูง Tall building 
 
ขงั Flooding  
 
เรือ Boat  
แผ่นดินไหว Earthquake  
 
เตือนภยั 
Alert/give 
warning 
 
ค่าโดยสาร Passenger fare 
อุทกภยั Flooding 
 
ระบายน ้า Drain water 
 
จุดตดั Intersection 
ความ
เสียหาย Damage  
    
จุดจร Rove points 
อาชญากรรม Crime 
    
ถนน Road 
อคัคีภยั 
Conflagratio
n 
    
จกัรยาน Bicycle 
ระวงั 
Careful/watc
h out 
    
จอด Park 
ปลอดภยั Safe/secure 
    
จราจร Traffic 
ยาเสพติด Drugs 
    
ขนส่ง Transport 
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Health Care 
 
Environment 
 
Education 
Thai  
English 
translation  
 
Thai  
English 
translation  
 
Thai  
English 
translation  
ป่วย Sick 
 
สีเขียว Green colour 
 
นกัเรียน  Student 
ร่างกาย Body 
 
สวนสาธารณะ Public park 
 
ภาษา Language 
สูงอาย ุ Elderly 
 
ส่ิงแวดลอ้ม Environment 
 
โรงเรียน School 
สุขภาพ Health 
 
ขยะ Garbage 
 
วินยั Manner 
สาธารณสุข Public health 
 
สะอาด Clean 
 
วิชา Subject  
กีฬา Sports 
 
บ าบดัน ้า Water treatment 
 
หอ้งสมุด Library 
ความสุข Happiness 
 
สายไฟฟ้า Electric cable 
 
หนงัสือ Books 
   
สายโทรศพัท ์ Telephone cable  
 
เยาวชน Juvenile 
   
หอ้งน ้า Toilet 
 
การอ่าน Reading 
   
ทางเลียบ Along the edge 
 
การศึกษา Education 
   
Green 
City Green City  
 
ดูแลเดก็ 
Look after 
children 
   
มลพิษ Pollution 
 
วยัเรียน Studying age  
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ASEAN 
 
Economy 
Thai  
English 
translation  
 
Thai  English translation  
ท่องเที่ยว Travel (tourism)  
 
โรงรับจ าน า Pawn shops 
วฒันธรรม Culture 
 
สินคา้ Product 
อาเซียน 
ASEAN (Association 
of Southeast Asian 
Nations 
 
ราคา Price 
SME 
Small and Medium 
Enterprise 
 
หน้ีนอกระบบ Unofficial debt 
ป้ายบอกทาง Road signs 
 
รายจ่าย Spending 
   
รายได ้ Income 
   
เศรษฐกิจ Economy 
   
ฟรี Free 
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Appendix 7: Research information 
 
 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
School of Modern Languages and Cultures 
The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus 
    Jalan Broga 
43500 Semenyih 
Selangor Darul Ehsan 
RE: Interview Research Information on the Use of Social Media for Election 
Campaign in Thailand  
Dear Khun …  
My name is Mukda Pratheepwatanawong and I am pursuing a PhD at The University of 
Nottingham. My PhD research is exploring into the use of social media for political 
communication in Thailand.  
As a result, I would like to ask for an opportunity to interview you and the people who are in 
charge of managing your social media page.  
The interview will last about 30-45 minutes and it can be conducted anonymously. The 
information provided by you will only be used for the current PhD research.  
It will mean a lot to my research if I can have an opportunity to interview you and your social 
media staff.  
If you are interested to take part in the study or would like more information about the research, 
please do not hesitate to contact me on (researcher’s telephone number or email address).  
Yours sincerely,  
Mukda Pratheepwatanawong 
PhD Candidate  
School of Modern Languages and Cultures 
University of Nottingham, Malaysia campus 
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Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
School of Modern Languages and Cultures 
The University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus 
 Jalan Broga 
43500 Semenyih 
Selangor Darul Ehsan 
ขอสมัภาษณ์ท่านเก่ีวยกบัการใช้สื่อสงัคมออนไลน์ในการหาเสียงเลือกตัง้  
เรียนท่าน …  
ดิฉนั นางสาวมกุดา ประทีปวฒันะวงศ์ นกัศกึษาปริญญาเอก มหาวิทยาลยั นอตติงแฮม (University of   
Nottingham) และก าลงัท าวิทยานิพนธ์ในหวัข้อ "การสือ่สารการเมืองไทยบนสือ่สงัคมออนไลน์                                                                
(social media)’’ โดยมีจดุประสงค์ท่ีจะค้นคว้าและวิจยัถึงการใช้สื่อสงัคมออนไลน์วา่มีผลอย่างไรกบัการหา
เสียงเลือกตัง้ ในปัจจบุนั 
ด้วยเหตนีุ ้ดิฉนัจึงมีความประสงค์ท่ีจะขอโอกาสสมัภาษณ์ท่าน ซึ่งจะใช้เวลาในการสมัภาษณ์ประมาณ 30-45 
นาที โดยผู้ให้สมัภาษณ์ไมจ่ าเป็นต้องออกนาม และข้อมลูทัง้หมดจะน ามาใช้ในวิทยานิพนธ์ชิน้นีเ้ท่านัน้  
การช่วยเหลือของท่านในครัง้นีถื้อเป็นแรงสนบัสนนุส าคญัของการท างานวิจยัปริญญาเอก  หากท่านมีความ
สนใจท่ีจะให้สมัภาษณ์ หรืออยากได้ข้อมลูเพ่ิมเติมเก่ียวกบัการสมัภาษณ์โปรดติดตอ่มาท่ี (หมายเลขโทรศพัท์
หรืออีเมล์ของผู้ วิจยั) 
ด้วยความเคารพและนบัถือ 
มกุดา ประทีปวฒันะวงศ ์
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Appendix 8: Interview questions  
Part 1: Basic Information on Social Media Usage  
 ขอ้มูลทัว่ไปในการใชส่ื้อสังคมออนไลน์ 
1.1. When did you start using social media as part of election campaign?  
คณุเร่ิมใชส่ื้อสังคมออนไลน์ในการลงแข่งขนัเลือกตั้งผูว้่าในคร้ังน้ีตั้งแต่เม่ือไหร่  
1.2. What form of social media do you use?  
คณุเลือกที่จะใชส่ื้อสังคมออนไลน์ใดบา้ง  
1.3. Please rank the frequency of usage. Why?  
กรุณาช่วยใหร้ะดบัความถี่ในการใชส่ื้ออนไลน์ต่างๆและเหตุผล  
1.4.  Please rank the importance of usage. Why?  
กรุณาช่วยใหร้ะดบัความส าคญัในการใชส่ื้ออนไลน์ต่างๆและเหตุผล 
1.5. How important was social media to you during the2013 Bangkok Governor Election campaign?  
คุณคิดว่าส่ือสังคมอนไลน์ส าคญัแค่ไหนในการลงแข่งขนัเลือกตั้งผูว้่า 
 
Part 2: Establishing Candidate’s Image  
2.1.  What type of image did you intend to establish during the 2013 Bangkok Governor Election 
campaign?  
คุณตอ้งการที่จะมีภาพลกัษณ์แบบใดต่อสาธารณะชนในการลงแข่งขนัเลือกตั้งผูว้่ากรุงเทพมหานคร 2556  
2.2.  How do you think your choice of image establishment and your intention to solve Bangkok 
problems will make voters wants to elect you?  
คุณคิดว่าการเลือกที่จะมีภาพลกัษณ์ของคุณพร้อมกบัการแกปั้ญหากรุงเทพจะท าใหค้นกรุงเทพตดัสินใจในการเลือก
คุณอยา่งไร 
What was your intention of establishing such image on social media during the election?  
เหตุผลในการมีภาพลกัษณ์เช่นนั้น คุณตั้งใจท่ีจะใหป้ระชาชนเบนส่ือสังคมออนไลน์เขา้ใจเกี่ยวกบัตวัคุณว่าอยา่งไร  
2.3.  How did you intend to portray such image on social media? What did you post? What did you  
do?  
คุณมีวิธีถ่ายทอดภาพลกัษณ์อยา่งไรบนส่ือสังคมออนไลน์ คุณโพสตอ์ะไรบา้ง และคุณท าอะไรบา้ง 
2.4.  How do you see social media benefiting you to convey such image to the public?  
      คุณคิดว่าส่ือสังคมอนไลน์มีประโยชน์ต่อตวัคุณอยา่งไรในการมีภาพลกัษณ์ต่อสาธารณะชน  
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Part 3: Strategies of Communication:  
3.1.  Do you have any strategy of communication that you follow to communicate and establish your 
image on social media?  
คุณมีกลยทุธ์ในการส่ือสารเพื่อมีภาพลกัษณ์ในส่ือสังคมออนไลน์หรือไม่  
 
Part 4: Public Relation Personnel  
4.1.   Do you have anyone helping you to manage your social media page?  
คุณมีผูช่้วยในการใชส่ื้อสังคมออนไลน์ต่างๆหรือไม่  
What is your relationship with your social media team?  
ความสัมพนัธ์ต่อทีมงานที่ดูส่ือสังคมออนไลน์ของคุณ 
4.2.  What are the routine jobs that are done between you and your social media team?  
อะไรคืองานประจ าของทั้งคณุและทีมงานที่ดูส่ือสังคมออนไลน์ 
4.3.  What obstacles/threats/challenges do you face in establishing their image on social media 
during election campaign?  
คุณเจออุปสรรคหรือความทา้ทายอะไรบา้งในแต่ละวนัในการสร้างภาพลกัษณ์บนส่ือสังคมออนไลน์  
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Appendix 9: Research ethics forms/Participant consent form 
ใบอนุญาตการให้สัมภาษณ์/Participant Consent Form 
ผู้วิจยั / Researcher’s name: มกุดา ประทีปวฒันะวงศ์ /  Mukda Pratheepwatanawong  
 ฉนัได้รับทราบรายละเอียดและจดุประสงค์ของงานวิจยันี ้ และยอมรับท่ีจะมีสว่นร่วมในการให้ข้อมลูเพ่ือ
งานวิจยันี ้ /The research project and research objective were explained to me. I 
understand and agree to take part. 
   ฉนัเข้าใจวา่ฉนัสามารถท่ีจะไมต่อบบางค าถามในการสมัภาษณ์ครัง้นี ้/ I understand that I can choose 
not to answer any questions during the interview. 
       ฉนัเข้าใจวา่ฉนัสามารถยกเลกิการให้ข้อมลูเพ่ือการวิจยัในครัง้นีเ้มื่อใดก็ได้ถ้าฉนัต้องการ และจะไมม่ีการ
ลงโทษในตอนนีห้รือในอนาคตถ้าหากวา่ฉนัยกเลิกการให้ข้อมลู / I understand that I can leave the 
research project at any moment. I also understand that there is no penalty, now or in the 
future, if I stop participating. 
       ฉนัเข้าใจวา่ข้อมลูท่ีได้จากการศกึษานีจ้ะถกูตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่ตอ่ไป แตจ่ะไมม่ีการระบช่ืุอของฉนัและผู้ วิจยัจะ
ไมใ่ช่ช่ือและข้อมลูสว่นตวัของฉนัในการตีพิมพ์ / I understand that information from the study 
can be published, but I will not be identified and the researcher will not use my name or 
personal information in the publication. 
       ฉนัเข้าใจวา่มหาวิทยาลยัจะเป็นผู้รักษาข้อมลูดงักลา่วไว้ / I understand that the university will keep 
the information. 
       ฉนัเข้าใจวา่ฉนัสามารถสอบถามผู้ วิจยัเพ่ือขอข้อมลูเพ่ิมเติมเก่ียวกบัการวิจยั และแสดงความคิดเห็นของฉนั
ตอ่ผู้ วิจยัได้โดยตรง โดยสามารถติดตอ่ได้ท่ี: The School Ethics Officer at the School of Modern 
Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Nottingham 
Malaysia Campus.  /  
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I understand that I can ask for more information about the research and can make a 
complaint if I want. If I want more information, I should contact the researcher. I can also 
make a complaint about my part in the research. If I want to make a complaint, I should 
contact the School Ethics Officer at the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus.   
ลายมือชื่อ /Signature:     ลายมือผู้วิจยั / Signature of Researcher: 
ชื่อ /Name:      วันที่ /Date:  
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